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Enhancing Patent Damages
Dmitry Karshtedt*
Many policymakers, judges, and scholars justify patent law on
economic-utilitarian grounds. It is therefore unsettling that when it comes
to damages for patent infringement in excess of the compensatory baseline,
courts have followed an approach that reflects primarily moral, rather
than economic, considerations. In order to obtain enhanced damages, the
prevailing plaintiff must show — among other things — that the
defendant actually knew of the existence of the patent-in-suit. This
subjective standard stems from pre-industrial tort actions designed to
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punish egregious interpersonal behaviors such as assault, piracy, libel,
and seduction, and to preserve the public order. But as the law developed
to cover “depersonalized” torts committed by corporate defendants and
expanded from its moral foundations to embrace economic reasoning to a
greater degree than before, the range of cases in which punitive damages
could be awarded broadened significantly. Specifically, courts relaxed the
culpability standard by making it less subjective, allowing punitive
damages for generalized reckless disregard for the rights of others. The
recklessness framework is now dominant in the fields of negligence and
products liability, which typically allow for punitive damages without
actual knowledge of a specific victim or defect, and in other civil actions
— including copyright and trademark infringement. Patent law, however,
continues to be an outlier by requiring actual, subjective knowledge of the
plaintiff’s patent and, in so doing, in effect clings to the old moralopprobrium model of punitive damages.
Not surprisingly, this standard has led to anomalous results. For one
thing, the actual-knowledge approach to enhanced damages discourages
firms from searching for and reading relevant patents, an unfortunate
result given the widely recognized notion that disclosure is a core function
of the patent system. Indeed, this rule errantly treats potential infringers
who make good-faith attempts to ascertain the nature of the patent
landscape in the fields in which they operate worse than those that decide
to bury their heads in the sand and do no patent searching whatsoever. But
there is a prospect for improvement in the law. A recent Supreme Court
decision, Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, arguably pushed a reset
button on the jurisprudence of enhanced damages in patent cases.
Although it accepted the pre-industrial, subjective conception of punitive
damages in its discussion of “deliberate” and “wanton” infringements, the
Court also pointed to the modern trend when it referred to recklessness as
an acceptable standard of culpability for enhanced patent damages.
I argue that, in failing to embrace Halo’s endorsement of recklessness,
the lower courts are making a mistake. I contend that installing
recklessness toward patent rights of others as the threshold level of
culpability for enhanced damages is consistent with the modern conception
of punitive damages in tort — which, at least to some degree, reflects a
shift away from the moral grounding of this remedy and toward economic
analysis. Accordingly, I propose a recalibration of the willfulness doctrine
to include reckless failures to search for patents as a route to making
infringers eligible for enhanced damages. If applied properly, the new
standard would mitigate the current doctrine’s perverse effect of
discouraging reading of patents, promote cost-effective patent searches,
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and take account of significant differences in patent landscapes between
various industries.
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INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act, like many other statutes setting forth civil causes of
action,1 allows prevailing plaintiffs to obtain retrospective relief in the
form of monetary damages.2 As in other areas of law, damages for past
tortious acts can come in two forms — compensatory damages and
additional damages that might generically be described as “supracompensatory” or “enhanced.”3 In recent years, rules for determining
compensatory damages in patent cases have been the focus of many
important court decisions4 and scholarly work.5 Although controversy
1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (2018) (authorizing awards of compensatory and
punitive damages for intercepting communications); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2018)
(authorizing awards of compensatory and punitive damages for employment
discrimination).
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . .”).
3 Id. (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.”); see G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts
About Multiple Damages, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 106-11 & nn.47–51 (1997)
(discussing “accumulative,” “enhanced,” and “punitive” damages); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 486, 486 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2012)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages] (“Punitive damages have
been a part of the civil law landscape in the United States since the nineteenth
century, but the past two decades have witnessed a firestorm of renewed interest and
debate over this supra-compensatory remedy, whose goals are to punish and to deter
wrongful behavior.”).
4 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1283-90 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295,
1301-07 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225-35
(Fed. Cir. 2014); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2014); WhitServe, LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 26-27 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868-73 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Jonas
Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 961, 1000-02 (2014) (discussing some of these decisions).
5 See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why Nominal
Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement, 39 VT.
L. REV. 867 (2015); Bernard Chao, Lost Profits in a Multicomponent World, 59 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3016814; Tun-Jen Chiang, The
Information-Forcing Dilemma in Damages Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81 (2017);
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627 (2010); Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for
Indirect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 911 (2014) [hereinafter Karshtedt,
Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement]; William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed,
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385 (2016); Oskar
Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L.
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over proper legal frameworks for damages to compensate for patent
infringement continues,6 there is at least a consensus with respect to
the notion that such damages should reflect economic considerations,
however they are to be translated into the actual rules that courts
should use.7 The proposition that careful calibration of damages is
important for the fulfillment of the patent system’s purpose of
optimizing innovation incentives is difficult to contest,8 and thanks to
the attention that compensatory damages in patent law have received
of late, courts have been making progress toward achieving the goal of
economically rational awards.9 There is more work to be done,
perhaps much more,10 but the problem of compensatory damages for
patent infringement has undoubtedly benefited from recent
engagement of courts and scholars.
Supra-compensatory damages in patent law present a very different
picture. To begin, although the section of the Patent Act governing
damages, 35 U.S.C. § 284, at least states the function of compensatory
damages — unsurprisingly, they must be “adequate to compensate for
the infringement”11 — that section says nothing about the purpose of
enhanced damages or the standard for awarding them. The only
“guidance” given by Congress is that “the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed” beyond the
damages clearly denominated as compensatory.12 In an effort to give
content to the statutory authorization to award these so-called “treble

REV. 1031 (2015); Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, Patent
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2009); Michael
Risch, (Un)Reasonable Royalties, 98 B.U. L. REV. 187 (2018); David O. Taylor, Using
Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79 (2014).
6 See supra note 5. See generally Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private
Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014) (advancing a broad criticism of the Patent
Act’s remedial schemes).
7 Compare, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 6, at 554-60 (rejecting the tort-law
framework for compensatory damages in patent law), with, e.g., Robert D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (2001)
(arguing that tort rules are appropriate for patent damages).
8 See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 439-45.
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 809 F.3d at 1303-04;
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1313-17.
10 See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 5; Risch, supra note 5; see also Erik
Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 REV.
LITIG. 379, 414-15 (2017).
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
12 Id.
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damages,”13 courts have sometimes looked to private law, and
particularly to the common law of torts, to see how courts handle
enhanced damages in those cases.14 This instinct is understandable,
and seems sound as a matter of statutory interpretation.15 After all, the
various iterations of the Patent Act have been passed with little
indication that, when it comes to issues shared with other areas of law,
courts in patent cases are to develop rules that are unique and patentspecific.16 Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary — that
13 The term “treble” refers to the maximum allowable enhancement — total
damages up to treble the compensatory damages. Under appropriate circumstances,
trial courts can award less than treble damages. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. SMEC,
Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1074 (D.N.J. 1990) (“A fifty-percent enhancement of
damages is appropriate here. Although SMEC’s infringement was willful, it was not
blatant.”); see also infra Section III.D.
14 See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827-28 & n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Tenn. 1992)); see
also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (relying on the
Restatement of Torts and precedent that was in turn based on tort sources in
determining the proper level of culpability for enhanced damages); Hoechst Celanese
Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); infra Section I.A.
15 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1079, 1105, 1112 (2017) (observing that the common law routinely provides
unwritten “substantive rules” for interpreting federal legislation); Dmitry Karshtedt,
Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565, 586 (2017)
(discussing this mode of interpretation in the context of non-performer liability in
patent law) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement];
Adam J. MacLeod, Patent Infringement as Trespass, 69 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029708 (“[T]he original Patent Act
could just as plausibly have codified the common law of trespass for patent
infringement generally.”); Lynda J. Oswald, The “Strict Liability” of Direct Patent
Infringement, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 999-1005 (2017) (discussing the role of
trespass in interpreting various provisions of the Patent Act); Jason A. Rantanen, An
Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1592-96 (2011)
[hereinafter Rantanen, An Objective View] (discussing the influence of aiding and
abetting principles in tort law on indirect liability in patent law). For case law
examples applying this principle outside patent law, see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“When a statute covers an issue previously
governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress intended to retain the
substance of the common law.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (“start[ing] from the premise that when
Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law”); United
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“In order to abrogate a common-law
principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common
law.” (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))).
16 See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137
S. Ct. 954, 964 (2017) (holding that general laches rules apply to patent law and
explaining that “[p]atent law is governed by the same common-law principles,
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil
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Congress meant for background common-law principles to apply to
cognate patent law issues.17 Accordingly, courts in patent cases have
drawn on the law of torts to deal with problems ranging from mental
states for indirect infringement,18 to proximate cause limits on the
scope of the defendant’s liability,19 to — reasonably enough — the
but-for causation requirement for awarding compensatory damages.20
This move has not always enabled dispute-free resolutions of these
various aspects of patent infringement claims,21 but it has at least
given courts a starting point for interpreting the sometimes sparse
language of the Patent Act.
When it comes to treble damages, however, examination of other
areas of law has not yielded a clear answer even with respect to the
litigation” (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Hughes, J., dissenting))); Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837-40 (2015) (rejecting a patentspecific rule for the standard of review of trial judges’ fact findings underlying claim
construction); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744,
1748-49 (2014) (similar for the standard of review of trial judges’ exceptional case
determinations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849-51
(2014) (similar for allocation of burdens of proof in declaratory judgment actions);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129-30 (2007) (similar for
declaratory judgment standing); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
392-94 (2006) (similar for injunctions and equity practice). For a recent analysis of
this dynamic, see Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1413, 1425-31 (2016). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 28, 31-32 (2007).
17 See supra note 15; see also Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on H.R.
5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1946) (statement of Mr.
Conder C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents) (likening enhanced patent
damages to what “[s]ometimes in actions of tort . . . is called exemplary damages”).
18 See, e.g., Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).
19 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
20 See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1284-85
(Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (mem.).
21 See, e.g., Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1931-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d
at 1558-60, 1569-70 (Nies, J., dissenting); Mentor Graphics, 870 F.3d at 1300-01 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (denying the very
relevance of tort principles to an aspect of patent damages). But see id. at 1299 & n.1
(Stoll, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I . . . believe the panel decision
to be consistent with long-standing damages principles in property, tort and contract.
I do not agree with the dissent that there should be a special rule for damages in
patent cases which is at odds with mainstream damages principles.”). See generally
Karshtedt, Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement, supra note 5 (criticizing courts’
misapplication of tort principles in patent cases in the context of measuring damages
for indirect patent infringement).
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basic purpose of this remedy. In recent times, consensus has
developed that such damages should be reserved for “willful” patent
infringement,22 however defined. But over the long history of treble
damages in patent law, courts have variously mentioned
punishment,23 deterrence,24 and even adequate compensation25 as
potential justifications for these awards, and legal scholarship has sent
similarly conflicting messages over the years.26 Although it is certainly
possible for a remedy to have multiple purposes,27 at least some of the
pairings — like punishment and compensation — might be at odds.28
Moreover, deciding which of these multiple possible purposes of treble

22 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (stating
that enhanced damages in patent law “should generally be reserved for egregious cases
typified by willful misconduct”).
23 Id. at 1928-29 (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488-89
(1854)).
24 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The role
of a finding of ‘willfulness’ in the law of infringement is partly as a deterrent — an
economic deterrent to the tort of infringement — and partly as a basis for making
economically whole one who has been wronged . . . .”).
25 Id.; see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638
F.2d 661, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1981).
26 See Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement: A Normative
Approach, 36 REV. LITIG. 417, 435, 439-41 (2017) [hereinafter Hylton, Enhanced
Damages for Patent Infringement] (focusing on deterrence); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh
K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089
(2003) (focusing on punishment); Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent
Infringers, 72 HARV. L. REV. 328, 350-51 (1958) (focusing on compensation).
27 Indeed, the purposes of punishment and deterrence are often interrelated. See
generally Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982). In addition, compensatory rather
than punitive damages can also further the goals of deterrence. See generally Russell
M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016); Love,
supra note 5.
28 See Harvey McGregor, Compensation Versus Punishment in Damages Awards, 28
MOD. L. REV. 629, 629 (1965) (“That the object of an award of damages is to
compensate the plaintiff for his loss and not to punish the defendant for his
wrongdoing is a modern notion. In an earlier age the separation of compensation and
punishment was not so clear-cut, but as tort gradually became weaned away from
crime and as, much later, the idea of no liability without fault became undermined by
principles of strict liability, so the idea that damages might be based on punishment as
well as compensation waned.”); cf. Peter Lee, Distinguishing Damages Paid from
Compensation Received: A Thought Experiment, 26 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013793 (arguing that the amount the infringer pays
could be different from the amount the patentee receives in order to calibrate the
deterrence and innovation inducement functions of compensatory damages).
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damages is dominant would be helpful because that framing could
shape the standards for awarding them.29
But the fact that the common law has not supplied ready answers for
enhanced damages in patent law is, unfortunately, not a surprise. The
very idea of awarding more than make-whole damages in civil cases
has been controversial, and the theory of punitive damages — a
potential tort-law analog of patent treble damages that courts and
scholars have often looked to for content when dealing with this issue
in patent law30 — is widely debated and appears rather unsettled, as
evidenced by the prodigious amount of scholarship devoted to this
field.31 Nonetheless, as I argue in this Article, there is much useful
29 For example, compensatory damages can be readily awarded without proof of
fault on the part of the losing defendant, while punitive damages generally require
some form of fault. See, e.g., Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 516-17
(Okla. 1983); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1268-71 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Litigation].
30 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989); Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke
from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118
YALE L.J. 392, 395 (2008) [hereinafter Colby, Clearing the Smoke]; Thomas B. Colby,
Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual,
Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982); Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in
“Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989); Dorsey
D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1982); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards:
The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3 (1990); Mark F. Grady,
Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1197 (1989); David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Angela P. Harris, Rereading
Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079 (1989);
Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J.
421 (1998) [hereinafter Hylton, Economic Theory of Penalties]; Alexandra B. Klass,
Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83 (2007); Jill Wieber Lens,
Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of Punitive Damages, 101 KY. L.J.
789 (2013) [hereinafter Lens, Bad Man]; Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort
Law’s Influence in Defining the Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (2011); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); David G. Owen,
Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103 (1982) [hereinafter Owen,
Civil Punishment and the Public Good]; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, supra note 29; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1988); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L.
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004); Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
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guidance that courts deciding patent cases can still glean from a close
examination of the historical developments that brought forth the
modern law of punitive damages in tort.32 Indeed, tort law can help
courts develop a standard for awarding treble damages for patent
infringement that is more rational than the one currently in place.33
The need for clarity in this area has not diminished after the
Supreme Court handed down Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics,
Inc., a recent decision addressing treble damages in patent cases.34
Although it roundly rejected a rigid, multi-part test that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit imposed on plaintiffs wishing to obtain
enhanced damages,35 the Supreme Court seemingly equivocated with
respect to the approach that is to take the place of the discarded rule.
The Court did offer some guidance: after looking to several old
precedents, it focused on the punishment rationale of enhanced patent
damages. The Court explained that such awards are reserved for
“egregious cases typified by willful misconduct”36 and for infringer
conduct that is “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate,
consciously wrongful, flagrant, or — indeed — characteristic of a
pirate.”37 Nonetheless, the Court also held that such damages are
available for a “full range of culpable behavior”38 that, in addition to
the epithets quoted in the previous sentence, also encompasses the
elusive mental state called “recklessness.”39 What are we to make of
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992); Schwartz, supra note 27; Anthony J. Sebok,
Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007); Anthony J.
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive
Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, What
Did Punitive Damages Do?]; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra
note 3; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J.
347, 357 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages];
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005).
32 See infra Part II.
33 See infra Part III.
34 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
35 Id. at 1934. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over cases that arise
under the Patent Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018).
36 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34.
37 Id. at 1932.
38 Id. at 1933.
39 Id. at 1933. For representative work on recklessness in the law, see generally
FINDLAY STARK, CULPABLE CARELESSNESS: RECKLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2016); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001) (analyzing culpability in cases when the defendant was
unaware of reasons why the conduct at issue was dangerous); Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111 (2008) (discussing
modern courts’ continued struggles with recklessness); Kenneth W. Simons,
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this apparent divergence, and what does it mean for enhanced
damages in patent law going forward? In this Article, I draw on tort
underpinnings of the Halo opinion in search for an answer.
The answer that tort law points to, and which I will explore in this
Article, differs in significant respects from that given by the Federal
Circuit in the months following Halo. Specifically, the Federal Circuit
has adhered to its pre-Halo rule that a victorious patent plaintiff
cannot receive damages beyond the compensatory baseline unless it
can prove, at a minimum, that the defendant had actual knowledge of
the patent-in-suit.40 Apparently, nothing less will suffice — not even
so-called “willful blindness”41 or constructive knowledge42 that might
be imputed based on,43 for example, the fact that the infringer copied a
product marked with a notation that a patent application with claims
covering the product is on file,44 or even with an actual patent
number.45 The lower courts, to be sure, have followed Halo’s teachings
to the extent of allowing plaintiffs to prove up willful infringement by
showing that the defendant behaved recklessly or in bad faith based,
for example, on a failure to develop a theory of noninfringement or

Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Rethinking
Mental States] (providing a taxonomy of different kinds of recklessness).
40 See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
41 Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
42 See 58 AM. JUR. 2D NOTICE § 4 (2015) (explaining that “[a]ctual notice rests
upon personal information or knowledge while constructive notice is notice that the
law imputes to a person not having personal information or knowledge”).
43 A different issue implicating imputation arises when plaintiffs claim willful
infringement and courts must determine whether actual knowledge of a patent by a
low-level employee could be attributed to the corporate defendant. See generally
Robert O. Bolan & William C. Rooklidge, Imputing Knowledge to Determine Willful
Infringement, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 157 (1996). In this Article, though, I focus on whether
(and when) the corporate defendant can be charged with willful infringement when
the patent-in-suit was not actually known to any corporate employees (e.g., under
willful blindness or recklessness principles).
44 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
45 Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Christopher A. Harkins, A Budding Theory of Willful
Patent Infringement: Orange Books, Colored Pills, and Greener Verdicts, 6 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (challenging the Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge rule in a
specific regulatory context and maintaining that “[i]f precautions by a defendant are
intentionally deficient, then courts ought to adjust accountability, not to deny the
opportunity to prove willfulness altogether”); see also Michael J. McKeon, The Patent
Marking and Notice Statute: A Question of “Fact” or “Act”?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429,
436 (1996) (contrasting notice requirements for obtaining compensatory damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), which requires a plaintiff to mark a product with a patent
number, with those for obtaining enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284).
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invalidity after learning of the patent.46 But that analysis is done with
respect to specific patents whose existence the infringer actually knew
about — and the possibility of treble damages arises only for the time
period that the infringer possessed that knowledge.
Intuitively, this rule seems questionable. After all, just as one can be
reckless with respect to patents of which one is aware, one can also be
reckless in failing to learn about the existence of a particular patent in
the first place.47 More generally, the very idea of drawing a line at
actual knowledge is strange. As courts have recognized even in patent
cases dealing with the related issue of mental states for indirect
infringement, willful blindness is legally equivalent to actual
knowledge, and the basic concept of imputed or constructive
knowledge appears throughout the law.48 Based on general legal
principles, then, some forms of “ignorance”49 could be sufficiently
“egregious” within the meaning of Halo as to exhibit “willful
misconduct.”50
In this Article, I examine where actual knowledge of the patent as a
trigger for treble damages comes from, and probe whether it is
consistent with the goals of the patent system. I conclude that the
elevated status of this subjective mental state can be traced to the tort
law standard for punitive damages prevalent in the nineteenth century
and demonstrate that today, it is anachronistic.51 A study of the early
history of punitive damages in tort reveals a key goal of sanctioning,
and perhaps ensuring full compensation for unquantifiable (e.g.,
dignitary) injuries caused by,52 reprehensible interpersonal behaviors
46 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1362-63
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing “subjective willfulness” and “objective reasonableness” as
possible routes to proving up the level of scienter needed to recover enhanced
damages for infringement of a known patent), cert. granted on other grounds, 138 S. Ct.
734 (2018).
47 See Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 138-52
(2017) (discussing the concept of reckless ignorance).
48 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
49 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (citation
omitted).
50 Id. at 1934.
51 See infra Part II; cf. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1854)
(applying contemporary tort law principles to enhanced damages under the patent
damages section then in force).
52 See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 200. Professor Sebok
explained, though, that the harms that punitive damages could “compensate” for in the
nineteenth century are different from compensable emotional distress as it is conceived
of today. Id. at 204-05; cf. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306-07, 309-10 (1992)
(tracing the goals of punitive damages throughout the history of tort law).
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revealing the defendant’s extreme disregard for the rights of a specific
victim. Examples include actions for assault, defamation, seduction,
and other “insults,” with early tort law playing the criminal-law-like
functions of providing an avenue for retribution of the wronged victim
and preserving the public order.53 Given these goals, an enhanced
damages standard concentrated on the defendant’s subjective
culpability makes sense.54
While tort cases today still allow for punitive damages for
intentional or knowing misconduct directed toward individual
targets,55 they also — in line with the admittedly limited guidance in
Halo — award such damages for reckless indifference toward the
rights of others generally. A more objective “reason to know”-type
standard and its cognates have been added to the list of mental states
that can make a defendant eligible for punitive damages.56 Awareness
of a specific victim, or actual knowledge that harm will eventuate to
someone in particular, is no longer absolutely required to increase
damages from the compensatory baseline.57 Particularly in tort cases
with corporate defendants, such as those involving products liability,
punitive damages have been assessed for failures to discover hidden
effects and for other reckless omissions that expose people in the
world at large to probable injuries.58 In some cases, this calculus has
justified enhanced damages awards when the defendant did not
adequately test a product before putting it out on the market.59 In all,
the scope of punitive damages in tort has expanded from actual
knowledge and intent to imputed knowledge and recklessness, and
from victim specificity to non-specificity.60
These shifts can be difficult to explain and theorize in a definitive
manner, and extensive literature on punitive damages reflects great
53

See infra Section II.B.1.
See generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40
ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989).
55 See, e.g., Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1981) (allowing
punitive damages in an intentional tort case upon proof of some aggravation beyond
the elements of the tort itself); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 787-90 (Mo. 1989)
(similar).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
57 See infra Section II.B.2.
58 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1999) (“Beginning in
the late 1960s, American courts began to depart radically from the historical
‘intentional tort’ moorings of punitive damages.”).
59 See infra notes 405–06 and accompanying text.
60 See generally infra Part II.
54
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complexity of this area of law.61 But to some degree, the greater role of
somewhat more objective inquiries in punitive damages
determinations today, as opposed to the nineteenth century, must
reflect tort law’s increasing preoccupation with economic analysis over
time.62 Indeed, while the modern law of punitive damages is not in
line with economic models by a long shot,63 some scholars have
argued that the evolving standards for punitive damages have, in
recent times, at least shifted somewhat toward serving “the efficiencybased goal of economic deterrence.”64 In some products liability cases
in particular, courts have framed punitive damages inquiries in
explicitly economic terms, addressing cost-optimization and balancing
precautions against the risks and gravity of harm, and giving only
limited weight to the defendant’s subjective mental state.65 Courts’
changing treatment of punitive damages is in line with the observation
that “objective standards are endemic in tort law, and the cases
generally insist on their superiority to subjective standards.”66
In contrast, the older, narrower conception of punitive damages
focused mainly on intent and other subjective factors and reflected
primarily moral, rather than economic, considerations. Although
modern commentators have developed post-hoc economic
justifications for awarding punitive damages for intentional torts,67 it
remains difficult to resist the conclusion that liability based on
subjective culpability fits uneasily into economic models of law.68
61

See supra note 31.
See infra Section II.C.
63 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 31, at 873; see also Sergey Budylin, Punitive
Damages as a Social Harm Measure: Economic Analysis Continues, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 457, 458 (2006) (“[T]here seems to be no clear-cut economic way to either
define the notion of reprehensibility, or, most importantly, to calculate the optimal
amount of punitive damages.”).
64 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 450; see also
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 95-96 (2011) (explaining
how the “reprehensibility” criterion for constitutional limits on punitive damages
could serve an economic function); Jill Wieber Lens, An Undetectable Constitutional
Violation, 106 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14-15), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3006036 (similar).
65 See, e.g., Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518-20 (Okla. 1983).
66 Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311, 339 (1996).
67 See Hylton, Economic Theory of Penalties, supra note 31, at 456-58; William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 127, 127 (1981); see also Grady, supra note 31, at 1200; Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (1985).
68 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3
62
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Consistent with this intuition, statements from nineteenth-century
decisions allowing enhanced damages brimmed with moral
opprobrium for subjectively bad behaviors, and said nothing about
economic considerations.69
In view of this brief tort background, the weight given to the
subjective mental state of actual knowledge for enhanced damages in
patent infringement cases is difficult to countenance. Although there
are prominent dissenting voices,70 “[t]here is widespread agreement
that the reason we have a patent system is utilitarian,”71 and,
particularly, economic-utilitarian. This orientation of patent law
suggests that, in addition to sanctioning subjectively culpable
behaviors, courts in patent cases should — as in tort cases —
sometimes award enhanced damages for failings that reflect more
objective forms of blameworthiness, such as reckless failures to search
for relevant patents. But this intuition is not reflected in the Federal
Circuit’s standard for enhanced damages post-Halo. Patent law today
deviates from modern tort law by requiring actual, subjective
knowledge of the plaintiff’s patent72 and, in so doing, it in effect clings
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 49-53 (1983) (exposing flaws in the Landes-Posner theory
and criticizing their 1981 article for insufficiently accounting for modern
developments in the law of punitive damages). Of course, sanctions targeting conduct
accompanied by subjectively culpable mental states can play an economic role of
deterrence. But, as even Professor Landes and Judge Posner conceded, “‘Intent’ is not a
normal part of the economist’s vocabulary and does not appear to correspond to any
concept in economics.” Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 127. In addition, what
such sanctions would deter is conduct accompanied by culpable mental states. See also
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 39, at 510-11 (“Shavell is more willing
than Posner to accept that ‘intent to do harm may be associated with the absence of
social benefits, for . . . society often appears reluctant to value private benefits that are
based on the enjoyment of harm.’ But this concession only underscores a principal
problem with his economic approach: can we really define a ‘social harm,’ or specify
its magnitude, independently of the mental state associated with the harm? A murder
is a more blameworthy crime than a negligent homicide; it is not simply a killing that
is more difficult to deter, therefore requiring a higher sanction.” (quoting Steven
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1248 (1985))).
69 See, e.g., Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 475 (1864) (citing Foot v. Nichols, 28
Ill. 486, 488 (1862)); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 430-31 (1854).
70 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41 (2011)
(advocating an approach to intellectual property rooted in moral, labor-theory
foundations).
71 David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting Patentable Subject Material, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2009). See
generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005).
72 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
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to the old interpersonal-animus and moral-opprobrium models of
punitive damages. If anything, eligibility for treble damages in patent
law is determined based on the standard resembling one that courts
have today adopted for criminal, as opposed to civil, recklessness.73
In this Article, I argue that this is a problem for several reasons.
First, the actual-knowledge limit seems to be a failure of statutory
interpretation. Relying on Supreme Court cases that dealt with the
question of the proper mental state for punitive damages in other
contexts, I argue that it is unlikely that Congress intended for courts
today to look to the nineteenth-century standard for tort punitive
damages when figuring eligibility for treble damages in patent cases.74
It is significantly more probable that Congress would have expected
for courts to modify mental-state standards for treble damages along
with evolving tort standards, rather than keep them frozen in time. In
addition, the fact that total damages in patent cases are capped at a
maximum of treble the compensatory damages, rather than uncapped,
further points to the fact that civil recklessness, as opposed to more
culpable mental states like criminal recklessness and beyond, should
be the threshold of eligibility for such damages.75 Accordingly, I
maintain that the “generalized recklessness toward the rights of
others” standard for enhanced damages in patent cases reflects a better
interpretation of the Patent Act than the current one, which can be
characterized as “recklessness or intent with respect to infringement of
specific known patents.” The former is the standard that I propose and
develop in this Article.76 As I will show, this standard would result in a
recalibration of enhanced damages, allowing for such awards in some
cases in which they are not possible under the present approach, but
also rendering defendants ineligible for them under some
circumstances in which enhanced liability is allowed today.77
A second, closely related point is that acceptance of the modern tort
standard in patent law would heed the Supreme Court’s general
guidance that patent law is not to be an outlier that adopts rules that

73 See infra Section II.B.2. Other commentators have, likewise, criticized the
incoherency of focusing on morally-grounded criminal-style standards for corporate
acts constituting patent infringement, and questioned the very idea of subjective
culpability in this setting. See generally Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15;
Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
74 See infra Section II.A.
75 See infra Section I.B.2.
76 See infra Part III.
77 See infra Section III.C.
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are exceptional or disconnected from the larger legal system,78 and the
specific guidance that trial courts must be allowed to exercise
discretion in awarding enhanced damages.79 As to the former,
although at times the Federal Circuit appeared to look to non-patent
sources when it adopted a standard for treble damages that it called
“objective recklessness,”80 the Federal Circuit’s version did not
actually resemble what objective recklessness looks like in other areas
of law.81 As to the latter, the actual knowledge threshold looks like a
rigid rule of the sort that, as the Supreme Court told us in Halo, the
Federal Circuit should generally avoid.82 Under a more flexible
approach, courts can, for example, allow juries to base their willful
infringement decisions on the characteristics of the industry in which
the parties operate, whether the infringement is concealed or open,
and other factors that allow for awards of enhanced damages in
economically justifiable scenarios.83 This result would follow the
guidance Halo, which sought — consistent with other areas of law84 —
to increase the range of the trial courts’ discretion in awarding treble
damages.
Third, if one accepts the proposition — not uncontroversial, to be
sure — that punitive damages in tort today reflect economic analysis
to a greater extent than they did in the nineteenth century,85 then
perhaps policy reasons also support the conclusion that patent law
should give up exclusive reliance on the old tort standard and
incorporate the modern approach into doctrine. As noted above, the
moral opprobrium model of punitive damages is an uneasy fit for
patent law, so it is no surprise that reliance on that model has led to
results that are inconsistent with the utilitarian goals of the patent
system. For example, because it sometimes discourages firms from
searching for and reading relevant patents, the Federal Circuit’s actualknowledge framework is opposed to the patent law’s fundamental

78

See supra note 16.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-34 (2016).
80 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),
abrogated by Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923.
81 See infra Section II.B.
82 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934-35.
83 See infra Part III.
84 In particular, the Court made clear that the Seagate standard was an outlier in
allowing litigation-created defenses as an escape hatch from liability for enhanced
damages. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
85 See infra Section II.C.
79
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purpose of encouragement of dissemination and disclosure of
information.86
Worse yet, and in tension with notions of fundamental fairness, the
current rule can treat potential infringers who make good-faith
attempts to ascertain the nature of the patent landscape in the fields
where they operate — by, for example, looking for patents that they
may be infringing in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) database — less favorably than those that decide to bury their
heads in the sand and do no patent searching whatsoever.87 Because
the current rule effectively rewards firms for refusing to search for
patents, it can promote socially wasteful behaviors of holdout and
“contractual bypass,”88 which entail infringers’ avoidance of
negotiation with patentees, and in turn leads to undesirable reliance
on litigation. Of course, extensive patent searching would not be
socially efficient for all industries and in all contexts, which is yet
another reason for courts to take industry characteristics (and other
relevant factors) into account when deciding whether the infringer’s
non-search was reckless enough to justify eligibility for an award of
treble damages. Under my proposed standard, courts can do so.
The remainder of the Article proceeds in five parts. Part I traces the
development of enhanced damages standards in patent law and
pinpoints how the misguided actual knowledge rule was adopted. It
catalogues the problems with this rule and notes that, although Halo
carried the potential of resetting the jurisprudence of enhanced
damages, lower courts continue to adhere to the old approach. Part II
begins by situating the role of common-law principles in matters of
interpretation of federal statutes, and then discusses how tort law and
other areas of civil litigation deal with supra-compensatory damages
with an eye to what patent law can (and should) learn from them. In
particular, this Part describes the move toward objective standards of
culpability for enhanced damages throughout the law. Part III returns
to patent law, applying this learning and providing an approach for
implementing the recklessness standard for treble damages in patent
infringement cases. This Part shows that, if courts take industry
86 See infra Section I.E.1. But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35
NATURE BIOTECH. 421, 421 (2017) [hereinafter Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?]
(providing empirical evidence that few researchers in biotechnology and chemistry
fields are deterred from reading patents by the threat of legal liability).
87 See infra Section I.E.2.
88 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 17-18, 27; see also Michael Abramowicz, A
Unified Economic Theory of Noninfringement Opinions, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 241, 281-84
(2004).
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characteristics and other economic factors into account in setting the
standard for enhanced damages, willful infringement doctrine will
more effectively serve the patent law’s goal of promoting innovation
than under the current rule. Further, this Part supplies the procedural
mechanics of this Article’s proposal, clarifying the allocation of power
between judges and juries in the enhanced damages determination.
Part IV addresses several objections, including administrative costs of
the proposal, concerns about overdeterrence, and skepticism about
whether the harms of patent infringement justify enhanced damages
awards. The Article then concludes.
I.

ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW: HISTORY, DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT, AND PROBLEMS

Section 284, the damages section of the Patent Act, is exceedingly
simple. Among other things, it says that “upon finding for the
claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,”
and that “[i]n either event the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed.”89 The former provision
authorizes awards of compensatory damages and the latter, supracompensatory damages up to an amount equal to three times the
compensatory baseline. The statute is silent with respect to the
purpose of supra-compensatory damages — are they punitive, or do
they have another role? — and it does not say what showings, in
addition to those needed to recover compensatory damages, are
required.90 Therefore, the answers to these questions had to be worked
out by courts.91

89

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
Note that liability for direct patent infringement is a form of strict liability,
which means that the plaintiff is not required to provide any proof of the defendant’s
culpable mental state to recover compensatory damages. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on
other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); cf. Oswald, supra note 15, at 1013-14 (criticizing
this nomenclature).
91 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Taranto, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“Section 284 is close to
content free in what it expressly says about enhanced damages . . . .”).
90
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A. Halo’s Tort Underpinnings: Treble Damages as Punitive Damages
In some early iterations of the Patent Act, treble damages were
mandatory.92 The Patent Act of 1836 changed this rule, declaring that
“it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum
above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages
sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount
thereof, according to the circumstances of the case.”93 Whatever the
purpose of the enhanced damages provision of the Patent Act, its
language has not changed much since 1836. As explained by Matthew
Powers and Steven Carlson, “[s]ubsequent amendments to the patent
laws maintained the provision of the Patent Act of 1836 that trial
judges should have the discretion to increase a damages award by up
to three times the jury verdict.”94 There were other important changes
to the damages section of the Patent Act — for example, Congress in
1946 eliminated accounting as a potential measure of damages — but
the permissive language with respect to monetary enhancements
beyond compensatory damages remained throughout.95 Importantly,
one early version of the patent damages section stated that “the court
shall have the same power to increase such damages, in its discretion,
as is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in actions in the
nature of actions of trespass upon the case,”96 thus explicitly tying
patent suits to tort-type actions claiming money damages.97 Although
this specific language was removed in 1946, there is no evidence that
92 Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (stating that the
infringer “shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to
three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other
persons, the use of the said invention”); see also Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2
Stat. 37, 38; Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the
Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 66-68 (2001); Jon E.
Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages — Evolution and
Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 99-100 (2001). But see Patent Act of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793) (referring only to “such damages as shall
be assessed by a jury” without any mention of trebling).
93 Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123.
94 Powers & Carlson, supra note 92, at 66.
95 See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778.
96 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (codified at REV. STAT.
§ 4921, U.S. COMP. STAT. 1901, p. 3395); see also Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69
(1876).
97 See Oswald, supra note 15, at 1000-01 (describing the role of the writs of
trespass and trespass on the case in the development of modern tort law and noting
the connection between the trespass writs and patent infringement). Trespass on the
case is considered to be the precursor to the modern tort of negligence. See also Brown
v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 295 (1850).
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Congress sought to sever the connection between patent infringement
remedies and remedies for trespass.98
The very first Supreme Court case to interpret the permissiveenhancement amendment to the formerly mandatory treble damages
provision, Hogg v. Emerson, assumed that treble damages still
represented the baseline award, but noted that “a fair ground existed
for a mitigation below that amount, if the maker of the [infringing]
machine appeared in truth to be ignorant of the existence of the patent
right, and did not intend any infringement.”99 This language strongly
implies that the responsibility of showing that no enhanced damages
are due rests with the defendant, who could avoid treble damages by
demonstrating that the infringement was innocent or at least
unintentional. Although Hogg has never been explicitly overruled, the
judicial attitude has changed, and the burden is now on the patentee
to show entitlement to enhanced damages.100
Another key early case to address treble damages for patent
infringement, and one on which Halo relied to a significant degree,
was Seymour v. McCormick.101 The Court in Seymour opined that the
pre-1836 rule mandating the trebling of damages no matter what the
circumstances was “manifestly unjust,” for it subjected to the “same
penalty” both “the defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith”
and “the wanton and malicious pirate.”102 The Court then held that
“where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive
or exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish
the defendant.”103 Seymour cited no authority for this conclusion, but
the phrases the Court used are telling. The rhetoric reveals an

98 See Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on H.R. 5231, supra note 17, at
9 (statement of Mr. Conder C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents) (“[The bill]
provides that the court can increase the damages in its discretion in the same manner
as it is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in actions in the nature of
actions of trespass upon the case. This, though, is not a new provision since it is in the
present law.”).
99 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850) (emphasis added).
100 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016); cf.
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-inpart) (contending, but without citing Hogg, that the pre-Seagate approach to
willfulness at the Federal Circuit contravened Supreme Court precedent by essentially
shifting the burden to defendants who have learned of a patent to avoid liability for
treble damages).
101 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1854).
102 Id. at 488.
103 Id. at 489.
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unmistakable connection between treble damages in patent law and
punitive damages in tort.
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, for example, used similar
linguistic formulations in Linsley v. Bushnell,104 an action involving
trespass on the case. The court noted “that vindictive damages, or
smart money, may be, and is, awarded, by the verdicts of juries, in
cases of wanton or malicious injuries.”105 Such rhetoric, including a
reference to “smart money” and an explicit nod to the common law,
was also used by the United States Supreme Court itself just three
years before Seymour in Day v. Woodworth.106 In addition, describing
the principles the courts relied on in Day, Seymour, and Linsley in
somewhat more contemporary-sounding language, Theodore
Sedgwick situated enhanced damages in civil litigation in his leading
contemporary treatise on damages as follows:
[I]n all cases of civil injury, or breach of contract, with the
exception of those cases of trespasses or torts, accompanied by
oppression, fraud, malice, or negligence so gross as to raise the
presumption of malice, where the jury have a discretion to
award exemplary or vindictive damages; in all other cases the
declared object is to give compensation to the party injured,
for the actual loss sustained.107
Fast forward to 2016. As in the early cases, the Supreme Court in
Halo v. Pulse was faced with the question of standards for the exercise
of trial court discretion to enhance damages in patent cases, aiming to
set limits on that decision because, as the Court succinctly explained,
“discretion is not whim.”108 The Court in Halo trained its focus on the
nineteenth-century framework, relying heavily on Seymour and
adopting a decidedly tort-style punitive damages conception of
enhanced damages in patent law. Indeed, some of the language that
the Court chose to describe behaviors that qualify for treble damages
is not very different from that found in the sources from the 1840s and
1850s quoted earlier:

104

15 Conn. 225 (1842).
Id. at 236.
106 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
107 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR AN INQUIRY
INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION RECOVERED IN SUITS
AT LAW 27-28 (1847) (emphasis added).
108 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) (citations
and alterations omitted).
105
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Awards of enhanced damages . . . are . . . designed as a
“punitive” or “vindictive” sanction for egregious infringement
behavior. The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages
has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton,
malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful,
flagrant, or — indeed — characteristic of a pirate.109
This string of epithets links treble damages in patent cases to
punitive damages in tort, and seems to reflect nineteenth-century
emphasis on awarding such damages for conduct accompanied by
subjectively bad mental states.110 But there is more to the Halo
opinion. For example, the Court stated that “Section 284 allows
district courts to punish the full range of culpable behavior” and
“eschew[ed] any rigid formula for awarding enhanced damages under
§ 284.”111 Moreover, the Court noted that “‘willfully’ is a word of
many meanings whose construction is often dependent on the context
in which it appears.”112 Elaborating on the meaning of willfulness, the
Court mentioned the recklessness standard for awarding punitive
damages, quoting the Restatement of Torts formulation stating that “a
person is reckless if he acts ‘knowing or having reason to know of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to realize’ his actions are
unreasonably risky.”113 The Court, unfortunately, did not say much
more about recklessness.
Given the Court’s limited discussion of what it means to be reckless,
a detailed analysis of tort law sources and other non-patent precedents
is necessary to flesh out how the standard works. In spite of Halo’s
extensive reliance on Seymour, that early case alone cannot give us a
full understanding of Halo because “[r]ecklessness was not a word in
the common law’s standard lexicon, nor an idea in its conceptual
framework; only in the mid- to late-1800’s did courts begin to address
reckless behavior in those terms.”114 To build up a conception of
109

Id. at 1932.
See Michael Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, “Characteristic of a Pirate”: Willfulness and
Treble Damages (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2811773, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811773; see also Karen Sandrik, Punishing the Malicious Pirate in
Patent Law, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
54c31bf9e4b02f4c0b4203e6/t/5a45b7cc0852292beed21203/1514518488638/Sandrik_draft
.pdf (analyzing Halo’s focus on deliberate wrongdoing).
111 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 1933 n.* (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
113 Id. at 1933 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
114 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2281 (2016).
110
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recklessness relevant for interpreting Halo, I examine modern
developments in the law of enhanced damages in Part II, but the
remainder of Part I continues focusing on patent law so as to provide
additional context for that more general discussion of mental state
standards for awarding supra-compensatory damages in civil litigation.
In particular, sections I.C through I.E are intended to reveal the full
complexity of patent law’s treatment of treble damages over the years,
to explain the framework that the Supreme Court in Halo rejected and
the rule that the Court put in its place, and to sketch out and critique
the Federal Circuit’s approach to treble damages in Halo’s wake. In the
section that immediately follows, though, I examine some rationales
for treble damages that Halo apparently discarded, and take a short
detour into other areas of law to address the significance of the cap on
supra-compensatory damages in patent law.
B. Can Multiple Damages Have a Role Other than Punishment for
Egregious Infringement? A Look at Alternative Approaches and the Role of
the Cap
1.

Litigation-sanction and Quasi-remedial Roles of Multiple
Damages

Halo’s tenor is to treat treble damages in patent law as punishment
for the infringement. But history reveals some alternative conceptions.
For example, a significant line of precedent leading up to Halo
suggested that enhanced damages in patent cases can play the role of
sanctioning vexatious litigation conduct. In Day v. Woodworth, for
example, the Supreme Court noted that damages might be increased in
a patent case when the defendant “has been stubbornly litigious, or
has caused unnecessary expense and trouble to the plaintiff.”115 To a
similar effect was Clark v. Wooster, in which the Court opined that
“the expense and trouble the plaintiff has been put to by the
defendant, and any special inconvenience he has suffered from the
wrongful acts of the defendant” could be remedied “by the court
under the authority given to it to increase the damages.”116 The Halo
Court, however, rejected such conceptions of enhanced damages in
patent law. Specifically, it explained that monetary awards in
connection with the infringer’s bad-faith litigation conduct are now

115
116

54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851).
119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886).
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primarily the province of 35 U.S.C. § 285, the attorney’s fees section of
the Patent Act.117
The references to the plaintiff’s “expense and trouble” in Day and
Clark — and particularly in Clark, which actually does not mention
any sanctionable litigation behavior, but implies that “wrongful acts of
the defendant” are simply acts of infringement forcing the patentee to
litigate the case — also point to quasi-remedial functions of treble
damages. In other words, treble damages under this view could make
up for the patentee’s losses associated with having to pursue the case,
and perhaps to provide for additional consequential damages beyond
the amount of compensatory damages found by the jury.118 There is
plenty of precedent for such schemes in civil litigation. For example,
the Lanham Act provides for permissive treble damages for trademark
infringement that are explicitly non-punitive.119 But there is no need
to leave patent law, because courts have characterized patent treble
damages this way as well. In Stockwell v. United States, a customs case
decided in 1871, the Supreme Court used patent law as an example of
a regime in which “a party injured is allowed to recover in a civil
action double or treble damages” and noted that “[i]t will hardly be
claimed that these are penal actions requiring the application of
different rules of evidence from those that prevail in other actions for
indemnity.”120 This case, not cited in Halo, appeared to take it for
granted that enhanced damages in patent law are not “penal,” or
punitive.
Stockwell is not an outlier. In the middle of the twentieth century, a
district court in Activated Sludge v. Sanitary District of Chicago, relying
in part on a nineteenth-century Supreme Court copyright case,
likewise concluded that the enhanced damages provision of the Patent
Act is “remedial and not penal.”121 This interpretation was cited with
117

See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1929.
Cf. Judith A. Morse, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and
Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 528, 528 n.13 (1986) (describing multiple
damages as compensating for “accumulative harm,” noting that “[w]hile courts refer
to the award of single damages as actual damages, they are more accurately labeled
‘legal’ damages” because “[a] plaintiff may suffer actual harm for which the law will
not provide damages,” and concluding that “accumulative damages compensate
plaintiffs for actual harm not otherwise recoverable as legal damages”).
119 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018) (stating that permissive treble damages “shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty”).
120 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 547 (1871).
121 64 F. Supp. 25, 35 (N.D. Ill.) (citing Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899)), aff’d,
157 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946) (mem.). But see Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 673-75 (7th Cir. 1960) (making the case that the court in
118
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approval in contemporary court decisions and law review articles.122
For example, a note titled Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts
distinguished enhanced damages in patent law from punitive damages
in tort, noting that “in patent infringement and antitrust cases, in
which the actual injury to the plaintiff may be significantly more than
he can establish, double- or treble-damage awards provide the plaintiff
with a rough measure of compensation for these additional
injuries.”123 The general idea behind these authorities is that damages
capped at a small multiple of compensatory damages are still basically
compensatory, granting some additional damages beyond quantifiable
compensation for the violation of the right at issue. The mandatory
treble damages provision of the early Patent Act124 likely reflected this
attitude.125
The view that treble damages in patent law can have a compensatory
function appeared as late as 1981: In Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s
Sons, Inc.,126 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that
enhanced damages are not limited to “willfulness,” however defined,
thereby suggesting an additional, non-punitive function of such
damages.127 On the facts before it, the court concluded that the
enhancement was punitive “because of defendant’s bad faith,” but
made it clear that “the enhancement provision of the statute is
designed to permit, inter alia, adequate compensation for an
infringement where strict legal rules would not afford it.”128 In his
leading treatise on patent law, Professor Donald Chisum addressed
cases like Activated Sludge and Trio Process, noting that “[w]hether the
purpose of an increased damage award should be exemplary (i.e., to
Activated Sludge did not actually award enhanced damages).
122 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Allen B. Du Mont Labs., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.
Del. 1955) (“The mere fact that Congress has allowed the Court to assess additional
damages, does not make the cause of action as for a penalty and this is rather clearly
shown by the statute itself and by a number of adjudicated cases.” (citations
omitted)); Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 132 F. Supp. 176, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (“Public policy dictates that where the injury is to property,
intangible aspects of the damage claim which relate to the complexities of our
industrial society be satisfied by the imposition of additional damages, which though
in some aspects punitive, are inherently remedial.”).
123 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957).
124 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
125 See Morse, supra note 118, at 528, 528 n.13; see also Blakey, supra note 3, at
106-11 & nn.47–51; Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26,
at 439.
126 638 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1981).
127 See id. at 662-63.
128 Id. at 663-64.
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punish and deter flagrant acts of patent infringement) or
compensatory (i.e., to compensate the patent owner for immeasurable
expenses and losses) is a longstanding controversy in the law.”129
Nonetheless, Halo said little about this line of authority, or the
controversy described by Professor Chisum.130
2.

Possible Significance of the Cap for Culpability Levels

Is this history now completely irrelevant in view of Halo’s punitivedamages orientation? Likely so, but I wish to sound a cautionary note.
Significant authority suggests that we should still be careful to
distinguish schemes involving uncapped punitive damages, limited
only by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,131
from those that provide for supra-compensatory damages capped at a
fixed amount or a small multiple of compensatory damages. The idea
is that damages with an upper limit — and particularly, “multiplier”
enhanced damages dictated by statute — ensure for at least numerical
proportionality between compensatory and enhanced damages.132 As a
result, even if treble damages are not exactly quasi-compensatory, they
are at least closely tied to compensatory damages and are thus reserved
for behaviors that are less culpable than those sanctioned by uncapped
damages.133
Professor Kenneth Mann captured these intuitions in a well-known
article. He contended that because supra-compensatory civil sanctions
constitute the remedial “middle ground” between criminal and civil
cases, the level of substantive and procedural protections (e.g.,
elevated burdens of proof) for those defending against such sanctions
should fall somewhere between what is accorded to criminal
defendants as opposed to defendants in civil cases with only
compensatory damages at stake.134 Moreover, Professor Mann argued
129

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[4][b][iii], at 20-344 (2017).
But see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
131 For the leading case on constitutional limits on uncapped punitive damages, see
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). See also BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
132 See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text; cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907-09 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing the proportionality
concept in the context of statutory damages for copyright infringement).
133 For example, Oklahoma imposes caps on punitive damages for reckless
conduct, but not for intentional conduct. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 9.1 (2018);
see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 509 (2008).
134 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
130
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that the protections should fall on a continuum — the closer to a
criminal sanction, the greater the protections.135 Because of potential
exposure to virtually unlimited monetary liability, uncapped punitive
damages in tort are much closer to criminal sanctions than capped
damages, such as treble damages.136 Therefore, it stands to reason to
reserve the highest levels of culpability for defendant’s eligibility for
damages that are uncapped and subject only to constitutional
proportionality review.137
The continuum approach is reflected in states in which the extent of
exposure to punitive tort damages corresponds to the level of a
defendant’s culpability. In Arkansas, for example, punitive damages
for reckless misconduct are capped, but punitive damages for
intentional tortious acts are not.138 The Supreme Court in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker,139 a federal admiralty case, endorsed the
continuum approach as well. The Court concluded that, because the
behavior at issue was reckless rather than purposeful, the punitive
damages award had to be capped at the “reasonable limit” of the 1:1
ratio of compensatory to enhanced damages, but implied that higher
ratios would be available upon proof of greater culpability.140 Because
tort cases under the federal admiralty jurisdiction are a matter of
federal common law, the Court reached this conclusion with no
statutory guidance as to the maximum permissible magnitude of
enhanced damages or the standard for awarding them. Following the
pattern that we will see again,141 the Court relied heavily on state
common law of punitive damages, and even on state statutes capping
punitive damages, to fill the gap.142
It is worth noting in this vein that, under settled interpretations of
§ 284, a trial judge in a patent case does not have to award full treble
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799 (1992).
135 See id. at 1837-38.
136 Although courts had not yet set Due Process limits on the amount of punitive
damages at the time Professor Mann published his article, see infra notes 476–80 and
accompanying text, he did explore potential constitutional limitations on civil
punishment based on the degree of punitiveness, see Mann, supra note 134, at 1842-43.
137 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003).
138 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (2018).
139 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
140 Id. at 510-11. The reckless behavior resulting in the award of punitive damages
in Exxon involved a tanker captain’s decision to operate the tanker while drunk,
ultimately causing a collision with a reef off the Alaskan coast and spillage of “millions
of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.” Id. at 475-79.
141 See infra Section II.A.
142 Exxon, 554 U.S. at 509-14; see also Baude & Sachs, supra note 15, at 1133-34.
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damages even if the jury finds that the defendant possessed the
necessary mental state to make the defendant eligible for them.143
Treble damages are a ceiling, not a floor, and trial judges can and have
awarded no enhanced damages, as well as double damages and other,
fractional multiples after a jury willfulness finding opened the door for
enhanced damages.144 As I explain in Part III,145 in which I work out
the details of my proposal, trial courts could adopt the continuum
model by modulating enhanced-damages sanctions for a “full range of
culpable behavior”146 depending on, for example, whether the
infringement was bad-faith or malicious as opposed to merely reckless.
Under the continuum model, the presence of the multiplier cap, and
the possibility of modulation of supra-compensatory damages within
it, reinforces the point that a requirement of proving an elevated level
of culpability to make a defendant eligible for any enhanced damages
may not be appropriate.147 In Part II, I provide further support for my
contention that this is how Halo’s “full range of culpable behavior”
reference should be understood, but for now I return to patent law to
sketch out the Federal Circuit’s pre-Halo approach to treble damages.
C. Treble Damages at the Federal Circuit Before Halo
1.

The Birth of the Actual Knowledge Rule and the “Duty of Care”

As noted in the previous section, there was a diversity of views with
respect to whether enhanced damages in patent law were punitive or
quasi-compensatory, or could possibly play both roles, prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit. Given the availability of these potential
alternatives, the approach in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co., the Federal Circuit’s first enhanced damages case, leaves

143 See Grp. One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
144 See, e.g., Sociedad Española de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge XRay Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529-33 (W.D.N.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-1551
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2017); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071,
1074 (D.N.J. 1990) (“A fifty-percent enhancement of damages is appropriate here.
Although SMEC’s infringement was willful, it was not blatant.”). The Federal Circuit
held, though, that a trial court should provide convincing reasons for no enhancement
of damages after a jury finding of willful infringement. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d
1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp., Nos. 2016-2211,
2016-2268, 2018 WL 707803, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018) (nonprecedential).
145 See infra Section III.D.
146 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
147 See Mann, supra note 134, at 1837-38.
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much to be desired. Without addressing the split of authority on the
issue, the court simply picked a Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
case that assumed that enhanced damages could be awarded only for
“willful infringement,”148 thus essentially deciding that such damages
were punitive. The lack of analysis is surprising given that the Federal
Circuit also relied on Trio Process, and even noted that the Third
Circuit “concluded that the enhanced portion [of the damages that
were allowed] was punitive in character”149 on the specific facts of that
case. Underwater Devices, however, ignored the language from Trio
Process suggesting that enhanced damages in patent law could serve a
compensatory purpose.150
More significant for the goals of this Article, Underwater Devices,
again without analysis, assumed that “actual notice of another’s patent
rights”151 was required for enhanced damages. A study of the citation
chain from Underwater Devices dead-ends in a 1950s district court
decision which, itself without citation, used the formulation
“intentional, willful and deliberate.”152 In Part II, I endeavor to show
that this phrasing, highlighting the significance of subjective mental
states, is rooted in the nineteenth-century conception of punitive
damages as sanctioning opprobrious interpersonal behavior, when tort
law was still much closer to its criminal law roots than it is today.153
But a tentative point can be made now that, based on the lineage of
Underwater Devices, the actual knowledge rule as the sine qua non of
enhanced damages appears to be drawn from that old tort law
conception.
Given that proof of subjective mental states is generally challenging,
the Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge requirement might lead one to
predict that Underwater Devices would have drawn the scorn of
plaintiffs in patent cases. But in fact, it was patent defendants who had
bigger problems with Underwater Devices. This is because this case
also concluded that awareness of the patent would trigger an
“affirmative duty . . . to seek and obtain competent legal advice from
148 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
149 Id. at 1389 (citing Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661,
663 (3d Cir. 1981)).
150 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
151 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389.
152 Bristol Labs., Inc. v. Schenley Labs., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 67, 80, 81 (S.D. Ind.
1953) (cited in Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959)
(cited in Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th
Cir. 1980) (cited in Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90))).
153 See infra Section II.B.
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counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”154
What is more, juries under this regime were instructed that they could
draw an adverse inference of willfulness against the infringer if it did
not produce such an opinion-of-counsel letter.155
These features of the willfulness doctrine, therefore, forced patent
defendants to generate significant expenses associated with opinion
letters to counter claims for enhanced damages.156 Perhaps more
perniciously, production of the letter would sometimes entail waiver
of uncertain scope with respect to attorney-client communications
related to the defendant’s legal positions, potentially even including
communications with trial as opposed to merely opinion counsel.157
To avoid waiver in any event, trial and opinion counsel had to be
rigorously
separated,
multiplying
expenses.158
Numerous
commentators criticized the “unfair dilemma” of either giving up
privilege or becoming a presumptive willful infringer, and called for
the abandonment of the adverse inference rule.159
Substantively, the Federal Circuit’s guidance with respect to what
sorts of conduct would fail the “affirmative duty of care” was
muddled. In one case, the court ruefully noted that “various criteria
have been stated for determining ‘willful infringement,’”160 and an
article co-authored by a well-known patent attorney, William Lee,
referred to a “plethora of willfulness formulations.”161 Some cases
came close to articulating a negligence-type standard of willful
infringement (though, to be sure, negligence evaluated with respect to
a patent whose existence was actually known to the defendant), while
others appeared to require a higher level of culpability.162 This
154

Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 (emphasis omitted).
See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
156 See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1092.
157 Cf. In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
158 See generally Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel
Defense to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A
Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 210, 238 (2007).
159 See William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing
the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 393, 419-20 (2004); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1115.
160 SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
161 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 159, at 427.
162 Compare Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793-94 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(addressing reasonableness of the defendant’s reliance on an opinion letter), with
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersys. Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“Whether an act is ‘willful’ is by definition a question of the actor’s intent . . . .”
155
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uncertainty exacerbated the practical problems created by the adverse
inference rule and the ill-defined scope of waiver, generating further
dissatisfaction with the willfulness doctrine.163 The Federal Circuit
eventually responded to some of these critiques, abrogating the
adverse inference rule and limiting the scope of the attorney-client
privilege waiver as well as of the waiver of work-product immunity.164
2.

In re Seagate

But then, the Federal Circuit went much further, completely
changing the substantive standard to establish entitlement to
enhanced damages. In the en banc In re Seagate decision, the court
adopted a multi-layer framework for proving willfulness.165 The court
held that, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff would need to show that
the infringer “acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”166 The court
explained that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not
relevant to this objective inquiry,” which was to be judged “by the
record developed in the infringement proceeding.”167 In practice, this
approach enabled defendants to avoid liability for enhanced damages
as long as they could develop an objectively reasonable — essentially,
non-frivolous — legal theory of patent noninfringement or invalidity
in the course of litigation, often long after infringement began.168
Moreover, this “objective recklessness” prong came to be treated as
a pure question of law, making it amenable to summary judgment

(alteration omitted)).
163 See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
164 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (abrogating Kloster Speedsteel); see also In re
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (defining the scope
of privilege waiver of attorney-client communications and of waiver of work product
immunity in cases in which advice of in-house counsel has been asserted as a defense
against a claim of willful infringement). With respect to the adverse inference rule,
Congress later went further and added a section to the Patent Act stating that “[t]he
failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly
infringed patent, or the failure of the infringer to present such advice to the court or
jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the
patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2018).
165 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
166 Id. at 1371.
167 Id.
168 In Section II.B, I will show that this take on objective recklessness is at odds
with the way this concept is defined in other areas of law.
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grants169 and ready appellate reversals on de novo review.170 In one
case, the Federal Circuit vacated an award of enhanced damages when
an attorney for the plaintiff-appellee admitted in appellate oral
argument that his opponent had a non-frivolous defense of
nonobviousness of the asserted claims.171 Because patent cases in
which the infringer lacks non-frivolous defenses are rare, this prong
made enhanced damages more difficult for prevailing patentees to
recover than it was prior to Seagate.172
Objective recklessness was not the only requirement plaintiffs
would have to meet to qualify for enhanced damages. Under the
Seagate formulation, plaintiffs also had to show that the risk of
infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have
been known to the accused infringer.”173 Subsequent cases held that
proof of this second prong, which would normally be decided by a
jury if the plaintiff overcame the “objective” threshold, typically
turned on subjective factors.174 Like the first prong, subjective bad
faith had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.175 And,
needless to say, actual knowledge of the relevant patent’s existence
continued to be the sine qua non of treble damages. Once all of these
elements were established, the court would enter judgment that the
infringement was willful, making the defendant eligible for enhanced
damages.176 As noted above, though, the trial judge still had the
discretion, subject to deferential appellate review, not to award full
treble damages, or even any enhanced damages at all.177
169 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 678
(2018); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages
After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 439-41 (2012).
170 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003,
1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
171 Lee v. Mike’s Novelties, Inc., 543 F. App’x 1010, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(nonprecedential).
172 But cf. Seaman, supra note 169, at 417 (showing a relatively small decrease in
the number of cases in which willfulness was found after Seagate).
173 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
174 See, e.g., SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1091-93 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
175 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
176 See id. at 1368.
177 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text; see also Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that “a finding of willful
infringement does not mandate enhancement of damages” and that a trial judge
should take several factors into account “in determining whether to exercise its
discretion to award enhanced damages and how much the damages should be
increased”).
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The Seagate framework did unburden patent defendants by making
it possible to defeat allegations of willfulness without opinion letters
— or, really, without any positions on invalidity or noninfringement
prior to litigation. But it also became a target of numerous critiques.
First, because Seagate made it quite difficult to obtain enhanced
damages, some commentators contended that even blatant
infringement was underdeterred as a result.178 Second, Seagate
aberrantly turned quintessentially factual questions of culpability into
questions of law, subjecting enhanced damages to tight appellate
control and resulting in frequent reversals of willfulness decisions of
trial judges who lived with the case and made fact findings with
respect to the conduct and mental state of the defendant.179 Third,
Seagate did not rest on stable doctrinal foundations. Other than some
discrete provisions to deter sham litigation,180 there was little
precedent for the Seagate framework anywhere in the law — in patent
law prior to Seagate, in other areas of intellectual property, or in
tort.181 The Seagate court did cite several copyright cases and even
relied on a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case, Safeco Insurance
Co. of America v. Burr, in support of its approach to willfulness
generally and objective recklessness specifically.182 But, as Halo
concluded with respect to Safeco183 and I conclude with respect to the

178 See, e.g., Rachel L. Emsley, Copying Copyright’s Willful Infringement Standard: A
Comparison of Enhanced Damages in Patent Law and Copyright Law, 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 157, 178 (2008) (“A lower standard for enhancement of damages is appropriate
in patent law where lost profits or a reasonable royalty can undercompensate and
underdeter patent infringement.”); see also Sarah J. Garber, Copycats, Relax! The
Federal Circuit Lightens Up on Willful Patent Infringement, 73 MO. L. REV. 817, 832
(2008) (stating that Seagate was “squarely in favor of patent litigation defendants”).
179 Cf. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1356-59
& n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
180 See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099,
1111-12 (9th Cir. 2007).
181 See infra Section II.B; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Independent Inventor
Groups in Support of Petitioners at 10, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356
(2015) (No. 14-1520), 2015 WL 4883187, at *10 (“The [Seagate] ‘willfulness’ test for
patent infringement now looks nothing like the traditional tort doctrine in civil
cases.”).
182 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69-70 & n.20 (2007)).
183 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (quoting
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69).
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copyright cases,184 these authorities did not support the Federal
Circuit’s test.
D. Halo and Its Aftermath
1.

Halo

The Supreme Court eventually overturned the Seagate framework.
The writing was on the wall when, in two unanimous companion
opinions issued in 2014, the Court rejected an analogous approach the
Federal Circuit adopted for awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.185 After the lower court refused to take an
opportunity for course-correction of its willfulness doctrine,186 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a pair of § 284 cases and, again,
unanimously vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgments, putting an end
to Seagate.187
Halo, one of the § 284 cases that made it to the Supreme Court,
turned on the “objective recklessness” prong of Seagate.188 In Halo, the
patents-in-suit were directed to modular pieces for producing
electronic circuits, and plaintiff and defendant were direct competitors
in the field of surface-mounting technology for making the circuits.189
The defendant, Pulse, was aware of the relevant patents as far back as
1998 and received letters from Halo offering to license them in
2002.190 According to Halo, at that point, “although a Pulse engineer
conducted a ‘cursory’ invalidity analysis and determined the patents
were invalid, there was no evidence that a decision maker at Pulse
relied on that engineer’s analysis to make a decision to continue
184

See infra Section II.B.2.c.
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752-53
(2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746
(2014). But cf. Tyler A. Hicks, Note, Breaking the “Link” Between Awards for Attorney’s
Fees and Enhanced Damages in Patent Law, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 191 (2016) (arguing that
the Supreme Court’s decisions in the § 285 cases do not have to control the seemingly
parallel issues in the § 284 cases).
186 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), reh’g en
banc denied, 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.).
187 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated sub. nom.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Halo, 769 F.3d 1371,
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1923.
188 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. Stryker, the other case on which certiorari was granted,
likewise turned on this prong of Seagate.
189 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1374-75.
190 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00331-PMP-PAL, 2013
WL 2319145, at *16 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013).
185
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selling the accused products.”191 Based in part on this evidence, a jury
found Pulse’s infringement to be willful.192
The trial court, however, granted judgment as a matter of law of no
willfulness because Pulse had a non-frivolous litigation position that
Halo’s asserted claims should have been found obvious and therefore
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.193 If Pulse had prevailed on this
invalidity defense, it would of course have escaped all liability. But
even though “Pulse did not prove obviousness by clear and convincing
evidence, [it] presented enough evidence of obviousness such that this
defense was not objectively baseless, or a ‘sham,’”194 thereby avoiding
enhanced damages. The court held that, under Seagate, the fact that
Pulse ignored Halo’s patent demand “does not undermine Pulse’s
reasonable obviousness defense” because it was “relevant [only] to the
subjective element of [willful] infringement,”195 as opposed to the
other, “objective recklessness” element. The Federal Circuit agreed,
concluding that although “[t]he record shows that . . . Pulse was
ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the validity of the Halo patents,
Pulse did raise a substantial question as to the obviousness of the Halo
patents.”196
In its opinion vacating the Federal Circuit’s judgment in Halo and
the companion case of Stryker v. Zimmer, the Supreme Court
abrogated the Seagate standard.197 First, the Court characterized the

191

Id.
Id. at *1.
193 Id. at *2.
194 Id. at *15 (citation omitted).
195 Id. at *16.
196 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
197 On remand in Halo, the district court ultimately concluded that, even though
the jury verdict of willfulness was proper under the Supreme Court’s new standard, no
enhancement of damages was warranted. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (D. Nev. 2017) (“Considering all of the evidence submitted by
the parties, I do not find that Pulse’s infringement was so egregious and unusual that
enhanced damages are needed here.”). In contrast, the trial court in Stryker enhanced
the damages to the maximum allowable treble damages limit. Stryker Corp. v.
Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2017 WL 4286412, at *11 (W.D. Mich. July 12,
2017) (“While perhaps more egregious cases exist, the test is not whether this case is
the worst possible that can be imagined. Zimmer’s conduct was more egregious than
most, and Zimmer is precisely the type of egregious infringer the Supreme Court had
in mind when it relaxed the Seagate standard to provide district courts with the
freedom to exercise their discretion to enhance damages in cases of willful
infringement.”), appeal docketed, No. 17-2541 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2017). See infra
Section III.D (discussing the respective roles of judge and jury in the damages
enhancement).
192
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Seagate approach as requiring three separate inquiries subject to
“trifurcated appellate review”: “objective recklessness,” “subjective
knowledge,” and “the ultimate decision — whether to award enhanced
damages.”198 The Court then launched into a critique of Seagate by
pointing to Octane Fitness, one of the § 285 cases it decided just two
years before. The Court explained that in Octane, it rejected a test
“requiring that the claim asserted be both objectively baseless and
brought in subjective bad faith.”199 The Court noted that the issue of
standards for awarding attorney’s fees “arose in a different context but
points in the same direction” and, following Octane, it eliminated the
Federal Circuit’s “rigid formula” for willfulness.200
The Court held that “[t]he principal problem with Seagate’s twopart test is that it requires a finding of objective recklessness in every
case before district courts may award enhanced damages.”201 This
approach, therefore, removed from the ambit of enhanced damages the
core, subjectively bad behaviors that were subject to such damages
dating back to the early tort cases.202 Emphasizing that the Federal
Circuit’s treatment of willfulness impermissibly interfered with the
trial courts’ discretion,203 the Court concluded that “[t]he subjective
willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant
enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was
objectively reckless.”204
As noted, the Court indicated that enhanced damages could also be
collected based on recklessness, but said very little about this route to
willfulness.205 At the very least, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
litigation-timed approach to recklessness when it observed that
“[n]othing in Safeco,” the case from which Seagate principally drew its
objective standard, “suggests that we should look to facts that the
defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he
acted.”206 The Court thus held that litigation was not the correct time
to evaluate the defendant’s mental state. In doing so, the Court
198

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016).
Id. at 1932. By “claim” here, the Court is referring to the accused infringer’s
defenses and counterclaims.
200 Id. at 1932-34.
201 Id. at 1932.
202 See infra Section II.A.
203 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930.
203 Id. at 1931-32, 1934-35.
204 Id. at 1933.
205 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
206 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
199
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approvingly cited Safeco’s formulation that a reckless person “acts
‘knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a
reasonable man to realize’ his actions are unreasonably risky,”207 which
Safeco in turn quoted from the Restatement of Torts. The “having
reason to know” language plainly suggests something less than actual
knowledge, but it is not clear whether this phrase refers to reason to
know of infringement or reason to know of the patent’s existence.208
Furthermore, the reference to “a reasonable man” connotes an
objective inquiry209 — but again, “the reasonable man’s” apprehension
of risk may or may not refer to a known patent.
Additional, though not decisive, hints of how Halo is best
interpreted come from Farmer v. Brennan,210 the case that Safeco relied
on in turn. Farmer distinguished civil recklessness from criminal
recklessness,211 and Safeco held — sensibly enough for a case
involving civil penalties for inaccurate credit reporting — that it is the
civil version of recklessness that should be adopted as the standard for
willfulness under the FCRA.212 What is the difference between the
two? The basic idea is that while criminal recklessness entails
indifference to a known risk, civil recklessness involves indifference to
a risk that is “objectively high,” or one of which — as stated in the
Restatement — the defendant had reason to know, but not necessarily
one of which the defendant actually knew.213 As Professor Kenneth
Simons explained, civil recklessness does not hinge on “advertence to
risk,” but might instead “require both indifference to risk and a greater
departure from the standard of care than negligence requires.”214
207 Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2007) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
208 Cf. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760-61 (2011)
(dealing with a similar problem in the setting of indirect infringement).
209 See generally Keating, supra note 66.
210 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
211 Id. at 836-37.
212 Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57-58 & n.9, 68-69; see Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari,
Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript
at 28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044035.
213 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37.
214 Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 293 & n.26 (2002); see also Simons, Rethinking Mental
States, supra note 39, at 471-72 & nn.31–32 (“[T]he test of recklessness is more
subjective than the test of negligence. Yet tort recklessness, unlike Model Penal Code
criminal recklessness, does not specifically require awareness of a risk. ‘Reason to
know’ suffices.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 12, 500 (AM. LAW INST.
1965))); cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1,
15 (2012) [hereinafter Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed] (explaining that,
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Although these definitions do not fully resolve the question of which
form of recklessness should be adopted by patent law, the distinction
at least supplies a starting point for further discussion. While Part II
will explore the difference between the two forms of recklessness in
more detail, the sections that follow focus on the lower courts’ actual
interpretations of Halo.
2.

Post-Halo: Actual Knowledge or Bust

In WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., the first case in which it had to apply
Halo, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[k]nowledge of the patent
alleged to be willfully infringed continues to be a prerequisite to
enhanced damages.”215 Although the court did not qualify the noun
“knowledge” with the adjective “actual,” district courts have so far
generally held that Halo did not abrogate the actual knowledge
threshold for willfulness. For example, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California concluded in Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Electronics Co. that, even though Samsung copied Apple’s
product, “because Samsung had no knowledge of the [asserted patent]
before the instant suit was filed, Samsung’s conduct before the instant
suit . . . does not constitute willful patent infringement.”216 The Apple
court relied on a case from the same district explaining that “[a]t the
time that the defendant allegedly analyzed the product embodying the
patent to introduce a competing product around 2002, the plaintiff
had not received any patents on infringed technology.”217 Although it
cannot be a surprise to an infringer that a patent on a successful
product that it copied may be forthcoming, Apple concluded that the
actual knowledge requirement is unbending. It noted that “the
defendant’s sales of the competing product for a decade without any
notice that the competing product infringed any plaintiff [sic] patent
cannot support a finding of willfulness,”218 even if that product was
copied not long before the patent covering it issued. The approach in

to be criminally reckless, an actor must “(a) believe that the risk of the relevant legal
fact is substantial and (b) take a risk that society considers unjustifiable” (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962))).
215 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs.,
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016)).
216 258 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
217 Id. at 1025 (quoting Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., 5:13-cv-02024-RMW,
2016 WL 4427490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016)) (some alterations omitted).
218 Id. (quoting Radware, 2016 WL 4427490, at *3).
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Apple is typical,219 and courts have not yet attempted to parse the
“reason to know” language from Halo.220
Admittedly, Federal Circuit cases prior to Halo did converge on the
actual knowledge rule.221 And although Halo overruled Seagate, it did
not specifically speak to actual knowledge. There is other authority
undermining that standard, to be sure. For example, it is difficult to
reconcile actual-knowledge primacy with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Global-Tech, in which — as noted in the Introduction222 —
the Court concluded that willful blindness is legally equivalent to
actual knowledge in the context of indirect infringement, over a
dissent on that very point.223 In addition, in the nineteenth-century
case of Topliff v. Topliff, the Supreme Court allowed an award of
enhanced damages seemingly without any evidence that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the patent-in-suit.224 But Halo did not

219 See, e.g., Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1400-SI, 2017 WL
2543811, at *3 (D. Or. June 12, 2017) (“Knowledge of the patent by the alleged
infringer is . . . a prerequisite to proving willful infringement.”); Greatbatch Ltd. v.
AVX Corp., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 2016 WL 7217625, at *2-3 (D. Del. 2016)
(“The key inquiry in this case is whether there is evidence in addition to AVX’s pre-suit
knowledge of the patents that could show that AVX’s infringement was ‘egregious,’
‘deliberate,’ ‘wanton,’ or otherwise characteristic of the type of infringement that
warrants the Court exercising its discretion to impose the ‘punitive’ sanction of
enhanced damages.” (citing Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932) (some emphasis omitted)). But
cf. Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys., LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 605, 623 (D. Del. 2017)
(refusing to grant summary judgment of no willfulness based in part on evidence that
“Intel’s own engineers concede that they avoid reviewing other, non-Intel patents so
as to avoid willfully infringing them” and allegations of “corporate atmosphere
encouraging employees to ‘turn a blind eye’ to patents”); see also Adidas, 2017 WL
2543811, at *5 (“It is unclear . . . that the doctrine of willful blindness as articulated
in Global-Tech, an induced infringement case, applies in the direct infringement
analysis context.”). Interestingly, Greatbatch and Intel were decided by the same
district judge.
220 In a recently decided nonprecedential case, the Federal Circuit suggested that
actual knowledge of the patent’s existence is not necessary for willfulness, while at the
same time observing that the plaintiff provided evidence from which actual knowledge
could be inferred. See WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp., Nos. 2016-2211, 2016-2268,
2018 WL 707803, at *8-9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018) (nonprecedential).
221 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
223 See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (defining
“willful blindness” as follows: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there
is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate
actions to avoid learning of that fact”).
224 145 U.S. 156, 174 (1892) (cited in Brief of Amici Curiae Small Inventors in
Support of Petitioners at 18, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923
(2016) (Nos. 14-1513, 14-1520), 2015 WL 9245248, at *18).
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highlight that aspect of Topliff, nor attempted to square its rules for
mental states for indirect infringement with those for willfulness.225 In
fact, the Commil case, which clarified the relevance of the defendant’s
knowledge and beliefs about asserted patents for indirect liability just
a year before Halo issued, was not even cited in Halo.226 Thus, panels
of the Federal Circuit are probably correct in maintaining the actual
knowledge threshold which, given Halo’s lack of endorsement of it,
the court could nonetheless modify if it decided to take up the issue
en banc.227
As I argue in this Article, tort law sources discussed principally in
Part II can help in determining the right mental state for eligibility for
treble damages in patent cases. But before delving deep into tort law,
an argument can be advanced that even an internal analysis of the
Patent Act casts doubt on the actual knowledge rule. Subsection
154(d), which governs compensatory damages for so-called
“provisional” patent rights (i.e., damages for infringement of patents
that have not yet issued) and is cross-referenced in § 284, requires
“actual notice of the published patent application.”228 The marking
subsection, § 287(a), also addresses notice, mentioning the
requirement of “proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter”229 in order to
225 In a copyright case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held
that, while willful blindness is the minimum mental state requirement for
contributory copyright infringement, willful copyright infringement can be established
upon proof of recklessness. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881
F.3d 293, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2018). Given “the historic kinship between patent law and
copyright law,” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984), and the BMG court’s extensive reliance on the Supreme Court’s patent law
precedents, 881 F.3d at 308-10, this result might have informative value for patent
cases going forward.
226 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926-28 (2015). See
generally Nate Ngerebara, Commil v. Cisco: Implications of the Intent Standard for
Inducement Liability on Willfulness, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2016) (examining
tensions between mental state standards for indirect infringement as opposed to
willfulness).
227 See Troy v. Samson Mfg. Co., 758 F.3d 1322, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
228 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2018); see Rosebud LMS Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 812 F.3d
1070, 1073-74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (interpreting the “actual notice” provision of § 154(d)
and noting that “‘actual notice’ is synonymous with knowledge” (quoting 58 AM. JUR.
2D NOTICE § 4 (2015)).
229 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2018). The marking subsection, to be sure, has been
interpreted to require “an affirmative act by the patentee to notify infringers.” See
McKeon, supra note 45, at 466. In addition, the marking subsection limits damages
only when the infringer copies a commercially available product, and does not apply
to method claims even when the patentee markets a product embodying such claims.
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collect past damages where the product at issue was not marked with a
patent number. Although § 154(d) came into existence in 1999,230
§ 284 and § 287(a) both have a long history in the Patent Act.231
Congress knew how to address notice explicitly, but chose not to add
any such language to § 284. Nonetheless, the requirement persists.
A fair question to ask at this point, however, is why should we care?
Even if courts are getting the law wrong, perhaps some mistakes are
not significant enough to fix. This response, however, is not a
satisfying one when it comes to willfulness. As Professor Keith Hylton
explained in a recent article, a miscalibrated enhanced damages
doctrine can lead to diminished incentives to innovate,232 and getting
damages right is a critically important challenge in patent law as a
general matter.233 The specific problems with the actual knowledge
rule, though, are worth addressing at some level of granularity. The
next section sets forth policy rationales for relaxing this rule because it
is, in fact, causing problems for patent law.
E. Problems with the Actual Knowledge Rule
1.

It Discourages Reading of Patents

The “knowledge of the patent” gloss on the enhanced patent
damages provision is problematic for a variety of reasons. One,
although there is some evidence that the threat of willful infringement
does not deter researchers in at least some fields from looking at
patents,234 actual knowledge as the trigger of enhanced liability can
discourage patent search and analysis.235 Commentators have voiced
See Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1, 55 (2013) (criticizing this rule).
230 Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536
(amending § 154 to add § 154(d)).
231 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 38, 55, 16 Stat. 198, 203, 206.
232 Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 425.
233 See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
234 See Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, supra note 86; see also Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546-47
(2012) (concluding that researchers use patents as a source of technical information
in certain fields).
235 Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law,
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 833-34 (2016) [hereinafter Chien, Opening the Patent System];
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 588 (2009) (“[T]o improve
the incentive to read patent documents, which is a critical aspect of operational
disclosure, it is vital to remove — if not reverse — the penalty of willful infringement

1470

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:1427

this concern with respect to Federal Circuit doctrine in this area over
the course of the previous decade,236 and the concern persisted, if not
increased, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Halo. Thus,
in the wake of Halo, Professor Lisa Ouellette suggested that “as lower
courts flesh out the meaning of Halo, they recognize the potential
harm from firms deciding that the risks of enhanced liability from
reading patents outweigh the teaching benefit those patents could
otherwise provide.”237 Professor Ouellette’s comments echo, for
example, the Federal Trade Commission’s observation, particularly
salient before Seagate,238 that exposure to treble damages triggered by
reading patents interferes with the various benefits that flow from the
disclosure function of patent law:
Some Hearings participants explained that they do not read
their competitors’ patents out of concern for such potential
treble damage liability. Failure to read competitors’ patents can
jeopardize plans for a noninfringing business or research
strategy, encourage wasteful duplication of effort, delay
follow-on innovation that could derive from patent
disclosures, and discourage the development of competition.
It is troubling that some businesses refrain from reading their
competitors’ patents because they fear the imposition of treble
damages for willful infringement.239

as applied to reviewing patents to inform follow-up innovation.”); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142 (2006) (“The doctrine of
willful infringement provides another structural infirmity to the ability of patents to
perform a teaching function.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 19, 21-22; Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 213 (2007) (“[K]nowledge of a patent can lead to a finding of
willful infringement, so there is a disincentive for competitors to review others’
patents to learn of the latest technology.”); see also Ryan T. Holte, Patent Submission
Policies, 50 AKRON L. REV. 637, 657-58, 687-88 (2016).
236 See supra note 235.
237 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Halo v. Pulse and the Increased Risks of Reading
Patents, STAN. L. SCH.: BLOGS (June 16, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/16/
halo-v-pulse-and-the-increased-risks-of-reading-patents.
238 Seagate, to be sure, reduced some of the disincentives for reading patents by
allowing an escape from enhanced damages liability based on defenses developed in
litigation. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 625 (2010). Still, Seagate continued to treat actual knowledge as the sine qua
non of enhanced damages, maintaining the incentive to avoid learning of patents.
239 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 16-17 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-
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I share these critics’ views that enhanced damages doctrine
structured so as to discourage rather than promote patent search and
analysis disserves the purposes of patent law. While the disclosure
function of patents is far from perfect,240 information-transfer benefits
of the patent document can be substantial, and should not be
undermined by patent law’s treble damages rules.241 Patents transfer
technical information, inform inventors and firms about research that
has already been done, and encourage inventive design-arounds.242
With the caveat that the relevance of personal anecdotes to scholarly
work may be limited, I note that during my time as a scientist working
in Silicon Valley, a supervisor once criticized me for finding, through a
Google search, a patent that was arguably relevant to my project. At
the time, it seemed odd to me that intellectual curiosity would be
suppressed rather than rewarded. Now that I know some patent law, I
see that my supervisor was in the right, but the rule still seems
strange. And other legal scholarship shows that my experience with
patent searching was far from exceptional.243
One could argue that, if patent disclosure were so valuable, firms
would search for and read patents anyway, even if that meant having
to deal with allegations of aggravated conduct sufficient for imposition
of enhanced damages. Nonetheless, when actual knowledge is made to
be the sine qua non of added liability, the decision to avoid searching is
tempting to make — and, in turn, would become much less attractive
when a standard that is not so strongly tied to actual knowledge is
adopted.244 It therefore stands to reason to have a standard for
patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
240 See, e.g., Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof),
118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2017-23 (2005); see also Fromer, supra note 235, at 539;
Seymore, supra note 238, at 628-41.
241 See Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy
Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739,
1743-44 (2016) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer];
Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2012).
242 See Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer, supra note 241, at
1745-46.
243 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 235, at 19-20; Risch, supra note 235, at 213.
244 Cf. Chien, Opening the Patent System, supra note 235, at 849 (“The criterion of
‘knowledge of the patent’ that the willfulness doctrine is connected to is arguably both
overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to what the patent system is trying to
deter. For example, an innovator who studies and reverse-engineers a patentee’s
product or website should not be less subject to a finding of willfulness than one who
happens to read a patentee’s patent among many others in the course of doing routine
research. At the same time, innovators should not be punished for being
comprehensive in checking different sources of technical knowledge by reading
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enhanced damages that rewards, or at least does not punish, patent
searching.245 This is so because search and analysis of patents might
sometimes produce benefits to society that would outweigh the social
costs and burdens of searching.246 Although it has been suggested that
properly calibrated compensatory damages should generally be
adequate to promote socially optimal behaviors,247 it is difficult to
explain the practice of ignoring patents, described further in the next
section, even in scenarios in which even a search could have been
performed in a socially cost-effective manner. The problem could,
therefore, be with the legal standards that discourage searches,248 not
with the costs and benefits of search in the abstract.
A common response to the argument that legal doctrine should not
inhibit patent searching is that patents in certain industries provide
little in the way of technically valuable information and serve
primarily as a tax on innovation.249 According to this narrative, search
and analysis of patents has little social value, and entails great costs.250
Maybe so — and such considerations, if accurate, should be taken into
account in the enhanced damages inquiry. As I argue in Part III,
reasons like these further point to introducing a greater degree of
industry-specificity in making the threshold determination as to
whether enhanced damages should be available to the prevailing

patents if there is no evidence that the patentee actually derived anything from the
patent. But the current law leads to both outcomes.”); Lee & Melamed, supra note 5,
at 460-61 (suggesting that “guilty infringement” is possible without actual knowledge
of the patent); see also id. at 441-42. But see Randy R. Micheletti, Willful Patent
Infringement after In re Seagate: Just What Is Objectively Reckless Infringement?, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 975, 1008 (2010) (“Knowledge of the patent at issue should remain a
critically important factor in the Seagate analysis, however, because such knowledge
may create an inference that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk of
infringement. Conversely, proving an infringer should have known of the risk that he
would infringe the patent at issue becomes very difficult — if not impossible — if the
defendant had no knowledge of the patent at all.”).
245 See infra notes 567–68 (exploring the notion of a safe harbor from willfulness
for firms that perform adequate searches). Another way to formulate the problem is to
say that the current approach, which is focused on actual knowledge, does not
sufficiently induce firms to engage in patent searching.
246 See Johnathan M. Jackson, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: The Pitfalls of Major
Reform of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement in the Wake of Knorr-Bremse, 15 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 63-64 (2006).
247 See, e.g., Love, supra note 5, at 943-48.
248 See id. at 936-41.
249 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 233-24 (2009).
250 Id. at 49-50.
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plaintiff, and this goal can best be accomplished by discarding the
inflexible actual knowledge rule.
2.

It Promotes Holdout

Recent literature has noted a “hold-out” problem in the patent
system. As Professor Colleen Chien contended, “[i]n many cases,
manufacturers fail to take steps to clear products prior to their release
even though they are arguably in the best position to determine
whether any patents read on their plans.”251 As discussed above, this
happens in part because “reading the patents of others results in a
manufacturer knowing about a patent, and knowledge of a patent
makes it easier for a court to enhance a damages award based on a
defendant’s knowing infringement.”252 Eventually, though, a patentee
might learn about a possible infringement, approach the defendant
with a demand letter, but then end up getting the proverbial cold
shoulder. Professor Chien explained that, “[f]rom the patentee’s
perspective . . . when companies resist patent demands, they shirk
their responsibilities as willing participants in the patent economy.”253
But, as Professor Chien’s comments about patent clearance suggest,
the shirking of responsibility can manifest itself not only through
resistance of licensing demands, but possibly also through the failure
to perform patent searches.254 In cases in which it would be relatively
inexpensive for the potential infringer to find and analyze relevant
patents, a non-search can become a form of “hold-out” that in
substance is not very different from the refusal to negotiate a license
over a known patent. If the infringer could have easily found the
relevant patents and readily concluded that they cover its products,
the salient difference from actual knowledge is difficult to pin down.255
Conversely, “a manufacturer’s good faith clearance search should be

251 Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 23 (2014) [hereinafter Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out].
252 Id. at 24; cf. Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 1849, 1887 (2016) (contending that if courts “clarify that mere knowledge of the
patent, without indicia that the patentee took advantage of the knowledge within the
patent, won’t trigger treble damages, this could further reduce the risks associated
with reading patents”).
253 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 24.
254 See F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different
Approaches to Holdup Mitigation and Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091, 1102 (2013) (discussing the
“socially optimal level of due diligence searching”).
255 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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respected, and indeed encouraged.”256 Patent searches can have a great
deal of social value because they could, besides transferring technical
information, help firms avoid duplicative research257 and promote the
formation of a market for patent rights258 — and, with it, development
and commercialization of patented inventions.259 And yet, we have a
rule that encourages the opposite.
The theory of punitive damages supports these intuitions. One set of
circumstances in which courts have not hesitated to award punitive
damages in other areas of law involves violations that could have been
avoided via negotiation with the rights-holder.260 As Professors David
Haddock, Fred McChesney, and Menachem Spiegel explained in a
well-known article, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, “a legal remedy must leave a defendant who takes

256 Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1122; see also Shubha Ghosh, Patents
and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1348 (2004) (noting that “patent law seeds a norm of
innovation and aids in instituting such social practices as searching a field before
beginning one’s research and development”).
257 Cf. Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1217, 1267 (2017) (“[I]n cases in which a reasonable amount of searching would
have revealed a known solution, it is preferable for the prospective inventor to search
and find that solution rather than waste time and money re-creating it.” (citing
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 401-02 (6th ed. 2013))). Although Professor Yelderman discussed this
dynamic in the context of novelty and patentability generally, concerns over
duplication of work equally apply to infringers who do not patent. See supra note 239
and accompanying text. Moreover, the world is not divided neatly into patentees and
infringers, and those who search for patents in order to clear a product might obtain
information relevant for their own patents. Unfortunately, leaving aside clearance
issues, there is also no duty to search the prior art before filing a patent application.
See generally Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
689 (2005). Arguments in this Article indirectly support the imposition of such a
duty, which, besides encouraging information transfer, would also lead to stronger
patents.
258 See Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1106; see also F. Scott Kieff,
Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 349, 366-67 (2006);
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 733 (2001). But see Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent
Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 137 (2015) (“We find that
very few patent license demands actually lead to new innovation; most demands
simply involve payment for the freedom to keep doing what the licensee was already
doing.”).
259 Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1107; Ted Sichelman, Commercializing
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010); see also Holte, supra note 235, at 660.
260 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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with no advantage vis-a-vis a defendant who bargains.”261 Accordingly,
“punitive rather than merely compensatory damages is a desirable
response to many property violations.”262 Patents may fit into this
framework because they are considered to be property rights whose
utilization can, at least in theory, be negotiated over provided that the
search, information, and transaction costs are not prohibitive. These
assumptions sometimes do not hold, but there are some circumstances
— like proceeding with making an infringing product after failing to
investigate the patents of close competitors, or even copying others’
products — when an infringement after non-search might also be a
welfare-diminishing “contractual bypass” of the sort described in An
Ordinary Economic Rationale.263

261 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 18; Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 461 (“[A]
guilty infringer should be required to pay more than an innocent infringer . . . .”); see also
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2004). An
argument has been made that an injunction against continued infringement could
function as a punitive remedy, Paul J. Heald, Permanent Injunctions as Punitive Damages in
Patent Infringement Cases, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 514-29
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); see also Dan L. Burk, Punitive Patent Liability: A
Comparative Examination, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c31bf9e4b02f4c0b4203e6/t/5a46ddfb9140b7ea14
ca1868/1514593788683/Burk_draft.pdf, but the traditional view is that, while the
issuance of an injunction might sometimes depend on fault as judges often take the
tortfeasor’s state of mind into account in performing equitable balancing, see MacLeod,
supra note 15 (manuscript at 67), generally speaking the injunction is not a punitive
remedy, see Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir. 1997); Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 540 (1982)
(“Injunctions, in their multiple variety, are merely remedial directives designed to
implement the court’s determinations on threshold questions, substantive liability, and
future conduct . . . .”). A related question is whether, when an injunction is denied,
ongoing royalties as an equitable remedy for future (i.e., post-judgment) infringement
could take on punitive character. See Layne S. Keele, Enhanced Ongoing Royalties: The
Inequitable Remedy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 469, 517 (2016) (“In most cases, courts should
award only compensatory ongoing royalties. Nevertheless, there may be times in which
supracompensatory awards are appropriate. One such example would be cases in which
the infringer engaged in intentional misconduct before incurring significant prospective
switching costs. Another example may be a case in which the court believes that the
infringer’s inadequate pre-infringement patent clearance activities prevented the parties
from reaching a negotiated license.”). Although the availability of punitive damages for
past harm presents questions that are conceptually separate from issues relating to
prospective relief via an injunction or ongoing royalties, a combination of punitive
damages and an injunction (or ongoing royalties) could overdeter. See Haddock et al.,
supra note 31, at 30-32. If a trial judge concludes that this may happen, he or she could
decide not to enhance past damages. See infra Section III.D.
262 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 41.
263 Id. at 18.
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While re-imagining punitive damages as a new kind of remedy
called “retributive damages,” Professor Dan Markel made a similar
argument. Professor Markel contended that “the availability of
retributive damages encourages parties to use market transactions
instead of misconduct that violates property rules — that is, those
rules that require parties to negotiate over the transfer of legal
entitlements prior to their exchange.”264 This is particularly true when
“detecting complex wrongdoing occurring in private is difficult and
where people may not even know they have been victimized,” as is
often true for patent infringements.265 Of course, in cases where the
infringement is “open and notorious,”266 the burden of coming to the
infringer should lie squarely on the patentee. But in a number of
important fact situations, infringement can be extremely difficult to
detect, resulting in the undercompensation of the patentee — as well
as underdeterrence of the infringer relative to a purely compensatory
regime.267 To deal with underdeterrence, patent law already recognizes
the notion of a culpable infringer in cases in which the infringer was
aware of the patent,268 but it is not clear why the infringer who opted
not to do any searching at all should fare better when launching an
infringing product under circumstances in which the relevant patents
could have been readily found and analyzed.269
To be sure, underenforcement of patents is not necessarily a bad
thing, as large-scale assertion of patents in litigation would bring the
economy to a halt.270 But searching need not equal mandatory contact
with the patentee followed by a lawsuit. For example, a firm may
reasonably ignore a discovered patent because it is probably not
infringed or invalid, side-step enforcement by designing around the
claims, or even acquire or license the patent at issue if the price is
right. In addition, even diligent searches can sometimes miss a patent,
perhaps resulting ultimately in no enforcement, and some patentees —
for various reasons, including cost, desire to preserve commercial

264

Markel, supra note 31, at 320.
Id. at 285; see also Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 194-95 (2011).
266 Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing
this issue in analyzing laches).
267 Cf. Masur, supra note 265, at 191-92.
268 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 443, 461-65.
269 Cf. id. at 411-12 & n.112 (“Current law distinguishes between ordinary and
willful infringement. We propose a different distinction, between ‘guilty’ and
‘innocent’ infringement.”); see also supra note 244 and accompanying text.
270 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 14.
265

2018]

Enhancing Patent Damages

1477

relationships, fear of invalidation, and so on — do not assert their
patents even when they know that infringement is occurring.271 In
some cases, relevant patents or applications might simply not exist at
the time that a clearance search is made, and the (eventual) infringer
would have no reason to believe that a relevant patent will appear.272
More generally, in some industries, the underenforcement story could
be a positive one as a general matter given the social costs and benefits
involved. But, because there are also industries for which an approach
that would diminish the number of uncompensated infringements can
provide social benefits that justify the costs of patent search,273 this
insight may again point toward introducing industry-specificity in the
enhanced damages analysis and, thus, to rejecting the uniformly
applicable actual knowledge rule.274
In some cases, moreover, the possibility of increased patent
enforcement could bring with it various positive spillover effects.
Patent litigation can be socially beneficial in numerous ways even if
the underlying patents are weak — for example, it can lead to
invalidation of such patents.275 This result is more readily
accomplished by manufacturers or suppliers, who have greater
capacity than other potential defendants, such as end users who
sometimes end up being targeted instead, to search for patents and
develop successful defenses.276 Professor Chien explained that “[t]he
manufacturer is more likely to be more ‘patent-sophisticated,’ have
better access to potentially invalidating prior art, and be more invested
in establishing a reputation for toughness lest they be targeted by
other patent asserters.”277 But for these very reasons, infringers falling
into this category “are often left off the case” in lawsuits brought by

271

See Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 711 (2017).
I explain that not searching under these circumstances should not be generally
considered reckless. See infra notes 556–58 and accompanying text.
273 See infra notes 535–57 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 383–86 and
accompanying text.
274 See infra Section III.C.
275 See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit
Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1620-21 (2013); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1007, 1010, 1034 (2016) (explaining how the rules governing mental states for
indirect infringement could affect market entry and patent validity challenges). But see
Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1943 (2016) (arguing that patent invalidation does not always result in procompetitive effects).
276 Love & Yoon, supra note 275, at 1618.
277 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 29.
272
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“enterprising” plaintiffs.278 If, however, there were a greater “stick” in
place to force manufacturers to search for patents, they would have a
greater likelihood of approaching the patentee, often triggering
litigation against firms actually in position to defend the case
successfully and thus improving the chances of the patent’s
invalidation as opposed to a nuisance settlement.279
3.

It Reinforces Excessive Focus on Individual Patents

The actual knowledge approach excuses ignorance of the larger
patent landscape, but makes up for that by creating the expectation
that the patents of which the defendant becomes aware are analyzed in
exhaustive detail. The now-discarded adverse inference rule embodied
this attitude, practically forcing accused infringers to spend a great
deal of resources on formal opinion of counsel letters to avoid or at
least counter charges of willfulness.280 Although the rule has been
eliminated, opinion letters continue to play an important role in
dealing with willfulness accusations.281 Of course, formal opinions can
always be helpful for accused infringers defending the charge of
willfulness in front of a jury. But given the high cost and resulting
social burdens associated with such opinions, a willfulness standard
that makes them critical would be misguided. For example, in cases
where the theory of infringement is unclear, where there is
invalidating prior art that looks on-point to an engineer analyzing the
patent,282 or perhaps where the potential defendant is too small to
278

Id.
Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 62741 (discussing the relative responsibilities of end users and manufacturers for
infringement); see also Masur, supra note 265, at 200 (criticizing a rule under which
“search responsibilities will not necessarily wind up in the hands of the most efficient
party”).
280 See supra notes 155–64 and accompanying text.
281 Lynda J. Oswald, The Evolving Role of Opinions of Counsel in Patent Infringement
Cases, 52 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012); Timothy M. O’Shea, New Rule for
Proving Willful Infringement and Why Opinions from Patent Counsel Still Matter After
Patent Reform, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=afac3f58-f817-4b00-a32e-04a93708bd33; Charles T. Steenburg, Do
Opinions of Counsel Still Matter After Patent Reform? Absolutely!, WOLF GREENFIELD
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.wolfgreenfield.com/publications/articles/2012/opinionsafter-patent-reform-steenburg. For an example of a post-Halo case discussing the value
of invalidity opinions in countering allegations of bad-faith infringement, see
Greatbatch Ltd. v. AVX Corp., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 2016 WL 7217625, at *45 (D. Del. 2016).
282 See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254,
257-58 (D. Mass. 2016) (relying on the testimony of the defendant’s director of the
279
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afford a formal letter and must rely on whatever resources it has, lack
of willfulness may be readily established even without any formal
invalidity or noninfringement opinions.283 Nonetheless, opinion letters
remain important for countering willfulness and are thought to have
become more so after Halo stripped infringers of “objective
recklessness” defenses developed during litigation.284 The outsized
role of opinions of counsel in the enhanced damages determination is
a natural consequence of the actual knowledge rule, which limits the
universe of patents that the accused infringer must deal with, but then
holds them to a very high standard with respect to those patents.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Halo, joined by two other Justices,
addressed the issue of expensive opinions of counsel.285 Justice Breyer
maintained that mere receipt of a “demand” letter from a patent owner
indicating the serial numbers of possibly relevant patents may not be
enough to justify an award of enhanced damages starting from the
date of receipt, even in some cases in which the infringer has not
acquired an opinion of counsel.286 He argued that companies cannot
always be faulted “simply for failing to spend considerable time, effort,
and money obtaining expert views about whether some or all of the
patents described in the letter apply to its activities.”287 The
concurrence further noted that “the risk of treble damages can
encourage the company to settle, or even abandon any challenged
activity,” leading to the possibility that “a patent will reach beyond its
lawful scope to discourage lawful activity.”288 Accordingly, Justice
intellectual property division, a person without a law degree, to conclude that a
reasonable basis to believe that the defendant did not infringe existed), appeal
docketed, No. 16-2576 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2016). But cf. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys.,
Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming, on abuse of discretion review, a
district court’s decision to exclude an engineer’s “personal beliefs regarding noninfringement” because “they were beliefs formed by a lay person without the benefit of
the court’s claim construction,” and therefore were “of little probative value and
potentially prejudicial”). It is worth noting that patent examiners, who decide whether
claims in patent applications comply with requirements of patentability and should be
allowed, have technical training, but typically no law degrees.
283 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1936 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see infra Sections III.B–C (arguing that courts should be lenient toward
end users in the enhanced damages calculus).
284 See Erik R. Puknys & Yanbin Xu, Willful Infringement After Halo, FINNEGAN
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/willful-infringement-afterhalo.html.
285 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1937-38 (Breyer, J., concurring).
286 Id. at 1937.
287 Id.
288 Id.

1480

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:1427

Breyer concluded that courts, in their exercise of discretion whether to
award enhanced damages, must account for the specific circumstances
of each case, which “make[ ] all the difference.”289 It would surely be
undesirable from a social welfare perspective to require a company to
deplete its legal budget, and maybe its whole operating budget, in
order to examine thousands of patents and initiate licensing
negotiations over many of them. In contrast, a more limited search
and analysis may not be excessively burdensome, and would be
consistent with what could be reasonably expected for certain types of
defendants.290
What is even less defensible, however, is a state of affairs in which a
complete non-search often ends up being preferred to a search, even
for well-resourced, sophisticated defendants practicing in the relevant,
well-circumscribed technology space.291 Indeed, although Justice
Breyer proceeded from the assumption “that the infringer knew of the
patent”292 before it could be eligible for enhanced damages, his “allcircumstances” insight actually points the other way. While it
sometimes may be non-reckless to do very little about a patent one
knows about, the converse could also be true — failing to discover
and address a patent that one could have readily found and analyzed
could be a hallmark of recklessness, making the infringer a “guilty”
one.293 But under the Federal Circuit’s willfulness doctrine, if a
company adopted a policy of never searching for patents, never
opening a demand letter, and instructing outside counsel to never
inform it of any relevant patents, it would still be “innocent.”294 As
colorfully described by a patent lawyer I know, this “would be the
patent equivalent of a driver putting on a blindfold and later claiming
(truthfully) he had no actual knowledge of all the pedestrians he ran
over.”295 An alternative rule that would induce companies to spend
some of their legal budgets on learning the broader patent landscape,
as opposed to analyzing a few patents they learned about from a
demand letter, would in turn discourage head-in-the-sand behavior

289

Id. at 1936.
See infra Section III.B.
291 See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.
292 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936.
293 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 461.
294 But see Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)
(concluding that, in the context of mental states for indirect infringement, willful
blindness equals actual knowledge).
295 Attributed with permission to Andrew Baluch.
290
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and align with the disclosure and information-dissemination functions
of the patent system.
***
The foregoing considerations suggest that the actual knowledge rule
is a poor fit as a threshold for enhanced damages in patent law, and is
potentially wrong in view of Halo and other authority. In the next
Part, I look to tort law and other areas of civil litigation to see how
analogous issues are handled. The aim of this analysis is manifold.
First, I maintain that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, evolving
common-law standards for enhanced damages should inform
analogous questions of patent law.296 I examine a Supreme Court case,
Smith v. Wade, that endorsed this methodology in a context of a
different federal statute.297 Second, adopting this interpretive
approach, I look to changes in mental state standards for enhanced
damages in other areas of law to supply content for awarding patent
treble damages, and, more generally, to see what patent law can learn
from the accumulated wisdom on enhanced damages in civil litigation.
This discussion fills the gaps left open by Halo, which embraced the
rationale that treble damages in patent law are like punitive damages,
but did not fully hash out the issue of what mental states must be
proven to obtain such damages. In particular, history provides a
grounding for Halo’s seemingly ambivalent treatment of treble
damages, which allows for sanctions against behaviors that are
“consciously wrongful” and “characteristic of a pirate,” but also those
that are reckless.298 Third, I focus on the claim, particularly
controversial in the area of punitive damages, that tort law has moved
toward the goal of economic efficiency over time and examine the

296 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 15, at 1083; see also Karshtedt, Causal
Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 586. Professor Ted Sichelman
questioned the value of tort principles for patent damages, Sichelman, supra note 6, at
554-60, but conceded that the Patent Act would need to be amended for his proposal
to be adopted, id. at 567-68. But in this Article, I take § 284, and its interpretation in
Halo, as givens and operate within these constraints. For an analysis of the tensions
between the goals of tort law and those of copyright law, raising issues similar to those
one encounters in developing the tort-patent connection, see generally Wendy J.
Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 449 (1992).
297 461 U.S. 30, 46-50 (1983). Smith was cited, but not analyzed, in Seagate. See In
re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
298 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016).
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relevance of this argument for the correct standard for treble damages
in patent cases.
II.

SUPRA-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES OUTSIDE PATENT LAW
A. Methodological Considerations

When Congress has been silent on the standards to apply for
awarding supra-compensatory damages, how should courts go about
filling in those standards? Fortunately for the purposes of this Article,
the Patent Act is not unique among federal statutes in setting forth no
standards for the recovery of supra-compensatory damages, so courts
have faced this general problem in other contexts. A well-known
example is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that creates a civil cause of
action for those who have suffered “the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”299 at
the hands of state officers. This section says little about remedies,
stating only that the losing defendant “shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.”300 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court readily concluded
that, among other remedies, Congress implicitly provided for punitive
damages against those found to have violated § 1983.301
As to the mental state standard for awarding such damages, the
Supreme Court explained that a two-stage analysis is in order.302 A
court should first ascertain the requirements for this remedy in the
developing tort law and, second, determine whether overriding policy
considerations in the specific statutory context would support a
departure from the dominant tort approach. While, in this section, I
focus on the first step of the analysis as set forth by the Court in an
important § 1983 case, I undertake a deeper exploration of the
trajectory of the tort punitive damages standard in the section that
follows, further hashing out the appropriate mental state that the
Wade Court has gleaned from the case law. Finally, in section II.C, I
examine whether policy considerations should override the tort
approach to mental states for enhanced damages in the context of the
Patent Act.
299

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
Id.
301 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980). Because § 1983 does not speak to
punitive damages, they are uncapped and limited only by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
302 See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
300
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In Smith v. Wade,303 the Supreme Court faced the question of what a
defendant’s minimal level of culpability should be for a plaintiff to
collect punitive damages in a successful suit under § 1983. Daniel
Wade, confined in a reformatory for youthful first offenders in
Missouri, successfully sued William Smith, a guard who had placed
Wade in a cell with other inmates who ended up assaulting Wade.304
After the district court instructed the jury that it “may assess punitive
or exemplary damages” upon showing that Smith exhibited “a reckless
or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of
others,” the jury “awarded [Wade] $25,000 in compensatory damages
and $5,000 in punitive damages.”305 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Eighth Circuit in turn.306 Although parallels between
patent infringement and deprivations of civil rights are difficult to
draw based on the differences in the interests at stake, the case is
nonetheless useful and instructive for its statutory interpretation
methodology. As in Halo, the Court dealt with a relatively old statute
whose language did not say very much. Accordingly, the Court turned
to tort law to deal with the problem before it, and made some
significant jurisprudential points.
In determining the appropriate mental state standard for § 1983
punitive damages, the Court looked “to the common law of torts (both
modern and as of 1871 [the year that § 1983 was signed into law]),
with such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry
out the purpose and policy of the statute.”307 Moreover, the Court
explicitly defended its reliance on modern tort law. It explained that,
while “we have found useful guidance in the law prevailing at the time
when § 1983 was enacted[,] it does not follow that that law is
absolutely controlling, or that current law is irrelevant.”308 The Court
noted that “if the prevailing view on some point of general tort law
had changed substantially in the intervening century . . . , we might be
highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a
now-obsolete doctrine.”309
303

461 U.S. 30 (1983).
Id. at 32-33.
305 Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
306 Id. at 33, 56.
307 Id. at 34.
308 Id. at 34 n.2.
309 Id.; see Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory
Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 8-9, 25), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131242 (arguing that statutes such
304
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Canvassing both modern and historical sources, the Supreme Court
ultimately settled on the standard of recklessness as opposed to intent
for punitive damages under § 1983. The Court initially determined
that
[m]ost cases under state common law, although varying in
their precise terminology, have adopted more or less the same
rule, recognizing that punitive damages in tort cases may be
awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but
also for recklessness, serious indifference to or disregard for
the rights of others, or even gross negligence.310
Based on this interpretive approach, the Court’s distillation of state
common-law developments led it to conclude tentatively that punitive
damages in § 1983 actions could be awarded for behaviors beyond
those that exhibited subjective intent to harm a particular victim. In
other words, the Court adopted the recklessness mental state as a kind
of a presumptive minimal standard for punitive damages based on the
common law, and then noted that “the purpose and policy” of § 1983
did not override this default.311 Specifically, the court determined that
Smith “has not shown why § 1983 should give higher protection from
punitive damages than ordinary tort law” by way of adopting the
intent, as opposed to recklessness, standard to open the door for such
damages.312
Justice Rehnquist’s thoughtful dissent, joined by two other Justices,
nicely captured the distinction between intent and recklessness. He
explained that the “distinction between acts that are intentionally
harmful and those that are very negligent, or unreasonable, involves a
basic difference of kind, not just a variation of degree.”313 But what is
the precise nature of that difference? “The former typically demands
inquiry into the actor’s subjective motive and purpose, while the latter
ordinarily requires only an objective determination of the relative risks

as the Lanham Act and § 1983 should be interpreted under the “common law method”
and enumerating factors pointing to the conclusion that the Patent Act likely does as
well).
310 Smith, 461 U.S. at 47-48.
311 Id. at 34; see Edward F. Mahoney, Casenote, Punitive Damages and the Use of
Modern Common Law in Construing Section 1983: Smith v. Wade, 25 B.C. L. REV. 1001,
1004-10 (1984) (discussing the genesis of this analytical approach).
312 Smith, 461 U.S. at 50.
313 Id. at 64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (first citing WILLIAM J. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971); then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500,
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
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and advantages accruing to society from particular behavior.”314
Justice Rehnquist believed that the subjective standard was more
historically defensible than recklessness for punitive damages under
§ 1983, as well as more appropriate from a policy perspective.315
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning has merit.316 In suits against
government officers engaged in abusive behaviors under color of law,
the coherence of a primarily subjective standard can be reasonably
defended. Here, it might make sense for juries to focus mainly on
punishing wardens and guards for consciously neglecting (and
perhaps showing disdain for) their duties toward prisoners in their
charge.317 Indeed, because § 1983 actions might be viewed as quasicriminal,318 a mainly objective, cost-benefit evaluation of the
defendant’s conduct leaves one uneasy in this context.319 In this vein,
there was some ambiguity with respect to the precise basis on which
punitive damages in Smith were imposed. While the case’s facts are
consistent with the guard’s laziness or desire to save money and time,
they also suggest that he subjectively held the lives of the prisoners in
his custody in low regard,320 and punitive damages were properly
awarded to sanction and deter such an immoral attitude and
associated conduct.321 Perhaps it stands to reason, then, that courts
applying Smith eventually settled on the criminal version of the
recklessness standard for punitive damages under § 1983.322 Justice
Rehnquist may have lost the battle in Smith, but he arguably won the
314

Id. at 64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282).
Id.
316 See Gary B. Brewer, A Recklessness Standard for Punitive Damages in Section 1983
Actions, 49 MO. L. REV. 815, 816-20 (1984) (criticizing the Smith majority and
defending Justice Rehnquist’s view).
317 See id. (providing various rationales for limiting the availability of punitive
damages in § 1983 actions).
318 See Taylor Van Hove, Fraud, Mistake, and Section 1983 Prison Claims: Why the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Should Be Amended to Require Heightened Pleading for
Section 1983 Inmate Litigation, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (2015); cf. Rachel A. Harmon,
The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765-77 (2012). To the extent that we
wished to make it easier to punish these violations, though, a civil recklessness
standard may be appropriate. See infra notes 371–74 and accompanying text
(suggesting that this dynamic may be behind the development of the law of punitive
damages for drunk driving).
319 See infra Section II.C.
320 Smith, 461 U.S. at 32-33.
321 Id. at 49-54.
322 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999) (construing Smith
to have held that subjective recklessness is the standard for punitive damages under
§ 1983).
315
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war in that future decisions adopted this more morally-grounded type
of recklessness which, like intent, has strongly subjective features.
The difference between the two forms of recklessness is worth
exploring further. Echoing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Smith, the
Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan distinguished them as follows:
While “[t]he criminal law . . . generally permits a finding of
recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he
is aware,” “[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who
acts . . . in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either
known or so obvious that it should be known.”323 In Safeco v. Burr, the
Court explained that in contrast to criminal recklessness, “[s]ubjective
knowledge on the part of the offender”324 is not required for civil
recklessness. While § 1983 actions today call for a criminal version of
recklessness as a prerequisite for punitive damages awards, perhaps
most other civil actions, like claims for compensation under the FCRA
addressed in Safeco, sensibly demand proof of only civil recklessness
before enhanced damages can be imposed.325
Leaving aside the details of Smith, the case’s methodology for setting
the standard for awarding punitive damages under a federal statute is
worth recapping. The Court looked to developing tort law to fill the
gaps in the statute, and only then, as a second line of analysis,
considered whether the tort standard made sense for § 1983 actions as
a policy matter.326 Smith is not unique in its focus on the common law.
323 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994). It is notable that even cases like Farmer, which
explicitly adopted the criminal version of recklessness as the standard for establishing
Eighth Amendment violations in prisoner suits, have been interpreted by some courts
to allow liability with proof of something less than actual knowledge. See, e.g.,
Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015) (vacating the judgment of a
district court against the plaintiff in an Eighth Amendment prisoner suit because the
lower court “failed to appreciate that the subjective ‘actual knowledge’ standard
required to find deliberate indifference may be proven by circumstantial evidence that
a risk was so obvious that it had to have been known”); see also Brice v. Va. Beach
Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Nevertheless, even under this
subjective standard, a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was
unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious.”).
324 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 n.18 (2007).
325 Id. at 68; cf. supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting critiques of subjective
standards in patent law by other commentators). Interestingly, Safeco also held that
punitive damages under the FCRA are not available for bad-faith conduct in the
absence of a showing of objective recklessness, obliquely referring to “history and
current thinking.” 551 U.S. at 70 n.20. But the Supreme Court distinguished this
aspect of Safeco in view of patent-specific precedents allowing for enhanced damages
for bad-faith infringement. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933
n.* (2016); see Narechania, supra note 212 (manuscript at 48).
326 See Michael L. Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV.
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To give another example, the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, a case involving punitive damages for torts under the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts,327 likewise drew upon state law
sources. The Exxon Court emphasized the importance of
“understanding of the place of punishment in modern civil law and
reasonable standards of process in administering punitive law,” and
accordingly provided “a brief account of the history behind today’s
punitive damages” before settling on the proper standard.328 The
Court’s characterization of the mental states relevant for punitive
damages was not far off from that of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in
Smith: Exxon noted that “under the umbrellas of punishment and its
aim of deterrence, degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent,”
and explained that “[r]eckless conduct is not intentional or malicious,
nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as
opposed to unheedful of it.”329 Notably, Exxon dealt only with the
issue of the proper cap on punitive damages, and did not question the
availability of this remedy in admiralty cases for behaviors falling
under the rubric of civil recklessness.330
Halo, like Smith and Exxon, looked to the common law of punitive
damages when it interpreted § 284, and flagged intent and
recklessness as the relevant culpability levels as well.331 The general
approach is ubiquitous: as Professors William Baude and Stephen
Sachs argued in a recent article, the common law routinely provides
unwritten “substantive rules” for interpreting federal legislation.332 But
to fully understand what Halo meant, an exploration of relevant tort
precedents is in order.
B. Punitive Damages in Tort
1.

Historical Developments

For a significant period of time in Anglo-American legal history,
torts and crimes were essentially undifferentiated.333 Both the state and
841, 844 (1996) (calling this a “two-part approach”).
327 554 U.S. 471, 489-90 (2008); see also supra notes 138–42 and accompanying
text.
328 Exxon, 554 U.S. at 490.
329 Id. at 493.
330 Id. at 493-94.
331 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016).
332 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 15, at 1105-07.
333 See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 (7th ed. 2015); Colby, Clearing
the Smoke, supra note 31, at 395. For an early case suggesting a distinction, see
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the injured party had a role to play in pursuing the offender in the
same case, blurring the functions and procedural aspects of what we
today recognize as criminal as opposed to civil actions. In some suits,
the injured party had the option of obtaining a monetary judgment
from the offender if it principally sought compensation, or of having
the offender imprisoned if he or she cared more about revenge.334
Although actions that we would characterize today as civil eventually
became independent from their criminal counterparts, scholars of the
common law have noted the historic links between them. For
example, “[l]arceny has been regarded as the criminal kin to the civil
action for trespass vi et armis, that is, by actual or implied violence,”
and “[m]ost scholars of English law agree that the writ of trespass is
derived from the appeal of felony for larceny.”335 Even so, the close
link between criminal and civil actions remained. Thus, “[a] civil
action of trespass as late as 1694 could result in criminal sanctions
against the defendant.”336 The spirit of the historical tort-crime
connection persists to this day, and some theorists continue to see
some aspects of tort law as carrying out the function of private
vengeance, or recourse.337
Weaver v. Ward (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284, 284 (K.B.) (noting that “if a lunatick hurts
a man, he shall be answerable in trespass,” but explaining that the killing “shall be no
felony”); cf. WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 216 (1896). See
generally David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common
Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 83-86 (1996).
334 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 432 (“Victims who preferred
compensation could bring an action for a writ of trespass; victims who preferred
vengeance could bring an appeal of felony. ‘They could either put their wrongdoers to
death and collect nothing [through an appeal of felony], or collect money for
themselves and leave their wrongdoers alive with the rest of their wealth intact
[through a writ of trespass].’” (quoting Seipp, supra note 333, at 84) (alterations in
original)).
335 Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1446 (1984) (citation omitted). Professor Tigar noted that “[m]ost scholars of
English law agree that the writ of trespass is derived from the appeal of felony for
larceny.” Id. (citing THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 369-70 (5th ed. 1956)).
336 Note, supra note 123, at 523.
337 See Keating, supra note 66, at 343-44 (setting forth the moral foundations of
tort law’s reasonableness standard); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 974 (2010) (“When the socialcontract metaphor is stripped away, the idea of civil recourse becomes clearer. It is a
political commitment to the following effect: Individuals who are able to prove that
someone has treated them in a manner that the legal system counts as a relational,
injurious wrong shall have the authority to hold the wrongdoer accountable to him.
This commitment is not founded, in the first instance, on instrumental concerns but
on political and moral ones.”). See generally ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
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Even as tort law began to embrace the goal of compensation in the
nineteenth century,338 courts’ description of punitive damages as a
vehicle of vengeance and punishment continued to reflect the tortcrime link. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1864 that “where
the wrong is wanton, or it is willful, the jury are authorized to give an
amount of damages beyond the actual injury sustained, as a
punishment, and to preserve the public tranquillity.”339 The reference
to “public tranquillity” suggests that punitive damages could reduce
the possibility of self-help by fulfilling tort victims’ desire for revenge.
According to the court, this function was different from that of
compensatory damages, which were meant to cover the victims’
monetary losses for “the actual injury sustained.”340 Some nineteenthcentury courts, however, took a different view, arguing that
punishment is the exclusive province of criminal law and punitive
damages do not belong in civil litigation at all.341 While punitive
damages remain an integral part of tort law today, the fit continues to
be an uneasy one and some commentators have argued that such
damages are nothing but criminal-style punishment through the civil
litigation backdoor.342
Still, the Illinois court’s reference to “public tranquility” seems
jarring to modern ears. Although public-order rationales for punitive
damages in tort, and for tort law as a whole, continue to be invoked
today, we now generally think of criminal law as playing the dominant
role over tort in helping maintain the peace.343 The law in the
(1995). Indeed, even a claim only for compensatory damages from a defendant, rather
than for punitive damages or for the defendant’s imprisonment, can be characterized
as seeking recourse. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra, at 960-66.
338 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
339 Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 475 (1864) (citing Foot v. Nichols, 28 Ill. 486,
488 (1862)); see also Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C.P.) (Heath J)
(“It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult by
exemplary damages.”); cf. McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 432, 437 (1845) (stating
that the function of punitive damages is “not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to
punish the defendant”); PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A PRACTITIONER’S
HANDBOOK 6-12 (Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998) (summarizing the history of punitive
damages).
340 Hawk, 33 Ill. at 475.
341 Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872).
342 See, e.g., Redish & Mathews, supra note 31, at 13-16.
343 Ellis, supra note 31, at 29. To be clear, the functions of revenge and of deterrence
of unlawful behavior are not mutually exclusive, and perhaps even complementary.
And, particularly in actions for intentional trespass to land, the rationale of prevention
of breaches of the peace, as through violent self-help, appears even today. See, e.g.,
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 209 (Wis. 1997). But the focus on
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nineteenth century, however, presented a somewhat different picture.
One commentator, Professor Michael Rustad, noted:
The doctrine of exemplary damages was used in nineteenthcentury American cases to punish and deter defendants who
committed a wide variety of intentional torts with a spirit of
malice, fraud, oppression, or insult. The purpose of the
remedy was to compensate the plaintiff for the mortification of
the injury and deter the defendant from repeating actions
which threatened the social order. The overriding function of
the remedy was to preserve the social peace and avoid crude
forms of self-help such as dueling and the type of destructive
social conflict dubbed by historian William Holdsworth as
“bastard feudalism.”344
Consistent with these intuitions, enhanced damages functioned to
provide redress for reprehensible interpersonal behaviors that
embodied the defendant’s extreme disregard for the rights of a specific
victim. Examples include cases of assault, seduction, breach of a
promise to marry, libel, and other “insults.”345 There are complications
in this picture: As Professor Rustad’s reference to “compensat[ing] the
plaintiff for the mortification of the injury” suggests,346 “exemplary” or
“vindictive” damages were not always completely divorced from the
goal of compensation — at least when it came to “dignitary” injuries
for which compensatory damages were difficult to quantify. Professor
Anthony Sebok, likewise, explained that “compensation for emotional
suffering” and “compensation for insult” were two make-whole
functions of “exemplary” damages that can be gleaned from
nineteenth-century opinions.347
Nonetheless, early understandings of the kinds of torts for which
punitive damages were available convey opprobrium of malevolent
behavior toward fellow human beings that, according to Professor
Sebok, gave this remedy a strong retributive flavor. In the context of a
discussion of punitive damages for trespass to chattels and seduction,

revenge as a key reason for awarding punitive damages appears more pronounced in
nineteenth-century tort cases as opposed to modern ones.
344 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7 (quoting 2 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, 2
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416-18 (3d ed. 1923)).
345 See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 200.
346 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3.
347 Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 197-201; cf. supra note
52 and accompanying text (noting that such harms are not remedied by compensatory
damages in modern tort law).
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Sebok noted that “[o]ne might even describe the phenomenon of
exemplary damages as a concrete example of the expressive use of
punishment, where punishment is not inflicted to alter criminals’ costbenefit analysis but to alter criminals’ sense of what would be tolerated
by the communities in which they live every day.”348 Thus, in line
with early tort law’s close connection with criminal law, punitive
damages began as a remedy against those who were acting upon evil
motives and exhibited reprehensible interpersonal conduct that would
be expected to prompt revenge.
But things have changed, at least to some degree. Professor
Catherine Sharkey contended that “[m]odern tort cases . . . have
exerted increasing pressure upon this individual-specific harm
model”349 that focuses on “retributive punishment.”350 As the advent
of the industrial age led to a depersonalization of injury-causing
behavior, the doctrine of punitive damages “expanded to punish and
deter large corporations which recklessly endangered the public
through their misconduct.”351 The law, however, was left with an old
vocabulary for labeling enhancement-eligible offenses: Professor
Rustad noted that “[t]he words most frequently used to describe
conduct deserving of punitive damages such as ill-will, evil motive or
wanton misconduct are fictitious when applied to organizational
deviance.”352
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a corporation, through its
officers, would actually seek to harm consumers with its products.353
More likely, this type of defendant would aim to cut costs and in so
doing put out an unsafe product or service — with railroads
distinguishing themselves as perhaps the most notable late nineteenth-

348

Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 203.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 357.
350 Id. at 353.
351 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7.
352 Id.; see also Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, supra note 31, at 119
(arguing that formulation of precise standards for punitive damages awards would
help prevent unfair results against corporate defendants).
353 Cf. Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15 (discussing the incoherency of
the notion of subjective mental states of corporations). Interestingly, punitive damages
are awarded more frequently for business torts than for personal injuries. See MARK A.
FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 756 (10th ed.
2016) (“Punitive damages are awarded more frequently and at higher rate in
commercial litigation than in tort cases. The only category of personal injury torts in
which punitive damages are awarded at a higher rate than the rate in commercial
litigation is intentional torts.”).
349
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century corporate miscreant of this sort.354 The law adjusted to these
developments, and punitive damages moved beyond the realm of
intentional torts against specific persons: “[B]eginning in the midnineteenth century, punitive damages were awarded in negligence
cases, where the defendant’s conduct was gross or reckless.”355 The
“public tranquility” rationale is more difficult to invoke in tort claims
alleging corporate misdeeds, as it would seem that one is more likely
to duel with or otherwise personally take revenge on an individual
who committed assault or libel, or corrupted one’s child, than with the
CEO whose product caused an injury due to reckless corporate
conduct.356
The twentieth century saw a further shift toward a more objective
conception of punitive damages. As Professor Sharkey concluded, “It
is no longer the case that malice or wanton conduct is required;
increasingly, state legislatures and courts acknowledge that reckless
disregard can suffice”357 for the imposition of such damages. In some
states, courts continued to use terms like “wanton,” but effectively
redefined them to bring them into line with the recklessness
framework.358 Professor Jody Kraus noted the linguistic side of this
phenomenon in an insightful article, explaining that courts might
resort to terms whose semantic purchase might have originally been
deontic, but which modern developments have imbued with
economic-efficiency connotations at least to some degree.359 The shift
has been comprehensive and covers numerous areas of law — from
individual negligence to corporate torts, including products liability,
354

See, e.g., Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869).
Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7.
356 But see Zipursky, supra note 31, at 107 (“The plaintiff’s right to be punitive
constitutes the core of a civil aspect of punitive damages, while the state’s goal of
inflicting punishment upon the defendant is the root of a criminal aspect.”); see also
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 337, at 974; cf. 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, SHAPO ON THE
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 29.04[I].1 (7th ed. 2017) (“Decisions favoring the award
of punitive damages sometimes have an avowedly moral slant.”).
357 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 358 & n.19.
358 For a leading example, see Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 863-65 (Cal.
1979) (Clark, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of twisting statutory language in
concluding that reckless conduct was indicative of “malice”), discussed immediately
infra.
359 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 323-36
(2007). But see Schwartz, supra note 27, at 141 (“The common law’s criteria governing
eligibility for punitive damages — ‘malice,’ ‘recklessness,’ and ‘conscious disregard’ for
victim’s rights — . . . seem out of line with the standards one would expect from a
deterrence oriented system.”).
355
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and to intellectual property cousins of patent law, copyright and
trademark. I consider each in turn in the following sections, hashing
out the prevailing modern approach to mental states for punitive
damages as I go.
2.

Modern Developments

a.

Drunk Driving

In a well-known case, Taylor v. Superior Court,360 the Supreme
Court of California was faced with deciding whether a statute that, at
the time, allowed recovery of punitive damages “where the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied”361
applied against a drunk driver. The trial court sustained the
defendant’s demurrer to the claim for punitive damages “based upon
plaintiff’s failure to allege any actual intent of defendant to harm
plaintiff or others.”362 The high court disagreed that this was the
appropriate standard and allowed the punitive damages claim to
proceed.
Turning to the Prosser on Torts treatise, the court explained that one
way a plaintiff can establish entitlement to punitive damages is to
show that the defendant engaged in “such a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called
wilful [sic] or wanton.”363 Canvassing case law authority, it held that
“courts have not limited the availability of punitive damages to cases
in which . . . an intent [to harm the plaintiff or others] has been
shown” and noted that the plaintiff can recover punitive damages if it
demonstrates “that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully [sic] and
deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.”364 The court
concluded that this standard was met in Taylor based on the fact that
the defendant got behind the wheel while intoxicated.365 In doing so, it
abrogated a lower-court decision holding that, while drunk driving “is
a reckless and wrongful and illegal thing to do . . . , it is not a

360 598 P.2d 854. See generally Michael H. Whitehill, Taylor v. Superior Court:
Punitive Damages for Nondeliberate Torts — The Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 911 (1980).
361 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1976).
362 Taylor, 598 P.2d at 855 (majority opinion).
363 Id. at 856 (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 313, § 2, at 9-10).
364 Id.
365 Id.
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malicious act,”366 and thus redefined “malice” to include reckless
conduct.
Relying on an older conception of punitive damages, the lone
dissenter in Taylor contended that “the evil motive requisite to
punitive damage is simply not shown by driving while intoxicated.”367
The dissent noted that “[r]arely will the defendant have been drinking
for the purpose of injuring someone, with knowledge that his drinking
will injure the plaintiff, or even with knowledge that his drinking will
probably injure someone.”368 But the dissent’s attitude has not
prevailed. Along with California, most states now allow punitive
damages in negligence cases against drunk drivers,369 even though the
“malice” in the old sense of the word — an act directed at hurting a
specific victim — is not present in these circumstances.
Although driving while intoxicated and similar “aggravated
negligence” scenarios embody an expansion of punitive damages
theories from sanctioning acts conducted with malicious intent to
harm particular individuals into the realm of generalized recklessness,
they do involve behavior that we might seek to eliminate completely,
rather than optimize.370 To be sure, sober driving is a socially useful
activity, but perhaps we should not be too concerned if drunk driving
is overdeterred with the recklessness standard of culpability.371 In
366

Id. (quoting Gombos v. Ashe, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
Id. at 864 (Clark, J., dissenting).
368 Id.
369 Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1988) (“The overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue have ruled that punitive
damages are available in drunk driving cases.”). But see Komornik v. Sparks, 629 A.2d
721 (Md. 1993) (denying punitive damages for drunk driving). Moreover, some states
require a previous history of intoxicated driving for the award of punitive damages.
See Bolsta v. Johnson, 848 A.2d 306, 308-09 (Vt. 2004); see also Taylor, 598 P.2d at
859-60 (Bird, C.J., concurring). California itself amended the punitive damages statute
to include the word “despicable,” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (2018), which makes
punitive damages more difficult to obtain. See Lackner v. North, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863,
880-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
370 See Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 470-76; Sharkey, Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 489, 492; see also George G. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (listing activities that
have no social utility). In contrast, overdeterrence of prison guards (for example)
might have social costs. Cf. supra notes 319–24 and accompanying text (discussing
this scenario).
371 In other words, there is no need to worry about overdeterring conduct that has
no or almost no social utility. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 367 (1980)
(noting that antitrust law sanctions against price fixing might reflect this attitude);
Stigler, supra note 370.
367

2018]

Enhancing Patent Damages

1495

addition, drunk driving might even fit into the old moral opprobrium
model of punitive damages: While the behavior at issue does not
involve intentional harm, it is nonetheless highly reprehensible, and
might prompt self-help by way of retribution.372 The relaxation of
punitive damages standards for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers,
then, may just be a legal adaptation that makes it easier to sanction
conduct that, although not fully in the mold of the nineteenth-century
intentional tort model of punitive damages,373 seems bad enough to
constitute malice in the classical sense.374 Still, the expansion of
punitive damages to generalized reckless conduct has ensnared far
more than just drunk driving cases.375
b.

Products Liability and Other Corporate Torts

Imposition of punitive damages for corporate torts, and particularly
against defendants liable for making or selling defective products,
presents questions that are more challenging than those involving
supra-compensatory awards in cases of assault or drunk driving.376
Unlike excessive damages for behaviors that have no redeeming value,
“expansive approaches to liability [for product defects] might damage
the innovation infrastructure, and the economy in general might
suffer.”377 Even when certain units of the product end up hurting
people, product manufacturing activities are, on the whole, socially
valuable. For these reasons, the balancing of risk and utility can be
particularly important in products liability cases.378 Patent law can
372 Cf. Livingston Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133 (1940) (cataloguing the trend of increasing penalties for reckless
driving crimes); Lydia Warren, Father Breaks Down in Tears as He’s Found NOT GUILTY
of Shooting Dead Drunk Driver Who Killed His Two Young Sons in Car Wreck,
DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2736066/DadACQUITTED-shooting-dead-drunk-driver-killed-two-sons.html.
373 See supra Section II.B.1.
374 Shooting into a crowd might be an early example of such behavior — although
not directed at a specific person, this sort of conduct could still be eligible for punitive
damages. See, e.g., Bannister v. Mitchell, 104 S.E. 800, 801 (Va. 1920).
375 Interestingly, the majority and dissent in Taylor also disagreed on whether
punitive damages against intoxicated drivers made sense from a deterrence
perspective. Compare Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 897, 899 (Cal. 1979)
(arguing that punitive damages will deter drunk driving), with id. at 903-05, 909-10
(Clark, J., dissenting) (countering that criminal penalties are sufficient to deter this
behavior).
376 For a leading early article on punitive damages in products liability cases, see
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, supra note 29.
377 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620.
378 See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
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present similar challenges, and “policy debates in the law of products
liability have resembled in some ways the debates in patent law.”379
Although, as Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Halo, patent
infringement is an “unlawful activity,”380 the proposition that
“expansive liability that would squash downstream inventive activity
is not desirable”381 seems difficult to contest.
As I suggested in a recent article, “compensatory aspects of the two
areas of law are different — patent infringement actions are meant to
make up for patentees’ forgone royalties (or lost sales, if provable) and
encourage innovation by future inventors, while products liability
actions typically provide monetary recourse for physical injuries.”382
But although the latter function sounds far more important, it must be
remembered that we live in a world of extensive first-party insurance,
with tort suits sometimes characterized as an avenue of last resort.383
In addition, dynamic effects of patent damages cannot be ignored.
Thus, as Professor Keith Hylton observed, while actions of future tort
victims are unlikely to be affected by damages awards in prior cases,
the same assumption might not hold for patent infringement.384 Low
awards, particularly those in cases in which the defendant made the
decision to accept the possibility of litigation in the event of getting
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 106263 (2009) (explaining that products liability for design defects now predominantly
involves risk-utility balancing, while liability for manufacturing defects remains close
to true strict liability). Regular (i.e., non-willful) patent infringement, to be sure, is a
strict-liability offense and therefore does involve this kind of balancing, but there may
be good utilitarian reasons for this rule. See Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for
Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (2016). But cf.
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 475 (2006) (questioning strict liability in patent law). See generally Oswald,
supra note 15 (criticizing the strict liability nomenclature for patent infringement).
379 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620.
380 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
381 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620;
see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936-38.
382 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620;
cf. Sichelman, supra note 6 (contending that the tort-law remedial framework should
be eliminated from patent law completely).
383 See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1546-49 (1966). Conversely, it is notable that patent
infringement liability insurance has not become prevalent to the degree that tort
liability insurance is. I thank Professor Jacob Sherkow for suggesting that I make this
point.
384 Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 428-29; see
also Gordon, supra note 296, at 454 (addressing this dynamic in copyright law).
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“caught” as a “cost of doing business,”385 could hurt innovation down
the line. At the same time, though, incentives for plaintiff
opportunism provided by awards that are excessive could also have
deleterious social effects.386
The bottom line is that enhanced damages for corporate torts, as for
patent infringement, require balance. Even though torts involving
product defects cause physical harm, concerns about excessive
damages in this area reveal that some amount of injury-causing
behavior might well go unremedied, or at least not sanctioned with
punitive damages, so as to avoid overdeterring socially productive
activity. Moreover, and closer to patent law in this particular respect,
punitive damages are frequently awarded in suits for tortious
interference with contract and other business torts that result only in
financial injuries.387 There is no physical injury requirement for
enhanced damages. Thus, in addition to examining mental state
standards for punitive damages awards in products liability and other
corporate tort cases because they are reflective of the evolving
common law and therefore relevant for interpreting the Patent Act,388 I
look to these areas of tort law because they might provide particularly
helpful substantive guidance due to some parallels in the tradeoffs
involved.
An examination of cases involving punitive damages in products
liability cases yields interesting insights. In many states that award
such damages, lack of awareness of a specific victim is a given, and
lack of actual knowledge of the injury-causing product defect may not
be a barrier either.389 Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries, an
385 Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 514 (7th Cir.
1994) (addressing this issue in a copyright case).
386 See, e.g., Samuel Chase Means, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent
Law’s Willful Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999,
2034.
387 See, e.g., Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 277-78 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 96 (Minn. 1979); Empire
Trucking Co. v. Reading Anthracite Coal Co., 71 A.3d 923, 936-39 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2013); see also Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus
“Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 133 (1999);
supra note 353 and accompanying text; cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as
Market Prospect, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 443 (2018) (likening copyright infringement to
tortious interference). Even in products liability cases, the harm does not always come
in the form of a physical injury. See, e.g., Hess v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 341 P.3d
662, 671 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J., concurring).
388 See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text.
389 See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 26.15 (4th ed. 2017) (“Punitive damages . . . may be appropriate when a
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Oklahoma asbestos case, provides an informative example.390 In Thiry,
a plaintiff who developed asbestosis sued an asbestos manufacturer on
the theories that “defendants’ products were defective in that they
failed to adequately warn of health hazards associated with the use of
asbestos” and that “defendant had an obligation to test its products
and remain abreast of the medical and scientific knowledge
concerning hazards in the use of products.”391 In addition, the plaintiff
argued that the “defendants knew that exposure to asbestos would
cause asbestosis or if defendants did not know such fact it was due to
its gross omission, conscious indifference and utter disregard for
persons exposed to the product.”392 On these theories, the plaintiff
sought “to recover exemplary and punitive damages in such an
amount as would deter defendants and others from such conscious
indifference and utter disregard for the welfare of users of their
products.”393
In prefatory comments, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted that
“[b]y removing the negligence requirement for recovery, strict liability
expands the legal consequences of fault to the ‘innocent’ manufacturer
of defective products.”394 But it explained that “[s]o much attention
was devoted to the questions of how innocent manufacturers should
be liable for defects in their products that rules applying to the highly
blameworthy manufacturer may have been forgotten.”395 Accordingly,
the court saw the need to complement the ‘shield’ of compensation
provided by strict liability doctrine with a ‘sword’ of punitive
damages.”396 Importantly, the court observed that while its prior cases
used “traditional phrases as ‘willful and wanton, malice, oppression,
gross negligence, ill will, actual malice, or under circumstances
manufacturer’s testing or quality control procedures are so grossly inadequate in view
of the known risks as to constitute a reckless indifference to public safety.”); see also
SHAPO, supra note 356, § 29.04[J] (“Good general advice to businesses seeking to
avoid the risk of punitive damages is to be able to establish that they have taken
seriously a potential risk associated with their product.”). But cf. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 652-53 (Md. 1992) (in a state where punitive damages are
uncapped, adopting an actual knowledge approach in products liability cases).
390 661 P.2d 515, 516 (Okla. 1983).
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.; cf. John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257 (2017) (explaining how the defendant’s blameworthiness
could be taken into account in the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish the
amount of damages).
396 Thiry, 661 P.2d at 517.
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amounting to fraud or oppression,’” it maintained that “[a] more
clearly defined and articulated standard is needed in the products
liability context.”397
The court held that social functions of punitive damages for injuries
from defective products would be vindicated when such damages were
allowed “if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects reckless
disregard for the public safety.”398 The court explained that “[t]o meet
this standard the manufacturer must either be aware of, or culpably
indifferent to, an unnecessary risk of injury” so as to “fail to determine
the gravity of the danger or fail to reduce the risk to an acceptable
minimal level.”399 But what, in the court’s view, was the hallmark of
“culpable indifference”? Was the court’s approach to culpability
concentrated on the subjective mental states of the defendant, or did it
include more objective considerations?
In keeping with the somewhat ambivalent nature of punitive
damages, the test fashioned by the court revealed that both kinds of
considerations matter. The court listed several factors for the lower
courts to consider in determining whether punitive damages for
product defects should be imposed, including “the gravity of the
resulting risk of harm to the public,” “the costs of correcting or
reducing the danger,” the level of “awareness of the existence and
gravity of the product defect,” and “the nature of steps actually taken
to correct the defect.”400 Although some of these factors suggest
economic cost-benefit analysis, the court also referred to displays of
“basic disrespect for the interests of others” as important to the
inquiry401 — implying moral opprobrium of a defendant who has no
regard for public safety. In addition, while the court noted that the
level of awareness can make a difference in the punitive damages
inquiry, it did not explain whether that factor matters because it is
cheaper to fix a defect of which one knows as opposed to one that
might take some research to discover, or because a defendant who
ignores a known defect is subjectively more culpable.402 In a similar
vein, while no knowledge of specific victims need be proved, “the
manufacturer must also fail to determine the gravity of the danger or
fail to reduce the risk to an acceptable minimal level” while

397
398
399
400
401
402

Id. at 518.
Id. (emphasis removed).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 519.
Id.
See id. at 518-20.
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“[k]nowing of this risk.”403 In many states, this mélange of
considerations is what “malice” looks like in the context of corporate
liability for product defects.404
Other states have more explicitly allowed punitive damages for
culpable failures to discover defects,405 including for claims of
inadequate product testing prior to marketing.406 Moreover,
formulations of a punitive damages standard that sanctions “reckless
indifference” or “reckless disregard” toward the rights of others
appeared in cases awarding such damages for torts by corporations
other than products liability, including trespass (e.g., by developers
failing to ascertain the property rights of others)407 and false
representations.408 A hybrid approach that sometimes takes into
account objective considerations, and allows enhanced damages for
403

Id. at 519.
Oklahoma has since codified the principle that recklessness is enough for
imposing punitive damages, but capped punitive damages available for reckless
behavior. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 9.1 (2018).
405 See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, supra note 29, at
1339-45.
406 See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 648-53 (Ill. App. 1969), aff’d,
263 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970) (allowing punitive damages for failure to test bursting
point of a drain cleaner bottle); Sufix, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cook, 128 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Ky.
App. 2004) (“Cook offered testimony by several experts that Sufix could and should
have discovered the defect in the course of testing prior to release of the product, but
that its testing had been grossly inadequate.”); Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424
N.E.2d. 568, 578-80 (Ohio 1981) (allowing punitive damages for failure to test car for
rollovers); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 897, 906-07 (Wis.
1980) (citing the defendant’s lack of a “formal safety review committee” as a piece of
evidence in support of allowing punitive damages); cf. Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514
N.W.2d 94, 100 (Iowa 1994) (declining to allow punitive damages for failure to test
coupled with generalized knowledge of danger, but explaining that such a failure
could lead to punitive damages when it constitutes “an act of an unreasonable
character in disregard of a risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow”). See generally PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL
MORALITY 210-13 (2010) (discussing duties to monitor in the manufacturing defect
context).
407 See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 872-73 (8th Cir.
2008) (applying Missouri law); Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v. Smuggler-Union
Mining Co., 203 F. 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1913); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Poston,
30 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tenn. 1895) (“There was also evidence sufficient . . . to raise the
question of gross negligence on the part of the company in not exercising more
caution to find and obtain the consent of the true owner of the property that the trees
might be cut, and also in the manner in which the cutting was done, and in cutting
the trees at all.”); see also Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 641
(Tenn. 1996) (reaffirming earlier rule). It is notable that punitive damages for reckless
trespass have been awarded even in old cases.
408 E.g., Schmidt v. Pine Tree Land Dev. Co., 631 P.2d 1373, 1374-75 (Or. 1981).
404
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highly unreasonable failures to discover defects and other lapses in
adverting to the rights of others, is sensible if the goal is to “punish
impersonal wrongdoing committed by artificial persons”409 who
typically do not intend to hurt anyone and may not even engage in
actions which, in a reasonable person’s understanding, would be
substantially certain to occasion harm.410 The Oregon Supreme Court
explained this adaptation of nineteenth-century “malice”-type punitive
damages standards to modern corporate torts in an illuminating way:
In the wide range of situations said to justify punitive
damages, the present case [in which plaintiffs alleged that
defendants made reckless misrepresentations in the course of a
real estate transaction] is not one of giving vent to personal
and societal outrage at aggressive or malicious wrongdoing,
[such as assault and battery or malicious prosecution]. The
large scale of these corporate defendants’ land development
and marketing project places the case rather with those in
which punitive damages serve the function to deter enterprises
from accepting the risks of harming other private or public
interests by recklessly substandard methods of operation at the
cost of paying economic compensation to those who come
forward to claim it. Such operations may well be wholly
impersonal with respect to any victim, indeed conducted with
the hope that no harm will occur, and they may not involve a
culpable attitude on the part of any one person responsible for
the management of the enterprise; yet this court has held that
such lack of managerial culpability alone does not foreclose
punitive damages. Still, to justify punitive damages the
conduct must go beyond mere carelessness to a willful or
reckless disregard of risk of harm to others of a magnitude
evincing a high degree of social irresponsibility.411
The modern frameworks for punitive damages in tort laid out by the
supreme courts of Oklahoma and Oregon indicate an expansion of the
scope of such damages, which in turn reflects a shift from their
function of sanctioning morally reprehensible interpersonal behaviors
to a broader goal of fostering deterrence of choices, sometimes made
409 Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that Would
Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 469 (2005); see also Rantanen, An
Objective View, supra note 15, 1609-22.
410 See infra note 464 and accompanying text.
411 Schmidt, 631 P.2d at 1374-75 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 349–52
and accompanying text.
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by corporate defendants, that generate high social costs.412 While
moral, deontological considerations remain, they are diminished in
prominence relative to older cases, or at least weighed or considered
alongside some form of economic cost-benefit analysis. In this frame,
awarding punitive damages for behavior that is reckless with respect to
the affected group generally, as opposed to intentional or knowing
toward specific victims, strikes one as good policy.413 Certain conduct,
even if not intentional, can still be worth sanctioning — if not on
moral grounds, then at least due to high social costs that the conduct
imposes relative to its benefits to society. Indeed, this is exactly what
we see in copyright and trademark cases as well.
c.

Copyright and Trademark

Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act actually uses the word
“willful,” and has a statutory damages provision that allows for
differing amounts of compensation on a per-work-copied basis
depending on whether the infringement was willful or not.414
Although one commentator argued that the word “willful” in the
Copyright Act’s civil remedies provision denotes “an intentional
violation of a known legal duty,”415 apparently relying exclusively on
criminal willfulness and recklessness cases,416 the majority view in
copyright law is decidedly different. For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Yurman Design v. PAJ held that
“[w]illfulness in [the copyright] context means that the defendant
412 See generally Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (applying this reasoning to repeated, but uncompensated,
harms that are relatively minor).
413 As other commentators noted in the context of patent law, the proper target of
punitive damages when economic considerations are paramount must focus not (or at
least not only) on the subjective states of mind of the “wrongdoer,” but on behaviors
that are, from an objective standpoint, so unreasonable that they impose significant
externalities on society. See generally Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15, at
1611-13; Sherkow, supra note 73, at 35-36.
414 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). Notably, the Copyright Act also includes
criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a copyright” with
additional aggravating factors, such as infringing “for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain.” Id. § 506(a)(1)(A). For an analysis of why there
are criminal penalties for some forms of copyright and trademark infringement, but
not for patent infringement, see generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal
Sanctions in Intellectual Property Law, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011).
415 Robert Aloysius Hyde, A Reckless Disregard of the Ordinary Infringer? Moving
Toward a Balanced and Uniform Standard for Willful Copyright Infringement, 35 U. TOL.
L. REV. 377, 377 (2003).
416 See id. at 377 & n.9; see also supra notes 210–14, 322–25 and accompanying text.
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‘recklessly disregarded’ the possibility that ‘its conduct represented
infringement.’ . . . A plaintiff is not required to show that the
defendant ‘had knowledge that its actions constitute[d] an
infringement.’”417 The court held that while “PAJ testified that it was
unaware of Yurman’s copyrights,” the jury was nonetheless “free to
discredit that testimony, or to find that PAJ’s ignorance was due to
recklessness.”418
Although the Federal Circuit cited Yurman in Seagate, the Second
Circuit’s standard for willful copyright infringement is different from
Seagate’s because, for one thing, it does not require actual knowledge
of the right at issue.419 Indeed, in contrast to Yurman, Seagate
conceived of objective recklessness as depending entirely on the
merits on the infringer’s legal position, and did not consider whether
the defendant’s lack of awareness of the plaintiff’s rights could itself be
culpable.420 Thus, in contravention to the Seagate standard and to the
current Federal Circuit approach requiring actual knowledge of the
infringed patent’s existence, but consistent with prevailing tort law
standards described earlier, the Second Circuit in Yurman upheld a
judgment that an infringement was willful based on the defendant’s
“‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the copyright holder’s
rights.”421 Of course, a higher level of culpability — that is, a showing
that “the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity”422 —
would also be enough for willfulness.
Another Second Circuit case, Island Software v. Microsoft, illustrates
these standards in operation. In Island Software, “a private investigator
employed by a company participating in Microsoft’s anti-piracy
program” found that Island, “a small software retailer and computer

417 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted); see also In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on
cases from the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits to hold that “recklessness is
sufficient for a finding of willful copyright infringement”); Wildlife Express Corp. v.
Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (same standard);
RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1988)
(same standard). But cf. Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that willfulness requires knowledge that actions constitute infringement).
418 Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 113; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Star Amusements,
Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1995) (providing three times the unpaid licensing fees
as a remedy for copyright infringement in a non-punitive context).
419 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
420 See id.
421 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263
(2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
422 Id.
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repairer,” was selling “counterfeit” or unauthorized copies of certain
Microsoft software acquired from a supplier.423 The district court
granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment that Island willfully
infringed Microsoft’s copyrights based in part on an affidavit in which
an Island employee stated that he was “suspicious of the authenticity”
of the supplier’s products, but “did not take extensive measures to
prevent the receipt and sale of high-quality counterfeit
merchandise.”424 Instead, “Island’s employees . . . would conduct a
relatively quick visual inspection of goods,”425 if any at all.
The Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment order and
remanded the case for trial on willfulness in part because Island
“dispute[d] the inferences to be drawn from that evidence.”426 The
court held that, based on the affidavit proffered by Microsoft, “[a] jury
could, without a doubt, conclude that [the Island employee’s]
statements reveal willful blindness, or establish a pattern of conduct so
unreasonable as to constitute reckless disregard.”427 But, crucially, the
court also opined that “a jury could infer that additional inspections
were, for any number of reasons, not mandated,”428 explaining that
“only an individual with specialized training . . . could discern the
difference between authentic products and high-quality counterfeits of
the sort at issue in this case.”429 The court noted that “the hiring of
such experts could be found by a jury to be beyond what could
reasonably be expected of small companies.”430
Notably, the Island Software opinion was authored by Judge Guido
Calabresi, who was a leading torts scholar in the law-and-economics
tradition before being confirmed as a circuit judge.431 The tenor of the
opinion is, not surprisingly, economic. Island Software made clear that
the question of whether the defendant’s investigation was so
inadequate as to qualify the infringement as willful can only be
established after balancing the costs and benefits of that investigation
under the circumstances, an inquiry that requires taking into account
423

Id. at 259.
Id. at 263.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 264.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 For one example of a foundational scholarly contribution by then-Professor
Calabresi, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (discussing the economic goals of tort law).
424
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the size of the defendant company and the expertise it is expected to
have with respect to the potentially infringing matter.432 Economic
analysis of this sort is what truly objective recklessness is about.433 In
the next Part, I will aim to apply this approach to patent law which,
like copyright law,434 is thought to have strong utilitarian foundations
that make economic analysis a proper tool in determining the scope of
the defendant’s liability.435
The remedial scheme for trademark infringement under the federal
Lanham Act is even more complex than in copyright. The relevant
subsection states that “[i]n assessing damages the court may enter
judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times
such amount.”436 These permissive treble damages are explicitly nonpunitive,437 and indeed courts have held that the Lanham Act does not
provide for punitive damages at all.438 Nevertheless, the statute also
allows juries to award profits and gives judges seemingly unlimited
discretion to adjust them,439 and it mandates treble damages for
432

See Island Software, 413 F.3d at 263-64.
Again, however, subjective considerations can also matter. See Yellow Pages
Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding copyright
infringement willful where the defendant was “not at all concerned about the source
of the photos it was receiving”).
434 See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, MICHAEL J. MADISON & MARK P. MCKENNA, THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12-14 (5th ed. 2017).
435 On the use of economic analysis of some common-law rules in determining
whether the defendant should be liable for patent infringement in a particular set of
circumstances, see generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Divided Infringement, Economics, and
the Common Law, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3111911.
436 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018).
437 See id. (stating that permissive treble damages, like other remedies under
§ 1117(a), “shall constitute compensation and not a penalty”).
438 See Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 108-13 (2d
Cir. 1988). I thank Professor Robert Brauneis for discussing these aspects of the
Lanham Act’s remedial scheme with me.
439 See id. at 109-11 (tracing the history of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); see Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks, Comm. on Patents, H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S.
895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 203-06 (1941). Some circuits require willfulness for an
award of profits. See, e.g., Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 789-91
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Second Circuit requires willfulness for accounting,
even though § 1117(a) says that this remedy is “not a penalty” and, unlike
§ 1117(c)(2), does not use the word “willful”), cert. granted and judgment vacated on
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017) (mem.), judgment reinstated in relevant part, 686
F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (mem.). But see Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399
F.3d 168, 173-75 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “willfulness is a factor, not a
prerequisite” for an award of profits).
433

1506

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:1427

intentional trademark infringement “unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances.”440 Finally, the Lanham Act provides for
statutory damages “[i]n a case involving the use of a counterfeit
mark . . . in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution
of goods or services,” including enhanced statutory damages for this
sort of infringement “if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit
mark was willful.”441
As in copyright law, the majority view appears to be that knowledge
of a specific trademark is not required for willfulness, and reckless
disregard toward the intellectual property rights of others would
suffice. In one case, International Star Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy
Hilfiger, the Second Circuit cited the defendant’s “failure to conduct a
comprehensive trademark search” as one of the factors pointing
toward willfulness,442 and explained that “willful ignorance should not
provide a means by which [the defendant] can evade its obligations
under trademark law.”443 After another appeal and remand, the parties
continued to dispute whether the defendant had “an obligation to
conduct a more extensive trademark search” than one it actually
performed to avoid a finding of willfulness.444 Some other jurisdictions
have adopted a rule to the same effect: In the First Circuit, the conduct
sufficient for willful trademark infringement is “measured against
standards of reasonable behavior,” which suggests that highly
unreasonable non-searches might be willful.445 Again, patent law is
440 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2018); cf. Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850)
(appearing to adopt this approach in patent cases); see also supra notes 99–100 and
accompanying text (discussing Hogg).
441 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).
442 Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749,
752-53 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132,
1135 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the purpose of trademark remedies is to “take all the
economic incentive out of trademark infringement”) (citation omitted).
443 Tommy Hilfiger, 80 F.3d at 754. See generally David Welkowitz, WillfulnessTM,
79 ALB. L. REV. 509 (2016).
444 Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 205 F.3d
1323, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
445 Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191-92 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In
federal civil litigation willfulness requires a conscious awareness of wrongdoing by the
defendant or at least conduct deemed ‘objectively reckless’ measured against standards
of reasonable behavior. The criminal standard is slightly more demanding because it
requires a subjective indifference to risk for recklessness — sometimes called willful
blindness — as the minimum condition for a willfulness finding.”). But cf.
SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1999)
(differentiating “careless” and “willful” failures to ascertain the trademark rights of
others and distinguishing Tommy Hilfiger based on the fact of copying and attorney
advice to search for trademarks) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other
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decidedly different in requiring actual knowledge of the existence of
the right being infringed for enhanced damages.446
One immediate objection, at least to the relevance of the copyright
portion of this discussion, might be that copyright infringement,
unlike patent law, requires proof of copying.447 But there are other
ways to infringe copyrights, including — as we saw in Island
Software448 — by distributing copyrighted materials,449 and similar
cases of willful infringement under this provision of the Copyright Act
can be readily found.450 In these cases, the defendants did not copy the
materials, but rather merely passed them along in the stream of
commerce. Nonetheless, the courts still concluded that the failure to
ascertain whether the rights of others are infringed in the process
could be willful. In addition, it bears repeating that, today, willful
patent infringement cannot lie even when a defendant copies an item
marked with a patent number or copies a product of a close
competitor without investigating the competitor’s patent portfolio.
The actual knowledge rule for patent treble damages is so rigid that
even copying combined with a lack of a patent search will not suffice
for enhancement. A fortiori, ignorance of easily discoverable patents
cannot currently lead to liability for enhanced damages either.451
It is worth noting, finally, that in contrast to the Patent Act, both the
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act include provisions for criminal
infringement, which are oriented toward subjectively culpable mental
states.452 Criminal penalties are possible, for example, against those
who “intentionally . . . traffic[ ] in goods or services and knowingly
use[ ] a counterfeit mark,”453 while enhanced civil penalties are
available for less subjective forms of culpability. Patent law, however,
grounds as stated in Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2005).
446 Although one can argue that the difficulty of determining validity and
infringement in patent cases might support a unique standard for willful patent
infringement, validity and infringement of trademarks can also raise exceedingly
difficult questions, as do defenses to copyright infringement liability based on fair use,
whether the use of the copyrighted material is authorized, and so on.
447 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018).
448 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 26061 (2d Cir. 2005).
449 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
450 Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir.
2015).
451 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
452 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2018). See generally Manta, supra
note 414.
453 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1).
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is distinctly non-criminal, so that the very notion of a form of liability
exclusively focused on subjective factors seems aberrant. Nonetheless,
criminal law concepts have found their way into patent cases in the
form of the actual knowledge prerequisite for treble damages.
d.

Summary

When compared to the laws of negligence, products liability,
copyright, trademark, and even the FCRA, patent law is a severe
outlier. This is because, even granting that “willfulness” is a
requirement for enhanced patent damages, patent law does not follow
the “standard civil usage” of willfulness.454 In emphasizing the
subjective mental state of actual knowledge, courts in patent cases pay
heed only to the historic function of punitive damages as a sanction of
behavior actuated by a desire to cause someone harm, as opposed to
modern, more objective forms of culpability reflected in the civil
recklessness standard.455 To be sure, the former route to obtaining
punitive damages has not been discarded, as courts generally continue
to award them for subjectively culpable behaviors that could be
classified as “insults.”456 But, as numerous examples in this section
indicate, courts in tort cases also allow punitive damages under the
objective standard, which focuses on socially undesirable conduct
endangering the world at large, including reckless failures to advert to
the possibility of invading the rights of others.457 Professor Sharkey
summed up these developments as follows: “[W]hereas punitive
damages were once awarded predominantly for acts that satisfied
malice aforethought or intentional wrongdoing, now many punitive
damages awards arise from what was essentially accidental conduct,
albeit committed recklessly.”458 The Federal Circuit has not fully
accounted for this aspect of enhanced damages.
Halo’s discussion of punitive damages for “conscious” and “flagrant”
infringements, as well as for “reckless” conduct involving
infringements of which the defendant had “reason to know,” perfectly
tracks the subjective-objective dichotomy of possible approaches for
proving up enhanced damages.459 Although the Supreme Court
454

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007).
See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-34 (2016).
456 See supra Section II.B. But see Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20.
457 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 213-14 (5th
ed. 1984) (discussing the interplay of culpable mental states and objectively deviant
conduct).
458 Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 493.
459 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33; see also infra notes 499–505 and accompanying text.
455
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emphasized subjective routes to willfulness,460 it did so in the context
of criticizing a Federal Circuit test that, anomalously, made subjective
factors basically irrelevant in the willfulness inquiry — and the Court’s
controlling opinion explicitly referenced continued applicability of
civil recklessness to enhanced patent damages by relying on the
formulation of that standard from the Restatement of Torts. The Court,
to be sure, characterized enhanced patent damages as punitive, but the
bottom line is that there is ample precedent for civil punishment of
reckless behavior.
Because Halo did not appear to signal a significant departure from
the modern tort standards discussed in this section, it is difficult to
rationalize retaining actual knowledge of the infringed patents as the
limit on treble damages in patent law. At the very least, a departure of
this magnitude from the prevailing standard would require highly
persuasive policy or economic justifications. Nonetheless, even if Halo
left that question open, those justifications do not support retaining
the actual knowledge rule. In the section that follows, I sketch out the
already familiar example of the statute in which policy considerations
overrode the prevailing common-law rule and contrast it with the
Patent Act. I then apply the prevailing rule to patent law in Part III.
C. Policy Considerations
Smith v. Wade holds that adoption of the dominant common-law
approach to fill a gap in a federal statute silent on the relevant point is
a sound methodology of statutory interpretation.461 Nonetheless,
departures from that standard are possible if strong policy
considerations that justify them, and which are consistent with the
statute at issue, are present. Thus, perhaps in part due to the quasicriminal nature of § 1983 actions,462 decisions after Smith v. Wade
settled on a standard limiting punitive damages in these suits to
behaviors exhibiting callousness or willful indifference to known risks,
as opposed to merely conduct that is “unheedful” in the circumstances
in which the defendant had reasons to know that harm would
eventuate.463 Indeed, because its passage was motivated by
Reconstruction-Era resistance to civil rights, § 1983 embodies a strong
undertone of moral disapproval against the acts that those subject to
460

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 307–12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
462 See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text.
463 See supra notes 321–30 and accompanying text.
461
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liability under this section have committed. The subjective focus of
punitive damages standards in § 1983 actions may reflect this
background.464
Patent law, in contrast, is as far from criminal law as can be in terms
of its social goals, and patent infringement does not typically engender
moral disapproval.465 The goals of patent remedies should be, on the
whole, to encourage efficient conduct, however defined, not to mete
out punishment that would preclude retribution and self-help.466 The
adoption of a subjective, criminal-style recklessness standard relying
on actual knowledge as an absolute constraint on awards of treble
damages is therefore puzzling. Moreover, because this standard
discourages assimilation of information and can reward forms of
holdout,467 it is difficult to square with the economic-utilitarian
orientation of patent law. While treble damages for the infringer’s
subjective bad faith remain available in patent cases,468 policy and
economic considerations fail to justify going against the tide of tort
law by limiting the availability of that remedy to acts accompanied by
subjectively culpable mental states, and in fact support its expansion
to sanction more objective forms of “egregious” conduct.469
To be sure, modern punitive damages doctrine is at variance with
outcomes that a purely economic analysis would support.470 Economic
models reject the very idea of “punitive” liability for egregious or

464 In addition, there are specific rationales for basing liability on a subjective
standard in constitutional tort suits against federal officers, see, e.g., Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-44 (1994), and for defamation claims against public
officials, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-86 (1964); Keating,
supra note 66, at 339 & n.96. Interestingly, as Professor Gregory Keating and others
noted, proof of certain intentional torts could include an objective component for
evaluating intent. See Keating, supra note 66, at 339 & n.96 (citing, among other
cases, Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955), for the proposition that one
intends the natural consequences of one’s actions); see also Keith N. Hylton, Intent in
Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1230 (2010). See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent
and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585
(2012).
465 See generally Sherkow, supra note 73; see also Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really
Need So Many Mental and Emotional States in Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279
(2000).
466 See generally Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation,
61 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2012); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 95 (2012).
467 See supra Section I.E.
468 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016).
469 Id.
470 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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reprehensible behaviors, however defined, and rationalize supracompensatory damages primarily in the circumstances in which
rights-violations are difficult to detect or provide such small
compensatory damages that lawsuits are not worthwhile.471 Because
they are still based on mental states of individual defendants, even if
objectively defined in part, today’s tort punitive damages standards are
not consistent with models that would make fault completely
irrelevant in the punitive damages inquiry.472 Additional lines of attack
on modern punitive damages doctrine include the criticism that the
required elevated level of culpability is extremely difficult to
communicate with precision to juries,473 as well as concerns about the
size and unpredictability of the punitive damages awards.474 All of
these critiques cast economic rationality of punitive damages into
doubt, though it must be remembered that at least the “unpredictable
punitive damages” critique does not completely translate to patent
law’s enhanced damages because of the treble limit in the latter.475
Availability of punitive damages awards untethered to compensatory
damages has, in a significant constitutional law development, triggered
Due Process claims that have led to such awards getting struck down
for lack of proportionality (to the awarded compensatory damages) in
a series of Supreme Court decisions.476 More interestingly, the seminal
case of Philip Morris v. Williams held that the Due Process clause
prohibits taking harms to parties not before the court into account in
determining the amount of punitive damages477 — though some,

471 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 31; see also Darryl Biggar, A Model of
Punitive Damages in Tort, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1995).
472 But see Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 488; see
also Porat, supra note 64, at 95-96.
473 See Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, supra note 31, at 108-10; see
also Ellis, supra note 31, at 33-43; Grady, supra note 31, at 1219-24 (discussing the
staying power of subjective elements in the law of punitive damages).
474 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986). For a critique of punitive damages in
products liability cases in particular, see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 14-15, 155-56, 170-71, 224-25 (1988). See also
Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages
Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (1989).
475 See supra Section I.B.2.
476 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
477 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-57 (2007) (holding that
harms to parties not before the court cannot be directly taken into account in the
punitive damages calculus).
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including the dissent in that case,478 pointed out that the Court still
allowed juries to consider such harms under the “reprehensibility”
factor for evaluating the award’s rationality.479 Although these
decisions were meant to prevent “runaway” awards, they have also,
somewhat ironically, resulted in a move away from a rigorous
economic treatment of damages enhancements. Even though awards
with very large punitive-to-compensatory ratios can sometimes be
economically justified, the Supreme Court appeared to forestall this
possibility by announcing that awards for which this ratio is greater
than 10:1 might draw particularly searching constitutional scrutiny.480
Still, economic considerations continue to find their way into
punitive damages cases. As Professor Sharkey argued, “it would be
wrong to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court has closed the door
entirely on economic rationales of punitive damages.”481 She explained
that “the Court recognizes optimal deterrence as one, but not the sole,
underlying justification for punitive damages.”482 More generally, and
putting the magnitude of the awards to one side, the threshold level of
culpability for punitive damages today is at least more consistent with
economic reasoning than the subjective nineteenth-century standard
motivated by retribution for “insults.”483 As Professor Sharkey argued
in a different article, the expansion of the scope of punitive damages to
reckless behaviors serves “the efficiency-based goal of economic
deterrence.”484 Professor Peter Diamond’s work is to the same effect —
he contended that awards of punitive damages for reckless disregard of
the rights of others properly take into account “costs that are not
adequately represented in the defendant’s decision process.”485 Given
478

Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 496-97; see also
Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 457-64.
480 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process.”); cf. id. (“[R]atios greater than those we have previously upheld may
comport with due process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages.’” (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582)); see Sharkey,
Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 492. But see Mathias v. Accor
Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (allowing
a large punitive-to-compensatory ratio in spite of State Farm).
481 Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 496.
482 Id.
483 See supra Section I.B.1.
484 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 450.
485 Peter Diamond, Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive
Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 117, 134
(2002).
479
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the importance of this internalization function, economically efficient
results are more likely to be achieved when the law of punitive
damages allows for objective evaluations of the defendant’s conduct
and does not, as in the nineteenth century, merely aim to punish those
who commit acts accompanied by subjectively culpable states of
mind.486 The modern solution may not be “first-best” from an
economic perspective, but it is probably better from that perspective
than the nineteenth-century one.487
Although the claim is highly contested, increased consideration of
objective factors in the punitive damages calculus may be a part of a
larger trend in tort law — the move toward economic efficiency. Thus,
Professor George Priest identified “the tendency of the set of all legal
rules to become dominated by rules achieving efficient . . . allocative
effects,”488 and Professor Paul Rubin came to similar conclusions.489
Others, including Professor Jody Kraus, likewise noted an “impressive
level of fit” between results of economic analysis and case outcomes
under common-law rules.490 Professors Priest and Rubin contended
that such shifts are an inevitable consequence of the iterative nature of
adversarial litigation,491 while others, including Professor Kraus,
argued that courts have lately been following — at least to some extent
and maybe somewhat unwittingly — the teachings of economically486 Cf. Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW iii, xiv-xv (Dover 1991) (1881) (“If law was simply an instrument to accomplish
certain material ends, it followed that the law should concern itself solely with
external behavior; the merely moral or subjective should be stripped away by the
process of evolution. Holmes argued that he could discern in the developing common
law a trend toward complete reliance on ‘external standards’ of behavior.”); see also
supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. Note, though, that Seagate’s supposedly
“objective” standard was in fact aberrant in comparison with objective standards in
modern tort law. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
487 In addition, a purely economic approach to punitive damages might encounter
significant challenges in the way of information costs, justifying the use of the
recklessness standard as rough, “modular” proxy for identifying economically
inefficient behaviors. See generally Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law
of Torts, 4. J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (explaining how modularity helps reduce information
costs in tort law).
488 George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977).
489 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51-52
(1977). See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972).
490 Kraus, supra note 359, at 357. But cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of
Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992) (disagreeing with the common law efficiency
thesis).
491 See generally Priest, supra note 488; Rubin, supra note 489.
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minded scholars of tort law, some of whom have become judges.492
Some have maintained, though, that the extent of influence of
economic thinking on tort law has been overstated or should be
limited493 — and still others argued that the rules that purportedly
serve the goal of “efficiency” instead do the bidding of powerful
interests in society.494
Be that as it may, the increasing influence of the law-and-economics
movement on civil litigation over time is difficult to deny — and Judge
Calabresi’s opinion in Island Software is a powerful example of that
trend.495 Nor is the shift to objective evaluations of conduct reflective
of economic thinking necessarily a hypermodern development.
Though far ahead of his time, one scholar, and later judge, with a
strong economic-utilitarian bent was Oliver Wendell Holmes.496
Interestingly enough, one of the legacies of Holmes’ handiwork as a
Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was an
objective recklessness standard for criminal violations, in addition to
the more historically grounded subjective standard.497 Although the
possibility of proof of recklessness using a (mostly) objective standard
should probably be considered aberrant as far as criminal law goes,498
the Massachusetts approach allowing for separate, disjunctive
subjective and objective routes to demonstrating recklessness for those
crimes for which this mental state is an element closely reminds one of
Halo. A recent case explained:
Wanton or reckless conduct is determined based either on the
defendant’s specific knowledge or on what a reasonable person
should have known in the circumstances. If based on the
objective measure of recklessness, the defendant’s actions
constitute “wanton or reckless conduct if an ordinary normal
[person] under the same circumstances would have realized

492

Kraus, supra note 359, at 333-36.
See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 337; see also Keating, supra note 66.
494 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
495 See supra notes 423–33 and accompanying text.
496 See HOLMES, supra note 486, at 108-09 (offering a vigorous endorsement of
objective standards in the law).
497 See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 174-78 (1884) (Holmes, J.)
(adopting a largely objective or “external” standard in a criminal recklessness case);
see also HOLMES, supra note 486, at 53-59.
498 See Note, Criminal Negligence, 12 HARV. L. REV. 428, 428-29 (1898); see also
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 192-206 (1996).
493
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the gravity of the danger.” If based on the subjective measure,
i.e., the defendant’s own knowledge, “grave danger to others
must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen
to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so as to
avoid the act or omission which caused the harm.”499
The influence of Holmes’s economic-utilitarian thinking on tort law
was marked as well. Specifically, his legacy has had an effect on the
modern law of punitive damages. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, its
latest pronouncement on punitive damages besides Halo, the Supreme
Court invoked Holmes’s “bad man,” a homo economicus who cares only
about possible penalties for his actions and thus seeks “some ability to
know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or
another.”500 Professor Jill Lens criticized Exxon’s reliance on the bad
man construct and lamented that the Court’s “conception of
punishment is detached from its traditional morality roots.”501 But
Exxon was dealing with a miscreant who was reckless, not one who
acted maliciously or with intent to harm anyone,502 so the Court’s
diminished focus on moral considerations can be defended.
Significantly, though, modern economic-utilitarian thinking
exemplified by Holmes’s bad man does not fully control the law of
punitive damages. As the Halo Court pointed out with its vituperative
“pirate” language, moral considerations can still come into play when
such damages are awarded for intentional rights-violations.503 But
Halo, like Exxon, also made clear that one can be liable for enhanced
damages due to recklessness,504 a level of culpability whose
“connection to morality”505 is more attenuated. As in most of the rest
of tort law, recklessness based on a “reason to know” of unreasonable
risk of infringement can, and should be, a route to establishing
eligibility for enhanced damages that is separate from the route that
contemplates punishment for “conscious” and “flagrant”

499 Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 585 (Mass. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909-10 (Mass. 1944)) (citations
omitted).
500 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008).
501 Lens, Bad Man, supra note 31, at 790.
502 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493-95, 512-13 (2008). To recall,
the faulty conduct in Exxon was the captain’s operation of a tanker while intoxicated.
See id. at 475-79; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
503 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016).
504 Id. at 1933.
505 See Lens, Bad Man, supra note 31, at 825.
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infringements.506 Enhanced damages based on recklessness, I
maintain, are particularly suitable for dealing with the homines
economici engaged in patent infringement. I develop this standard in
the Part that follows.
III. BACK TO PATENT LAW: TOWARD A PROPER STANDARD FOR
ENHANCED DAMAGES
A. Civil Recklessness: A Recap and Some Potentially Easy Cases in
Patent Law
To orient the discussion of how civil recklessness can be
implemented in patent law, its features are worth recapping and
highlighting. To begin, the standard of having “reason to know” of
facts that point to a risk of a rights-violation, adopted from the
Restatement by Halo,507 is demanding. As explained by Professor
Kenneth Simons, “The Restatement’s concept of ‘reason to know’ is
narrower than ‘reasonably should know’ — it essentially requires that
the facts be at your fingertips.”508 Echoing this characterization,
Professor Stephanie Bornstein maintained that “[r]ecklessness in tort
goes further than negligence to account for situations in which the
actor takes risks that are unusually high and for which the costs of
preventing the harms are low.”509 According to Professor Dan Dobbs’s
treatise, “the risk-utility balance strongly disfavors the defendant’s
conduct,”510 but — as noted throughout — civil recklessness can also
include the somewhat subjective component of “conscious
indifference,” which is “not necessarily required to establish gross
negligence.”511 One way to further characterize the subjective
component of the inquiry is that the defendant “intentionally or
consciously runs a very serious risk with no good reason to do so.”512
Another commentator, Professor Geoffrey Rapp, explained that some
cases “find[ ] recklessness [in] the defendant’s ‘I don’t care

506

Cf. supra Section II.B.
Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69
(2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
508 See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 39, at 472 n.32 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12).
509 See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1086
(2017) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 147 (West 2000)).
510 DOBBS, supra note 509, § 147, at 351.
511 Id.
512 Id.
507
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attitude.’”513 Nonetheless, as Professor Dobbs observed, “[T]he
defendant’s state of mind can ordinarily only be proved by proving the
defendant’s conduct, so that extreme departure from ordinary care in
many cases tends to prove not only gross negligence but a conscious
indifference to the rights of others.”514
Under this standard, a patent infringer’s conduct could be eligible
for treble damages within the meaning of Halo in certain
circumstances in which it lacked actual knowledge of the patent’s
existence515 — a state of mind that, under the Federal Circuit’s current
interpretation of Halo, now completely exonerates the infringer from
liability for enhanced damages.516 For example, willful blindness to the
existence of a patent, whereby “(1) the defendant must subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that
fact,”517 would probably suffice under the proposed approach.518 So
513 Rapp, supra note 39, at 152 (quoting Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 67
(Or. 1960)).
514 DOBBS, supra note 509, § 147, at 351-52. The formulation in Georgia is
illustrative. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018) (punitive damages possible
where “the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness,
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences”). Interestingly, Theodore Sedgwick’s 1847
treatise stated that punitive damages could be awarded for “negligence so gross as to
raise a presumption of malice.” SEDGWICK, supra note 107, at 26; see also supra notes
105–09 and accompanying text. In that, Sedgwick was probably ahead of his time,
presaging the recklessness standard. Indeed, truly “objective” recklessness might be
logically equivalent to gross negligence. See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra
note 39, at 464-65, 478; see also George P. Fletcher, The Fault of Not Knowing, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 265, 278 (2002) (equating recklessness with gross
negligence and discussing circumstances in which “the fault lies in [the defendant’s]
having failed to investigate the risks attendant upon his affirmative conduct”).
515 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). For an
illuminating discussion of actual versus “statistical” knowledge, and associated
concepts of particularized versus general risk, see generally Simons, Statistical
Knowledge Deconstructed, supra note 214.
516 See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text.
517 See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011).
518 For a recent example where a district court allowed a claim for enhanced
damages to proceed in a willful blindness scenario, see Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys.,
LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 605, 623 (D. Del. 2017) (refusing to grant summary judgment
of no willfulness based in part on the evidence that “Intel’s own engineers concede
that they avoid reviewing other, non-Intel patents so as to avoid willfully infringing
them” and allegations of “corporate atmosphere encouraging employees to ‘turn a
blind eye’ to patents”). This result seems in tension with prevailing precedent, see
supra, Section I.D.2, though it is not clear if in the leading post-Halo Federal Circuit
case on point, WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the plaintiff
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would other behaviors involving inquiries into patent coverage that
are so woefully inadequate as to demonstrate a gross enough departure
from ordinary care and, in turn, indicate an infringer’s conscious
indifference to the patent rights of others.519 Consistent with the
demanding nature of the recklessness standard, as captured in the
“reason to know” formulation, qualifying behaviors might include a
failure to investigate whether a product that the defendant copied was
covered by patents, or a decision not to monitor the patents of a close
competitor.520 To go beyond these specific examples of non-searches
that may be reckless, though, a comprehensive framework is needed.
In the next section, I consider some factors that could be relevant to
the recklessness inquiry.

proved the defendant’s actual knowledge of the patent as a factual matter. In fact, it
seems that the Federal Circuit held that actual knowledge could be inferred from
patent marking on the products that the defendant copied. Id. at 1341-42; see supra
notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
519 One may note that this standard is like the “deliberate indifference” mental state
for indirect infringement that the Supreme Court rejected in Global-Tech in favor of
the willful blindness standard. See Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766-70. Although, as
observed above, see supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court’s
willfulness and indirect infringement standards are difficult to reconcile, it is notable
that Global-Tech explicitly rejected recklessness (the criminal version of it!) in the
indirect infringement context, id. at 769-70, while Halo acknowledged recklessness as
a possible standard, Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. But there is yet another wrinkle — the
defendant’s beliefs with respect to the asserted patent’s validity cannot negate liability
for indirect infringement, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920,
1926-28 (2015), but can negate willfulness, Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. In this vein, I
argued in a recent article that claims like those at issue in Commil might be
recharacterized as claims of direct infringement, dispensing with the knowledge-ofthe-patent requirement. See Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement,
supra note 15, at 586-92.
520 Cf. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir.
2010), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. 754; Intel, 268 F. Supp. at
609, 623. For an example from Canada, see Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltée v.
Eurocopter, [2013] F.C.A. 219, para. 190 (Can. C.A.), aff’g [2012] F.C. 113 (“[I]t
simply defies belief that a large and sophisticated corporation such as Bell Helicopter
would not verify intellectual property rights prior to embarking, as it did, on a research
program directly involving the study of the landing gear of a leased EC120 helicopter. At
the very least, this would be willful blindness.”). On remand, the court allowed treble
damages, citing the fact that copying was involved. See Airbus Helicopters, S.A.S. v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Canada Ltée, [2017] F.C. 170, para. 312, appeal docketed, A-94-17
(F.C.A. Mar. 10, 2017). Notably, punitive damages in this case were awarded under
the common law — there is no statutory authorization for them under Canadian
patent law. I thank Professor Norman Siebrasse for bringing this case to my attention.
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B. Reckless Failures to Learn of a Patent: Beyond the Easy Cases
The exercise of setting a standard of care, and instructing juries on
what might constitute an extreme deviation from it, creates — on the
model of Judge Calabresi’s approach in Island Software — an
opportunity for courts to bring economic reasoning to bear on the
issue of enhanced damages within the strictures of modern commonlaw punitive damages doctrine.521 Borrowing from tort law, the default
standard one would set is, simply, what a reasonably prudent firm
would do by way of investigating patent rights of others under all the
circumstances.522 By itself, though, that standard does not tell us very
much, and the real work lies in ascertaining the relevant
circumstances, as well as their salience for the recklessness inquiry
based on the defendant’s allegedly extreme deviation from the
standard. A close examination of the specific setting of the
infringement, then, should give us some sense of the efficient amount
of patent search and analysis. The emphasis here, again, is on costs
and benefits: as William Lee and Professor Douglas Melamed noted,
“when a company can cost-effectively learn of relevant patents and
avoid infringement ex ante, it should be deterred from proceeding to
infringe the patents.”523 In other words, when potential defendants can
readily take steps to avoid infringement but do not, deterrence
through enhanced damages may be appropriate.
Accordingly, one factor that the fact-finder could take into account
in deciding if a non-search was reckless, suggested by Judge Calabresi
in Island Software, is company size and sophistication in the relevant
area of technology.524 Less is to be expected from a small company, for
which an extensive investigation intended to forestall infringing
activity may become cost-prohibitive, than of an established
manufacturer operating in the field. Furthermore, the law should
demand even less from an end user who lacks any technological
expertise and just happens to have acquired the technology from
another party because the necessary investments into search are, in
these circumstances, likely to be highly socially costly relative to any
social benefit of the avoided infringement.525 A related intuition is that
521 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 264
(2d Cir. 2005); see supra notes 426–30 and accompanying text.
522 See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 296-97 (1850).
523 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 299.
524 Island Software, 413 F.3d at 264.
525 See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text; see also Mark D. Janis &
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012);
Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 625 n.376.
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patent searching would be likely inefficient and socially wasteful if a
firm had to develop expertise in an area of technology that is irrelevant
to the firm’s operations just to avoid exposure to treble damages.
Professor Paul Heald’s insightful model of optimal remedies for patent
infringement is consistent with these insights: He is skeptical of
enhancing damages in the circumstances in which “the inventive firm
and a self-inventing infringer operate in different commercial
fields.”526 Examining the characteristics of the infringing firm ensures
that courts “do not automatically multiply a damage award simply for
a failure to search,”527 but rather ascertain circumstances that make a
search that would aid in avoiding infringement particularly
appropriate and cost-effective.
Another factor, alluded to earlier in the Article, centers on the
patentee’s difficulties in detecting infringement,528 whether based on
the defendant’s efforts to conceal the infringing acts or simply based
on the nature of the invention. Reduced likelihood of detection leads
to systematic undercompensation for infringement,529 making this
factor particularly suitable for consideration under the economic
models of enhanced damages.530 Indeed, this factor embodies one area
in which modern approaches to mental states for punitive damages
and law-and-economics thinking have reached some convergence: “As
Judge Posner points out in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, reckless
and grossly negligent conduct may justify the application of a damage
multiplier based on the chance that the wrong will go undetected or
unchallenged.”531 Courts should therefore instruct juries to look with
particular care at infringements of so-called method or process patents
and other infringements unlikely to be discovered by the patentee.532
Criticizing Seagate, Professor Heald questioned the fact that the
526 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1165, 1191 (2008).
527 Id. at 1197.
528 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text; see also Chiang, supra note 229.
529 Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney’s
Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 310 (2004).
530 Indeed, culpability aside, high punitive damages awards have been thought to
be justifiable when the wrongdoing was difficult to detect, increasing the defendant’s
chances of getting away with a violation. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
531 Heald, supra note 526, at 1190 (citing Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc.,
347 F.3d 672, 675-76, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)).
532 See Jeffrey R.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit
Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 5, 7 (2002).
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“express focus in [its] willfulness inquiry is on the infringer’s intent,
while ignoring the chance that the infringement will go
undetected.”533 The criticism also applies to the Federal Circuit’s
willfulness doctrine post-Halo, which focuses on the defendant’s
subjective mental state by privileging actual knowledge, but ignores
underdetection as an independent factor in determining whether
threshold requirements for enhanced damages have been met.534
Under the third factor, related to the other two, the fact-finder
would address in a holistic manner the type of industry in which the
infringer operates and the number and kind of patents potentially
covering the infringing products. If the product could potentially
infringe numerous patents, or if the area of technology is known for
notice failures when it comes to patent claims,535 “self-inventing”
could well be “the optimal behavior” given the expense of search.536
Although these characterizations are subject to debate, broadly
speaking the information technology industry is described by some as
one in which a patent search could be prohibitively expensive based
on notice difficulties and a sheer number of relevant patents, while the
biomedical device industry could fall on the other end of the
spectrum.537
Decision-makers, to be sure, should consider the particular facts of
each case, but the features of products and patents in the area of
infringing technology could be highly informative with respect to
whether a search would be efficient. The general idea of industryspecific policy levers in patent law is not new — it was developed by
Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley in a series of insightful articles
533

Heald, supra note 526, at 1197.
See Masur, supra note 265, at 195-96; see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1585, 1591 (1998). Concealment is, however, one of the “Read factors”
guiding the trial judge’s discretion as to how much to increase the damages once the
jury finds willfulness. See infra Section III.D.
535 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 249, at 49-50, 233-34. See generally Peter S.
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
536 See Heald, supra note 526, at 1189.
537 See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN
THE BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES (2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL33367.pdf; see also Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System,
68 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 289, 304 (2012) (estimating that “[i]n software, for
example, patent clearance by all firms would require many times more hours of legal
research than all patent lawyers in the United States can bill in a year” because “there
are around twenty-four billion new [software] patent-firm pairs each year that could
produce accidental infringement”).
534
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and a book.538 But it has not yet been applied to the context of
enhanced patent damages.539 Under the proposed framework, then, if
industry characteristics suggest that uncompensated infringements
would carry high social costs that could be readily avoided by patent
searching, the fact-finder might readily find a non-search to be
reckless.
For this third factor, as for the first, an examination of industry
customs with respect to patent searching might be relevant, though
not conclusive.540 Although endogeneity is always a concern when
courts rely upon the custom of a particular industry to determine
whether a defendant grossly deviated from the standard of care,541
accepted practices can often converge on socially efficient conduct.542
In tort cases, courts have held that “extreme deviations” from industry
customs or standards are indicative of recklessness,543 and some
commentators have recognized that custom can be relevant to the
enhanced damages inquiry in patent law in particular.544 Therefore,
decision-makers could consider, in undertaking the recklessness
inquiry, whether the defendant has acted like a severe industry outlier
— but may, consistent with the treatment of custom in other areas of
law, discount the custom if it appears eminently unreasonable, is a

538 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 95-170 (2009); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty
Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 735 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576-77
(2003).
539 Professor Jason Rantanen’s work comes close. See Rantanen, An Objective View,
supra note 15, at 1623-24 (arguing that “it is the risk as perceived by a person in the
actor’s place that is relevant, not some abstract notion of risk held by an omniscient
being”).
540 Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,
93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (expressing skepticism with respect to the use of custom
for determining fair use in copyright law).
541 For an insightful empirical study on endogeneity in two specific areas of law,
see Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical
Examples of Endogeneity in Property and First Amendment Precedents, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1081, 1081 (2013).
542 For an early analysis of this thesis, see Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence,
42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1942).
543 See Rhea v. Brown Mfg. Corp., No. 3:08-cv-35, 2010 WL 2572052, at *1-3 (E.D.
Tenn. June 18, 2010) (safety standards); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923
P.2d 456, 459, 461 (Idaho 1996) (insurance industry standards).
544 See Heald, supra note 526, at 1191 & n.12 (citing Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and
Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 766 (2002)).
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product of collusion between industry players, or is an inappropriate
stand-in for the standard of care for some other reason.545
Fortunately, some relevant data based on which we could make
tentative generalizations on search practices by industry is available.546
Addressing patent search behavior among startups, a study by
Professors Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman “inquired
whether . . . respondents’ companies regularly check the patent
literature to determine if someone else has a U.S. patent that covered
what they were doing or were considering.”547 The authors found, for
example, that “[a]mong [non-venture backed] respondents who
answered,
slightly
more
than
one-third
reported
conducting . . . [patent] searches.”548 Notably, “[t]his likelihood was
particularly high for biotechnology (nearly seven in ten) and medical
device (over half) companies, while slightly less than one-quarter of
software companies reported doing regular patent searches.”549 The
overall search numbers were “substantially” greater among venturebacked firms, and those firms exhibited a similar industry trend:
“propensity [to search] was particularly high among biotechnology
(nearly nine in ten) and medical device (over nine in ten) firms.”550
These findings are consistent with the work on industry trends with
respect to notice failure and patent numerosity discussed earlier.551
Custom, indeed, has already been accepted in the willful
infringement inquiry on some level. For example, relying on Federal
Circuit precedent, the trial court looked to custom in Stryker v.
Zimmer, the companion case to Halo. The court explained that
“Zimmer offered no evidence that its behavior — copying a
competitor’s product, without attempting to design around the
competitor’s patents and without first seeking clearance from counsel
545

See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.).
I assume that the ten-year-old study discussed here is not outdated and remains
relevant. If not, at least the study provides a model of the sort of data that could be
collected and used in litigation in the future.
547 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1321 (2009).
548 Id.
549 Id.
550 Id.
551 See supra notes 535–37 and accompanying text; see also Stewart E. Sterk,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1285, 1285 (2008) (“In some instances, the cost of acquiring information about the
scope of property rights will exceed the social value of that information. In those
circumstances, further search for information about the scope of rights is inefficient;
the social harm avoided by further search does not justify the costs of the search.”).
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on infringement concerns — was in keeping with standards of
commerce in the medical device industry.”552 The court concluded
that this evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness and, for
this and other reasons, denied Zimmer’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law of no willfulness.553 The Federal Circuit reversed the
trial court in Stryker under the Seagate standard,554 but the Supreme
Court in turn vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in that case and
the district court ultimately reinstated the award of full treble
damages.555 Although, under prevailing precedent, the Stryker court
considered custom only with respect to conduct involving patents
known to the defendant, there is nothing in Halo to foreclose the trial
court’s consideration of search customs as well, and much to support
it. Allowing the jury to hear this kind of evidence and assess its
relevance should be a part of the trial court’s exercise of discretion that
the Supreme Court emphasized in Halo.556
Finally, the timing of search would be relevant for the recklessness
inquiry. If a patent covering a product springs up unexpectedly years
after the product has been launched, the failure to find that patent
should be significantly less likely to be adjudged reckless than if the
patent was in existence prior to product development. While the
recklessness standard could readily demand a clearance search prior to
potentially infringing activity based on the factors discussed above, the
costs of continuous monitoring for new patents after product launches
would probably be prohibitive in many circumstances. In addition, as
Professor Mark Lemley and Ragesh Tangri explained, the number of
options that an infringer has after investing into a particular product is
more limited than prior to the time that the investments were made.
They argued that “a company . . . can hardly be expected to
throw . . . product-specific investments away every time the company
is confronted with one of the more than two million patents currently
in force in the United States” and concluded that a willfulness inquiry
that “focuses only on the accused infringer’s state of mind at the time

552 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2013 WL 6231533, at *14
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2013), vacated, 837 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
553 To be sure, under the prevailing standard, the custom at issue was one relating
to dealing with known patents. See id. at *12.
554 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated sub. nom.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
555 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2017 WL 4286412, at *1
(W.D. Mich. July 12, 2017), on remand from 837 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2016), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2541 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2017).
556 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34.
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it initially adopts the product” would help avoid overdeterrence.557 I
largely agree: unless some special circumstances, such as a very lowcost search followed by a cheap redesign, are present after the product
launch, the failure to find “after-arising” patents should not count
against the infringer in the recklessness inquiry.558
To summarize, the ultimate purpose of the inquiry into the quality
of a patent search is to enable the fact-finder to decide whether the
defendant who lacked actual knowledge of the asserted patent should
nonetheless be charged with it based on Halo’s “reason to know”
standard.559 Importantly, the inquiry has both factual and evaluative
components. On the factual side, the defendant who lacked actual
knowledge could have either (1) done no searching at all; or (2) done
some searching but missed the relevant patent. On the evaluative side,
the fact-finder would conclude whether route (1) or (2) was reckless
with the aid of the factors discussed above and thus decide if the
infringement was willful. Of course, a defendant who lacked actual
knowledge of the patent’s existence could not have formed a belief
about legality of its activities as far as noninfringement or invalidity
are concerned — the problem, if any, lies in the failure to find the
patent. The nature of the inquiry, however, changes once the
defendant learns of the patent.560 In the next section, I examine how
willfulness should be analyzed under the proposed test for defendants
who have acquired actual knowledge of the patent.
C. Patent Search Versus Patent Analysis
Assume an infringer who, at one point, lacked actual knowledge of
the asserted patent and, based on the factors in the previous section,
the court concludes that infringement during that period was not
reckless and therefore not willful. But then the infringer learns of the
patent, whether after a search, receipt of a demand letter, or perhaps
even after being served with the plaintiff’s complaint. How should the
conduct of this type of defendant be evaluated? Because, today, actual
knowledge is the sine qua non of enhanced damages, we are seemingly
557

Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1117, 1119.
At the same time, infringers who do have patent monitoring programs for their
existing products could use this fact in their favor in countering claims of willful
infringement. I thank Professor Brian Love for suggesting that I make this point.
559 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
560 For example, if the defendant developed a reasonable noninfringement or
invalidity position after acquiring actual knowledge of a patent, enhanced damages
could not be collected from that point on. See Holbrook, supra note 275, at 1039,
1044 (discussing similar timing issues in the context of indirect infringement).
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in familiar territory. The question to ask is whether the conduct
involved in infringing a known patent was reckless or intentional,561
which could be answered by examining whether the defendant
developed a noninfringement or invalidity position, attempted a
redesign of its product, and so on. In the wake of Halo, courts have
already been making such inquiries.562
But under the approach set forth in this Article, something is now
different than under the rule that renders actual knowledge dominant
because the relevant timeframe has expanded to include search in
addition to analysis. It should matter for the cost-benefit calculation,
for example, whether a defendant acquired knowledge of the patent
through its own search as opposed to a demand letter or another
action by the patentee, such as a lawsuit.563 Particularly when the
infringer already expended significant resources on search, it cannot
be expected also to scrutinize every potentially relevant patent to the
level of an opinion of counsel letter so as to avoid liability for
enhanced damages. Under these circumstances, a relatively shallow
analysis of each of the patents of possible interest by an engineer
trained in the field may be sufficient to counter the willfulness
charge.564 As an alternative, examinations of patent validity or
noninfringement that do not involve the “deep dive” of an opinion
letter are sometimes performed by law firms in the course of a socalled “freedom to operate” study may be adequate to avoid willfulness
in this context.565 Thus, a major benefit of the proposed inquiry is that
561

See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33.
See, e.g., WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 136263 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018).
563 Cf. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1100-02 (noting that, under pre-Seagate
doctrine, it did not seem to matter in the willfulness inquiry how the defendant’s
knowledge of the patent was acquired).
564 Cf. supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text (explaining how something less
than an opinion letter can be sufficient to avoid the conclusion of recklessness).
565 Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, “opinion of counsel”
for the purposes of this Article refers to an in-depth development of invalidity or
noninfringement positions with respect to one or a few patents, while “freedom to
operate” denotes a broad patent search followed by a relatively cursory analysis of the
patents that seem to be a threat. The latter is generally cheaper. See, e.g., A. James
Isbester, 5 Top Takeaways: When Is an Opinion of Counsel Required in the New, PostHalo Environment?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=235da072-c7c8-463e-99d1-222392a9c517 (distinguishing “clearance
(freedom to operate) studies” from “opinions of counsel” and noting that there may be
circumstances when “a summary memo regarding a specific patent or a freedom to
operate memo covering all patents prior to product launch should be adequate,” while
a “formal opinion” would not be needed to avoid willfulness).
562
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it is at least structured in such a way so as not to discourage search,
which the current approach does by giving potential infringers
incentives to blind themselves to the patents of others.566
Thus, inclusion of the quality of patent search, in addition to legal
analysis, in the willfulness calculus could potentially further reduce
reliance on opinion of counsel letters, and mitigate associated
problems involving privilege waivers as the focus of the inquiry shifts
from specific patents to clearance activities generally.567 As the case
law develops, courts may even settle on some “industry standard” safe
harbors, concluding that a certain amount of search and analysis is per
se sufficient to avoid a finding of “egregious” infringement qualifying
for enhanced damages.568 Ultimately, by rewarding search, this
approach to willfulness could encourage investments into learning
patent landscapes and concomitant acquisition of technical
information, rather than consumption of resources on opinion letters
designed solely to be shields from enhanced damages. This
recalibration of the willfulness doctrine in line with modern tort
standards could, therefore, make it consistent with the patent law’s
disclosure function, rather than at odds with it.569
In addition, the foregoing analysis is not meant to suggest that every
time an infringer learned of a specific patent (or a set of patents) from
the eventual plaintiff, as opposed to from its own search, a detailed
analysis of the patents must be carried out to avoid the possibility of
treble damages under the recklessness prong of Halo.570 When, on the
one hand, the defendant is an end user lacking expertise in the
relevant industry, requiring a formal opinion letter would be highly
inefficient, for similar reasons that doing a patent search in the first
566

See generally supra Section I.E.
See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.
568 Professor Heald suggested that a diligent search could qualify the infringer for a
safe harbor from willfulness, a proposal with which I agree to the extent it can be
made consistent with Halo’s flexible inquiry. Heald, supra note 526, at 1191 (“[I]f the
infringing firm conducted a reasonable search prior to self-inventing, and yet failed to
find the invention, it seems clear that the damage award should not be augmented.”
(footnote omitted)); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Accidents and Aggregates, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14-20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960072
(discussing the concept of safe harbors in negligence law).
569 Cf. supra Section I.E.2 (discussing the importance of patent disclosure). To be
sure, if no reasonable invalidity or noninfringement positions could be cheaply
developed, the searcher would need to engage in licensing (or designing around the
patent) and, perhaps, litigation. I address this point immediately below and also infra
in Section IV.B.
570 Or, under the intent prong. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1923, 1931-32 (2016).
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place would also be inefficient for such an entity.571 On the other
hand, though, when a company accused of infringement already
employs technical experts who can meaningfully work with attorneys
to evaluate the relevance of patents brought to the company’s
attention, a relatively thorough analysis could be justified. In addition,
company size and resources should matter here as well. As Justice
Breyer suggested in his Halo concurrence, a small company might not
have the financial wherewithal needed for extensive patent analysis,
and could therefore be overdeterred by a rule allowing for ready
imposition of enhanced damages based on mere knowledge of patents
listed in a demand letter.572
A question remains with respect to the proper course of action once
it appears likely to the defendant that the patent at issue is valid and
infringed. As an initial matter, proceeding with the development of the
infringing product in these circumstances could potentially move the
defendant from the zone of recklessness to that of intent and “piracy”
under the subjective prong of Halo,573 though liability for patent
infringement is always somewhat probabilistic given uncertainties in
validity, claim construction, and so on.574 In any case, even when
infringement approaches the intentional category, efficiency
considerations are not completely irrelevant. In line with the
framework adopted by Lee and Melamed, the fact-finder could ask if
the intentionally-infringing defendant “could cost-effectively have
avoided infringement by negotiating a license ex ante but chose
instead to infringe.”575 Specifically, the fact-finder could evaluate
whether the defendant was already “locked-in” to using the infringing
product, or whether there was a reason that negotiating a license
would generate high transaction costs.576 If the costs of avoiding
infringement in these circumstances were high, a finding of willfulness
may be unwarranted — though perhaps, as I argue in the section that
follows, efficiency considerations in cases of intentional infringement
may be better addressed by a judge as opposed to a jury.

571

See supra Section IV.B.
Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
573 Id. at 1932 (majority opinion).
574 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 75 (2005).
575 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 441.
576 But cf. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1196 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that, even though activity before the issuance of the patent may have
“locked” the infringer in, it could still be liable for enhanced damages based on postissuance infringement); see Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1100-02.
572
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***
Combining the inquiries set forth in this section, the fact-finder
could generally assess the “reasonableness of the infringer’s failure to
negotiate a license ex ante in light of his or her assessment of the
strength of the infringement claim, the number of patents and patent
holders implicated by his or her product, and the cost of negotiating a
license,”577 as well as, of course, the cost of search. The ultimate
evaluative inquiry under the recklessness prong of Halo could be
phrased to a jury as follows: “The defendant acted despite there being
a substantial and unjustified risk of infringement that the defendant
had reason to be aware of and should have avoided.”578 If the factfinder concludes that the defendant acted in this manner and thus
determines that the infringer has deviated from reasonable behavior so
greatly as to enter the land of reckless conduct,579 the infringement
would be adjudged willful, and therefore eligible for enhanced
damages.
D. The Roles of Judge and Jury
Under the current approach to treble damages, jury verdicts of
willfulness have a quasi-advisory character.580 As with any jury
577

Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 462.
I thank Professor Alexander Sarch for suggesting this formulation. As noted
throughout this Part, the “should have avoided” decision would be based on the
likelihood of the detection of infringement, relative social costs and benefits of search,
and so on. Although the recklessness standard implemented through this jury
instruction is intended to follow tort law’s modular approach to economic efficiency,
see Smith, supra note 487 (discussing modularity in tort law), a judge’s decision
whether to enhance the damages at all, and by how much, might reflect more finegrained case-by-case determinations, see infra Section III.D.
579 See supra notes 507–14 and accompanying text.
580 I refer here to the judge’s ultimate decision to enhance damages, not to the
initial willfulness determination. A recent district court decision called the jury’s
willfulness conclusion itself advisory, which is a view that I do not believe to be
consistent with Federal Circuit authority. Compare Enplas Display Device Corp. v.
Seoul Semiconductor Co., No. 13-cv-05038 NC, 2016 WL 4208236, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2016) (“The Court approaches the jury finding as an advisory finding.”),
appeal docketed, No. 16-2599 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2016), with WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We do not interpret Halo as changing the
established law that the factual components of the willfulness question should be
resolved by the jury.”). But cf. Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., Nos. 2016-2315, 20162341, 2018 WL 1193529, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2018) (nonprecedential)
(suggesting that a judge can decide not to enhance damages without a jury
578
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determination, an infringer can challenge a verdict that an
infringement was willful via a motion for judgment as a matter of law
of no willfulness,581 but that is not the only way that the infringer can
avoid enhanced damages. The trial judge, in his or her discretion, has
the ultimate authority to award any amount ranging from no enhanced
damages to the full treble damages.582 Because the ultimate result of no
enhancement is therefore possible in spite of a jury finding of
willfulness, this division of authority renders the mechanics of treble
damages fairly protective of defendants. Indeed, in numerous district
court decisions since Halo, including Halo itself, trial judges declined
to award any enhanced damages in spite of jury findings of
willfulness.583
Even more so than the standard for jury determinations of
willfulness, the law governing the trial judge’s discretion with respect
to whether and how much to enhance damages has been in flux postconsideration of willfulness).
581 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
582 Grp. One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
583 See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., Nos. 14-CV-1296-JPS,
17-MC-49-JPS, 2017 WL 6759410, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 29, 2017) (noting that the
infringer “should have taken a license like every other competitor,” but declining to
enhance damages because “there is no reason to layer additional punishment atop this
error”), appeal docketed, No. 18-1516 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018); Saint Lawrence
Commc’ns LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 2:15-CV-351-JRG, 2017 WL 6268735, at
*2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2017); Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d
694, 698-99 (D. Del. 2017), further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16,
2018) (invalidating the patent at issue); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 3d 1087, 1092-95 (D. Nev. 2017); Convolve, Inc. v. Dell Inc., No. 2:08-CV-244RSP, 2017 WL 2463398, at *4-5 (D. Del. June 7, 2017), appeal docketed, 17-2335
(Fed. Cir. July 24, 2017); Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 285, 293-94 (D. Mass. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2021 (Fed. Cir. May
12, 2017); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 11-2686-JWL, 2017
WL 978107, at *12 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2017); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-05235-MMC, 2017 WL 130236, at *4-5 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 13, 2017); Sociedad Española de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue
Ridge X-Ray Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529-33 (W.D.N.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No.
17-1551 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2017); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, No. 13-cv0876-WJM-NYW, 2016 WL 6664619, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2016); Presidio
Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-cv-02061-H-BGS, 2016 WL
4377096, at *20-21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d in relevant part, 875 F.3d 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Enplas Display, 2016 WL 4208236, at *8; Trs. of Bos. Univ. v.
Everlight Elecs. Co., Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257-28 (D. Mass. 2016), appeal
docketed, No. 16-2591 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2016); cf. Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep
GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2017 WL 2190055, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
May 18, 2017) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (granting judgment as a matter of
law of no willfulness because the court “would not have enhanced damages even if the
jury had found Lilly’s infringement to be willful”).
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Halo. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, trial judges would
typically look to the factors enumerated in the well-known Federal
Circuit opinion in Read Corp v. Portec, Inc., including (1) “whether the
infringer deliberately copied the [patentee’s] ideas or design,”
including copying directly from the patent or from a patent’s
“commercial embodiment,” (2) “whether the infringer . . . investigated
the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was
invalid or that it was not infringed,” (3) “infringer’s behavior as a
party to the litigation,” (4) infringer’s “size and financial condition,”
(5) “closeness of the case,” (6) “duration of the defendant’s
misconduct,” (7) “remedial action by the defendant,” (8) “defendant’s
motivation for harm,” and (9) “whether defendant attempted to
conceal its misconduct.”584 After Halo, though, some courts have
begun to de-emphasize the Read factors, maintaining instead that
“they are not dispositive of the issue at hand” because Halo held that
that “there is no precise rule or formula for awarding damages under
§ 284” and that “the touchstone for awarding enhanced damages after
Halo is egregiousness.”585 Although it is difficult to draw
generalizations less than two years after Halo was decided, trial judges
appear to treat egregiousness as a kind of overarching requirement for
awarding enhanced damages that they must enforce after the patentee
proves to the jury that the infringer acted willfully.586
Whatever the exact relationship between the jury willfulness
standard and the trial judge enhancement standard,587 the inquiries
overlap to some extent. For example, a good-faith belief of invalidity
or noninfringement is likely relevant to the former as well as the latter,
584

970 F.2d 816, 827 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Sociedad Española, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 532; see also Imperium IP
Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 755, 763 (E.D. Tex.
2016) (“While the Read factors remain helpful to the Court’s execution of its
discretion, an analysis focused on ‘egregious infringement behavior’ is the touchstone
for determining an award of enhanced damages rather than a more rigid, mechanical
assessment.”), amended in part, 2017 WL 1716589 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2133 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2017).
586 Cf. Presidio Components, 875 F.3d at 1382-83 (affirming this approach); Alfred
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Res. v. Cochlear Corp., 841 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(remanding to the district court to “consider whether [the defendant’s] infringement
‘constituted an “egregious case[ ] of misconduct beyond typical infringement”
meriting enhanced damages under § 284 and, if so, the appropriate extent of the
enhancement’” (quoting WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d
1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1923, 1934 (2016)) (alteration in original))).
587 See generally Mitchell G. Stockwell, Who Decides Enhanced Damages?, 45 AIPLA
Q.J. 645 (2017).
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even for courts that have replaced or supplemented the Read factors
with the more amorphous “egregiousness” determination. Given the
significance that Halo assigned to subjectively culpable behaviors and
the Court’s mention of “motive or intent,” the “motivation for harm”
factor likewise remains significant for both inquiries.588 Some of the
other factors, such as the defendant’s size and financial condition, may
not currently be relevant for the first, jury inquiry step. Under the
framework I propose, though, this factor would be adapted to the
recklessness inquiry by way of acknowledging the defendant’s specific
circumstances and resource constraints, and queries captured in some
of the remaining Read factors should also come into play at this, first
stage of the willfulness inquiry. Thus, the fact that a product was
copied would matter to the question whether the infringer was
willfully blind, and concealment of misconduct would be probative of
the difficulty of detection.
Are such duplicative inquiries necessary? Perhaps not: for one thing,
the litigation process would be more efficient if the trial judge
performed the entirety of the treble damages analysis. In addition, the
risk of prejudicing the defendant’s jury case for no infringement
liability with matter related to willfulness, which may be
inflammatory, would be reduced.589 Some textual support for the trial
judge’s plenary role in the treble damages determination exists in the
statute, which declares that “the court shall” assess compensatory
damages if they are “not found by a jury,” but also states that “the
court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed” without mentioning a possible role of the jury for that
decision.590 Nonetheless, complete elimination of the jury’s role in
awarding enhanced damages would be so at odds with common-law
principles that, given the statute’s ambiguous language, an
interpretation that puts enhancement under § 284 entirely in the
hands of trial judges should be disfavored.591 And, in this Article, I
588

Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
See Daniel Harris Brean & Bryan P. Clark, Casting Aspersions in Patent Trials, 79
U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929055; see also
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1108-19 (considering but tentatively rejecting the
possibility of bifurcation of patent trials into separate proceedings to determine
liability and willfulness).
590 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018); see Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d
1357, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
591 See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424
(2001) (addressing the somewhat constrained but nonetheless pervasive role of juries
in the determination of punitive damages in tort).
589
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take § 284 as it exists today as a given and aim to develop an
interpretation of this section that is as accurate as possible without
also violating the limits set by Halo.
Moreover, there is virtue in involving both jury and judge in the
enhanced damages determination. For one thing, the presence of two
separate decision-makers who are not required to defer to one another
may help ensure that “enhanced damages are not . . . meted out in a
typical infringement case.”592 For another, the current structure gives
the judge the ability to modulate the amount of enhanced damages
based on the severity of the infringer’s conduct, considerations of
efficiency and deterrence specific to the circumstances of the case,
and, perhaps, even based on the judge’s conclusion that the
compensatory damages award is sufficiently severe that little or no
enhancement is needed to ensure that the infringer is “punished.”593
In addition, while the considerations taken into account by judge and
jury might be similar, the dual decision-maker structure ensures that
the relevant factors (for example, concealment and probability of
detection) could be profitably used for both evaluating the infringing
conduct generally and for fine-tuning the actual amount of
enhancement. In all, the decision structure ensures that sanctions that
are sometimes described as “extraordinary” are awarded with care as
to both eligibility for the award and its actual amount.594
One specific form of possible judicial modulation might involve
differentiation in the amount of damages based on whether the
conduct at issue is intentional or in “bad faith” as opposed to merely
reckless. There is a great deal of precedent for awarding lower
enhanced damages where the defendant acted in a way that is “worse
than negligent but less than malicious,”595 in the old “intentional
harm” sense of “malice.”596 Judges assessing enhanced damages may
592

Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
See, e.g., Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 (D.
Del. 2017) (“[G]iven that the jury’s damages award is already the largest damages
verdict ever returned in a patent trial (compensating Idenix for what it lost),
additional sanction is just not warranted.” (emphasis removed)), further proceedings,
2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the patent at issue); Brigham &
Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D. Mass. 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2021 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2017) (declining to award any enhanced
damages where compensatory damages were “at the high end of the damages
sought”).
594 See, e.g., Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th
Cir. 1982).
595 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 510 (2008).
596 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text.
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well decide to follow this distinction, generally awarding, say, an
amount closer to double damages for the former but closer to treble
damages for the latter.597 To aid in this analysis, a jury could be asked
to indicate whether the infringement was reckless or intentional on a
special verdict form, or a judge could decide whether the facts
supporting a jury’s decision to open the door for enhanced damages
allow for the conclusion of intentional conduct or that which is merely
reckless.598
Still, in keeping with his or her ultimate ability to exercise
discretion, the trial judge could further modulate the amount of
enhanced damages to account for the case’s circumstances. Thus,
when the intentional infringer is an end user of technology rather than
a manufacturer working in a relevant field, the judge could decide to
award a relatively small amount of enhanced damages, or even none at
all, based on the efficiency rationales discussed earlier even if the jury
happens to find willfulness.599 This result would be consistent with
Halo because, in the context of the defendant’s intentional conduct,
the Court refers to “bad-faith infringement,”600 connoting more than
mere intent. Case law shows that bad faith could evince a desire to
exploit a disparity in resources or harm a competitor,601 but this
dynamic is typically not present in the end-user infringer scenario:
The customer who bought the product and used it as intended, even
in the face of a demand letter, is no pirate.602 Conversely, an infringer
adjudged to be willfully blind to its competitor’s patents might have to
end up paying relatively high damages even though its acts were not
597 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
“where the maximum amount is imposed . . . [t]he court’s assessment of the level of
culpability must be high”); see also Polara Eng’g, Inc. v. Campbell Co., 237 F. Supp.
3d 956, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“Trebling damages is reserved for the cases at the most
egregious end of the spectrum.”), appeal docketed, No. 17-1974 (Fed. Cir. May 1,
2017).
598 See, e.g., Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., 867 F.3d 1229, 1245-46
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming an award of enhanced damages in the amount of
$1,000,000 in addition to compensatory damages of $1,541,333 based on “the degree
of willfulness”).
599 See supra notes 524–25, 570–71 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amici
Curiae Internet Companies in Support of Respondents at 12, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (Nos. 14-1513, 14-1520), 2016 WL 344490, at *12.
600 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 n.* (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964)).
601 See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
602 Cf. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33; see also Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and
Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 625 n.376.
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intentional.603 This approach is consistent with Halo, which held that
“courts should continue to take into account the particular
circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and
in what amount.”604
IV. OBJECTIONS
The proposed framework is open to several related objections that I
have already alluded to in the previous Parts. The objections concern
increased costs of litigation and adjudication for the expanded
recklessness inquiry, raise the possibility that — particularly in cases
of independent invention — the proposed standard will overdeter
potential infringers, and, finally, question whether harm from patent
infringement is as worthy of social concern as harm from other torts,
so that standards for enhanced patent damages should be structured in
such a way as to make that remedy as difficult to obtain as possible. I
consider each in turn.
A. Litigation and Adjudication Costs
Looking into the adequacy of a patent search, or attempting to argue
(and decide) whether a non-search was reckless, might consume
significant resources of courts and litigants. One ready answer to this
objection, however, is that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
Seagate standard in Halo reflects an attitude that the lower courts do
not get to create standards lacking support in the common law even
though such standards might reduce litigation costs. The Court
explained that “respondents’ policy concerns,” including worries
about increased “threat of litigation,” nonetheless “cannot justify
imposing an artificial construct such as the Seagate test on the

603 See supra Section III.A. Professor Gregory Day reached a contrary conclusion,
contending that infringing use of the patents by the patentee’s competitors might be
desirable because of the resulting consumer benefits. See Gregory Day, Competition
and Piracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2904373. Professor Day’s approach is generally difficult to reconcile with Halo.
Nonetheless, one can imagine circumstances in which the social benefits of infringing
conduct, even if intentional, so outweigh the value of the enforcement of the
patentee’s property interests that enhanced damages may not be warranted. See, e.g.,
Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703-04 (D. Del. 2017),
further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the patent
at issue); cf. David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791
(2013).
604 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
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discretion conferred under § 284.”605 Halo is not the only case in
which the Supreme Court took this position. In SCA Hygiene, again
reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court sidestepped “policy
arguments” for preserving the defense of laches against claims for
damages for past infringement after adopting the general argument
that “patent law is governed by the same common-law principles,
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other
areas of civil litigation.”606 Administrative cost savings cannot
vindicate statutory interpretations that are not correct.607
Moreover, with time, the costs of the recklessness analysis could be
controlled, and the new standard could generate dynamic benefits. As
discussed earlier, judicial decisions may establish recurring patterns of
acceptable amount of search in specific industries that would make
subsequent cases cheaper to litigate and adjudicate.608 Ideally, tailored
standards that encourage cost-effective, reasonable searching would
also facilitate transfer of technical information usable to industry
participants, rather that expenditures on patent opinions crafted
primarily for litigation.609 Another, related benefit of more thorough
patent searches could be avoidance of costly litigation when a potential
infringer, after coming across a patent to which it has no plausible
defense of noninfringement or invalidity, designs out the infringing
feature or gets a license from the patentee.610
B. Overdeterrence
Another (and related) potential set of concerns relates to delay in
innovative activity, or even potential abandonment of it, based on the
possibility of increased exposure to enhanced damages.611 The

605

Id. at 1935.
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct.
954, 964 (2017) (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods.,
LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Hughes, J., dissenting)).
607 Cf. Narechania, supra note 212 (manuscript at 24); see also Lee, supra note 16.
608 See supra Section III.B.
609 See supra notes 568–69 and accompanying text.
610 Abramowicz, supra note 88, at 252, 257-63; see also id. at 250 (“[A] legal
determination of infringement represents our system’s conclusion that the social costs
of the unlicensed infringing activity exceed the social benefits, and so there are no
other factors to take account in the balance.”); Oskar Liivak, Private Law and the
Future of Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 33, 50-52 (2017).
611 See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1936-37 (2016)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
606
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existence of patents of uncertain validity and scope612 exacerbates
these concerns, raising the prospect of undue holdup of innovation,
mounting legal expenses, and perhaps nuisance-value settlements.613
The concerns are weighty but, again, they can be addressed by
industry-specific rules that would reduce or minimize search
responsibilities in industries in which such lower-quality patents are
more likely to be found.614 In contrast, in fields with higher-quality
patents, deterrence of infringement, or at least attention to the patent
rights of others, is what we want to see. In those fields, patents play
their intended role of protecting innovators even against independent,
but later-arriving, inventors. In this context, patent search could play
the socially valuable functions reducing duplicative work and, in turn,
spurring design-arounds or even facilitating bargaining over, and
eventual licensing of, patent rights.615 The actual knowledge rule, in
contrast, is much less effective at achieving this sort of tailoring.
In addition, even under the proposed standard, enhanced damages
would not be imposed gratuitously. The two layers of review ensure
that, to be liable for a significant enhancement, the infringer had to —
consistent with Halo — have done something out of the ordinary.616
An infringer who can point to the fact that it performed a search and
analysis at the level close to what is generally expected in the relevant
industry would be very unlikely to face enhanced monetary liability
from a reasonable jury or, failing that, a judge. Recklessness, even in
its more objective forms, is still a demanding standard that requires
the plaintiff to show some serious misconduct on the losing
defendant’s part, and there are procedural protections as well. Indeed,
even if the defendant engaged in intentional conduct that, according
to the trial judge, should nonetheless not be sanctioned with enhanced
damages, this form of liability could still be avoided.617 Given the
612 On overdeterrence due to legal uncertainty, see generally Louis Kaplow, Burden
of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012). See also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984);
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). On this problem in the patent context, see Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 574.
613 See Means, supra note 386; see also Lemley, supra note 235, at 28.
614 See supra Section III.B.
615 See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(finding no willfulness where the defendant made a good-faith attempt to design
around the patent).
616 Cf. supra note 583 and cases therein (collecting cases where the trial judge
decided not to enhance damages in spite of the jury finding of willfulness).
617 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703-04 (D. Del.
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numerous ways that a defendant can escape liability for enhanced
damages, the risk of overdeterrence may not be as high as was feared
in the wake of Halo.618
C. Harm from Patent Infringement
The final objection I consider stems from the claim that the harm
from patent infringement is so different from harm from other kinds
of torts that arguments for damages enhancements from other areas of
civil litigation do not apply to patent law. For example, products
liability torts result in physical injury, trespasses to land could cause
physical damage to the land and trigger violent self-help, and
negligence claims, likewise, often stem from harm to person or
property.619 In contrast, harm from infringement is internal to patent
law: nothing is actually destroyed by an infringement, and no one is
hurt. If anything, the infringement can increase social welfare by
diminishing deadweight loss via increased competition in some
product market.620 Why then, should we worry about “reckless
indifference” with respect to patent infringement?
In responding to this objection, one notes as an initial matter that
there is not an absolute actual damages or physical injury requirement
for enhanced damages in civil litigation either. Punitive damages may
lie even when the trespasser causes no actual harm621 or when only
nominal damages are awarded under various federal statutory torts.622
Moreover, punitive damages for trespassory torts have been granted
even when the possibility of violent self-help was not in the picture.623
Finally, as discussed earlier, punitive damages can be awarded for torts
2017), further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the
patent at issue).
618 See Puknys & Xu, supra note 284.
619 Cf. supra notes 376–88 and accompanying text.
620 I thank Dr. Erik Hovenkamp and Professor Stephen Yelderman for discussions
that crystallized as this objection. For a similar tension in copyright law, see Gordon,
supra note 296. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Models: On
Not Mistaking for the Right Hand What the Left Hand Is Doing, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND
ECONOMICS 311 (Giovanni B. Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds., 2016); Wendy J.
Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW, supra note 261, at 452-83.
621 See, e.g., Feld v. Feld, 783 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2011); Rhodes v. Harwood,
544 P.2d 147 (Or. 1975). See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein,
Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1832-35 (2009).
622 Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 159-63 (5th Cir. 2008).
623 See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 872-73 (8th Cir.
2008).

2018]

Enhancing Patent Damages

1539

causing injuries that are strictly financial, such as negligent
misrepresentation624 or tortious interference with contract — for
latter, even in the circumstances where the breach itself might
arguably be “efficient.”625
By way of another response, the very claim that “actual injury” in
patent law is not possible is subject to challenge. The remedy of lost
profits recoverable by a prevailing plaintiff practicing the infringed
patent is treated as providing for actual damages based on the fact that
the infringing market entrant interferes with the patentee’s ability to
charge supracompetitive prices enabled by the patent.626 It is true that
the claim for a so-called “injury” of lost profits is only possible
because of the existence of a patent right. But that does not
differentiate patent law from many other torts: A suit seeking
compensation for a tortious financial injury associated with a lost
contract depends on the existence of the tort of interference with
contract, a claim for damages based on trespass only exists because we
have trespassory torts, and so on.627 Patent law is not unique in this
regard.
Nor is patent law unique in allowing enhanced damages when the
only compensation for the patentee involves reasonable royalties as
opposed to lost profits.628 In the intellectual property domain,
enhanced damages (in the form of elevated statutory damages) are
awarded without proof of lost profits for copyright infringement
and,629 as already noted, no actual injury is required to collect
compensatory or punitive damages for trespass. That is not to say that
a recklessness or enhancement determination cannot turn on the fact
that the patentee and infringer are competitors who are both
practicing the patent — it certainly can.630 But a rule mandating that
enhanced damages should be very difficult to obtain when the
compensable injury is the loss of reasonable royalties would make
patent law an outlier.

624

See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text.
See McChesney, supra note 387.
626 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 394.
627 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
628 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (setting “a reasonable royalty” as the floor of
compensatory damages).
629 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).
630 Cf. Dov Greenbaum, In re Seagate: Did it Really Fix the Waiver Issue? A Short
Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting from the Use of a Counsel’s Opinion Letter as a
Defense to Willful Infringement, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 184 (2008) (noting
treble damages as a motivation for patent trolls).
625
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Finally, awards of enhanced damages for harm from patent
infringement under similar standards as for other torts can be
generally justified as a matter of policy. Consider the lost profits
scenario first. Competition between firms, even based on copying, can
often be good for consumers and worth encouraging,631 but it can also
be socially harmful — as when, for example, the patent owner ends up
losing market share to the competitor, is unable to recoup its
investments through the exclusive right of the patent, and ends up
having to fold.632 An even less socially desirable scenario could
eventuate when a larger, well-resourced firm uninterested in doing
innovative work ignores the patent of a smaller, upstart competitor
who might not have resources to bring a lawsuit. As with any other
tort, infringement of a patent can sometimes be socially harmful to the
extreme, necessitating an award of enhanced damages in reckless
disregard scenarios.
The social harm when an infringement does not involve a claim for
lost profits is more attenuated,633 but it is still possible. The patent
system exists to encourage innovation and, for its ex ante incentive
mechanism to work, inventors — who may be prospective patentees
— need to see that valid and infringed patents can be effectively
enforced.634 An infringer who just does not want to pay for patent
licenses even when the costs of patent search, analysis, and
negotiation are low and the patentee would have been willing to
engage could, at least in theory, seriously harm innovation via
negative dynamic effects on future activities of the inventor of the
asserted patent or of other, future inventors.635

631 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-53, 15657 (1989).
632 See supra Section I.C.2.
633 Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 252-53 (2006)
(contending that patent remedies should differ for practicing as opposed to nonpracticing entities because each incurs a different kind of harm).
634 See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 6, at 540 (“[T]he exclusionary rights afforded by
patents promote a more optimal level of innovation by providing greater incentives to
innovators to invent, market, and sell innovative products, as well as to disclose the
knowledge underlying those innovations in the form of published patent
documents.”); see also id. at 532-33 (“[T]he patentholder is more akin to a private
attorney general, paid via the enforcement of his right as a reward for benefitting the
public, than a vindicator of his own private rights.”).
635 Cf. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 425;
Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 762 & n.107
(2012) (discussing similar dynamic effects in the context of mistaken patent denials at
the PTO or invalidation of issued patents).
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It is true, as Professor Ted Sichelman argued, that patent law’s
remedial frameworks, which are focused on private harm, are not set
up to directly serve larger social goals of this sort.636 But enhanced
damages are, in fact, one remedy for which some consideration of
societal harms, as opposed to merely private ones, is possible even
presently in civil litigation.637 Indeed, even Professor Thomas Colby,
who argued that consideration of societal harms in the calculation of
punitive damages is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s constitutional
precedents, noted that “by punishing the private wrong to the victim,
punitive damages achieve a deterrent effect that benefits all of
society.”638 If properly calibrated, treble damages in patent law can
serve this role just as enhanced damages can in other areas of civil
litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge limit on enhanced damages
in patent law fails to reflect modern common-law developments.
Moreover, it undermines the goals of economic efficiency and is in
tension with the goals of the patent system. Finally, the rule arguably
contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Instead of the actual knowledge
rule, the recklessness standard for enhanced damages, accepted widely
in other areas of law, belongs in patent law as well.

636

See generally Sichelman, supra note 6.
Cf. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, supra note 3.
638 Cf. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 462.
637

